Subject: Communication from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary
Sir Oliver left the attached communication from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary.
It is in answer to the Secretary’s communication to Mr. Bevin delivered by
Mr. Douglas on July 11.
He said he had been asked to point out that the other members of the
Commonwealth, they believed, took much the same attitude as that indicated
in this communication. However, they wanted to make it perfectly clear that
they had not consulted the Commonwealth in connection with this
communication and that this communication represented U.K. views.
[Annex]
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State
I am very glad to have the detailed and frank exposition of the U.S. view
on the Korean situation and the implications arising from it which were
communicated to me in your Ambassador’s letter of the 11th July. I have
already sent you a message to this effect through Oliver Franks.
I should also like you to know that we fully realise here how onerous is
the duty which the United States have so readily assumed in Korea. We
are all indeed indebted to the U.S. for their prompt action in coming to
the assistance of the Korean Republic and recognise how heavy an
additional burden has been added to the world-wide responsibilities of
the U.S. Government.
I should like first of all to remove any misapprehension about the
purpose of the message which I sent to you on the 7th July through
Oliver Franks, and to which Mr. Douglas conveyed your answer on the 11th
July. It was never in my mind, when I asked what the U.S. view would be
in the event of the Soviet Union asking a price in return for using
their influence with the North Koreans, to suggest that a bargain was
desirable. We are just as determined not to submit to Soviet blackmail
as you are. I want to make it quite clear that we could not agree with
you more wholeheartedly when you say that you have faced squarely a
calculated act of aggression. We ourselves, and I think the whole
right-thinking world, appreciate to the full the stand which the U.S.
Government have taken in Korea on behalf of us all. I think it essential
to remove any misunderstanding before we discuss, as I hope we can
dispassionately, the two questions of Formosa and our attitude towards
China where clearly there has been a difference in our thinking.
I know that I can explain without troubling our relationship exactly why
we have been very seriously worried here about the implications of the
President’s declaration about Formosa. I am sorry that it was not
possible for you, no doubt owing to the speed of events, to consult us
in advance on a step which is of such close concern to us, particularly
in view of the undertakings we exchanged when you and I met in
Washington last September1 and again
in London in May to consult on matters affecting China. We are, as you
know in a very vulnerable position in Hong Kong, and we have vast
Chinese communities in Malaya where we have a long drawn campaign on our
hands. You know our views on China and that our aim remains that
[Page 397]
China should not go
irrevocably into the Soviet camp and be lost permanently to the Western
world. The President’s declaration on Formosa evidently has an impact on
all these situations, and it therefore cannot be said to affect the U.S.
alone.
As I see it the possibilities of the Formosa situation are as follows. If
the Central Peoples’ Government take heed of the President’s declaration
and abandon any attempt to invade Formosa and thus avoid an armed clash
with the United States Forces, no very serious consequences may ensue.
But the Central Peoples’ Government have addressed a communication to
the Security Council stating their intention to “liberate” Formosa
whatever the United States may do, and though this may only be bravado,
it may be unwise to assume that no attempt to stage an invasion will be
made. If an attempt is made we must, in view of the position taken by
the President in his statement of the 27th June, expect hostilities
between the Forces of the United States and those of the Central
Peoples’ Government. We consider that the consequences of such a clash
would be very grave. They might lead to an extension of the conflict.
Even if that does not happen it is not improbable that Russia would
appeal to the Security Council and accuse the United States of
aggression. While no doubt you have considered this, and would have a
good case I am concerned lest the solidarity of the support you now have
should not be maintained in these circumstances. The Russians will of
course, be out to make mischief.
I recognize that you attach great strategic importance to Formosa. What I
am anxious to avoid is that we should give the Russians a chance to
divide Asia from the West on an Asian problem. I really think there has
been some misinterpretation of what the President said about Formosa and
of course the Russians are doing their best to encourage this. Maybe the
President in his own inimitable way could say something to remove any
misapprehension by making it clear that the final disposal of Formosa is
an open question which should be settled on its merits when the time
comes, and that nothing which has been said or done implied any decision
to go back on the position as set out in the Cairo declaration. I
realise the delicacy of this matter.
