310/7–1650: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India
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71. For the Ambassador from Rusk. Urtel 1001 received here late Sunday night. Ind Amb sees Sec Monday morning,2 probably to inform us of Stalin’s reply. Since Nehru’s message to Acheson was very short, we have considered replying very briefly in event early publication of exchange becomes necessary and to follow our short reply with long personal and confidential message from Pres or Sec giving full background and flavor our views present world situation. Urtel 100 contains excellent material for longer message but we have doubts about using it for formal reply. If public reply should contain much argumentation, Nehru might feel compelled to continue public debate on points of disagreement in order not to let silence give consent or let “points” stand against him.
We have in mind following short formal reply and would greatly appreciate your judgment soonest as to (1) whether we are right in replying so briefly for public record and (2) whether you consider our text would be helpful.
Text follows:
“My dear Mr. PM: I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose which prompted ur Excellency in sending the message which I received on July 13, 1950 through ur distinguished Amb in Wash. Both the Pres and I have given the most searching consideration to ur appeal for the US to exert such influence and authority as it may have for the maintenance of peace and for the preservation of the solidarity of the UN.
“One of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the US is to assist in maintaining world peace and the Govt of the US is firmly of the opinion that the UN is the most effective instrument [Page 407] yet devised for preventing the outbreak of war. The US is, therefore, eager to do all that is proper and possible to preserve and strengthen the UN.
“The purpose of the US Govt and of the Amer people with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal the determination of the UN to repel the armed attack upon Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area. We desire not only to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea but to end it—as required by the SC of the UN.
“We are deeply convinced that law-abiding Govts and peoples throughout the world have a vital stake in the issues involved in this aggression and in the success of the United Nations in dealing with it. It is painful to realize that there could have long since been a restoration of peace and the saving of the lives of those fighting on behalf of the United Nations had not certain Members of the United Nations failed to meet their obligations under the Charter and refused to use their authority and influence to prevent or stop the hostilities.
“We do not believe that the termination of the Korean aggression can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other questions which are currently before the United Nations. A breach of the peace or an act of aggression is the most serious matter with which the SC can be confronted. It has shown that it is both competent and willing to act vigorously for the maintenance of peace. There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Union itself.
“In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China’s seat in the UN is one which must be taken by the UN on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the UN. I know you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the UN to coercion and duress.
“I wish to assure your Excellency of our earnest desire to see an early restoration of peace in Korea and elsewhere and of our eagerness to work with you and your great country to establish in the UN a means by which the fear of aggression can be permanently lifted from the peoples of the earth.”