Your communication to me deals in some detail with the question of
Chinese (and Russian) representation in the United Nations. As already
explained, I only raised this question in my message to you because of
the likelihood that the Russians would put it forward as part of a
bargain, and I am in entire agreement with you that we cannot bargain on
the Korean issue. We should refuse to discuss with the Soviet Union the
question of Chinese representation in the United Nations as part of the
Korean problem. In other words, Russia must come back and take her place
in the United Nations and, in order to
[Page 398]
give a sense of security to the world, must
renounce the practice by which one nation can claim to prevent the
United Nations from working. The question of Chinese representation does
not therefore seem to me to arise at this present stage, though I shall
be very glad in due course to give you our views on the questions which
you put.
You have elaborated to me at length the attitude of the U.S. Government
towards China, and their reasons for that attitude. I do not think that
we should necessarily find ourselves in full agreement with all your
statements, but that is not the point which I want to make. You know our
policy towards China, and I think it is the right policy. On the
question of recognition you and we have differed, but I did think that,
as a result of the official talks in London in May, we were agreed that
we did not want to see China irrevocably alien ted from the West. What I
am afraid of is that the present situation will, if we are not careful,
push China further and further in the direction of the Soviet Union. On
our information China, though reacting violently to your declaration on
Formosa, has committed herself no more than Russia has over Korea, and I
should doubt if she wishes to become involved in that conflict. I should
also doubt whether, for the present, she would embark on adventures
further afield apart from Formosa, although we cannot afford to
disregard that possibility. But I think we must be careful not to accuse
China of what she has not yet done, or to give her the impression that
she is already so much beyond the pale that she has no hope of
re-establishing her position with the West. Once she becomes convinced
that the Western Powers will have nothing to do with her, she will turn
even more to the Soviet Union, who will be out to exploit such a
tendency to our detriment and we may find that we have aligned against
us a Power whose influence in Asia, for good or evil, is bound to have a
profound effect upon the course of events. This is a question of vital
concern to us because of our position in Hongkong and Malaya. It is also
of vital concern to all Asian countries, who are very conscious of
it.
Therefore I say that we must be very careful not to add China to our
enemies by any actions or attitudes of ours. If China eventually
demonstrates by practical evidence that she will in no circumstances
co-operate with the free world; if she takes her seat in the United
Nations and behaves in precisely the same way as the Soviet Union has in
the past, then at any rate it will be clear to Asian as well as to other
Nations what she is and where she stands. I do think it is important
that we should not put ourselves in a position where it can be alleged
that, but for some action of ours, China would not have gone irrevocably
into the Soviet Communist camp. I will now try to summarise my
views.
[Page 399]
I think that the governing factor in our politico-strategic policy should
be to localise the Korean conflict and attempt to prevent it from
spreading. I think that this objective would be helped by some public
clarification regarding Formosa and by the adoption of policy towards
China which would not press her to the point where still closer
association with the Soviet Union would appear to her to be her only
course.
If you agree with this I should hope that we could find common ground on
the following points.
The first is that the aggression in Korea must be repelled and North
Korean Troops must go back to the 38th parallel.
The second is that there can be no submitting to Soviet blackmail, but
that Russia’s right course is, as said above, to come back and take her
place in the United Nations, having renounced the practice of holding up
the work of the United Nations by the action of one Nation.
Thirdly the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations
should be considered in the United Nations and not in relation to any
possible Soviet blackmail connected with Korea. In any case as a matter
of practice I cannot believe that the necessary majority for the
changeover at the United Nations could be secured so long as the Korean
conflict lasts, even if any Power were to attempt to push it at the
United Nations.
I hope that this exchange of correspondence will help to clarify the
position and that we may continue our exchanges through our respective
Ambassadors in an endeavour to remedy any weakness in the common front
against Soviet expansion. My hope is that in the end we may arrive at an
agreed policy. If our policies are somewhat divergent in the meanwhile,
I think it very important that the United States and Britain should do
their best not to take opposing lines in any statements we have to make
to third Powers or publicly, and that we should make sure that these
divergencies do not prejudice the future. The forthcoming talks in
Washington will, I hope, help to clear our minds in certain important
respects, but I should like to think that this will not be an isolated
event but that we shall get ever closer together on Far Eastern
questions.
