795.00/7–1450
Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
secret
[Washington,] July 14, 1950.
Since I understand thought is being given in the Policy Planning Staff to the desirability of a present public commitment on the part of the U.S. to permit the North Koreans anytime they wish to retreat in good order and re-form behind the 38th Parallel,1 I give you briefly my views as follows:
- 1.
- The 38th Parallel was never intended to be, and never ought to be, a political line. The United Nations, has, from the beginning, insisted that equity and justice require a united Korea. The 38th Parallel, if perpetuated as a political line and as providing asylum to the aggressor, is bound to perpetuate friction and ever-present danger of new war. If we have the opportunity to obliterate the line as a political division, certainly we should do so in the interest of “peace and security in the area”. (U.N. Resolution)
- 2.
- I would think that, from a national standpoint, it would be folly to allow the North Korean army to retire in good order with its armor and equipment and re-form behind the 38th Parallel from whence it could attack again the now ravaged and Weakened Republic of Korea. To permit that would mean either the exposure of the Republic of Korea to greater peril than preceded the June 25th attack or the maintenance by the United States of a large military establishment to contain the North Korean Army at the 38th Parallel. The North Korean Army should be destroyed, if we have the power to destroy it, even if this requires pursuit beyond the 38th Parallel. That is the only way to remove the menace.
- 3.
- Neither equity nor good sense dictates that an unprovoked act of aggression should occur without risk of loss to the aggressor. If there can be armed aggression under conditions such that failure involves no permanent loss, then that puts a premium on aggression. There must be a penalty to such wrong-doing unless we want to encourage its repetition.
- 4.
- I do not suggest that we should at this time make any public declaration of intention. Perhaps expediency would make it wise to stop at the 38th Parallel. But I believe strongly that we should not now tie our hands by a public statement precluding the possibility of our forces, if victorious, being used to forge a new Korea which would include at least most of the area north of the 38th Parallel.
- We should preserve our freedom to act in the way that seems best at the time when a decision is practically needed. That may be months hence and no one can now know the then surrounding circumstances.
- 5.
- I would not suppose that a united Korea would necessarily include the North Kanyo [North Hamgyong] Province, which runs up to the neighborhood of Vladivostok or the North Heian [North Pyangan] Province, which borders on the Yalu River. But most of Korea could be, and should be, united without this involving any territorial threat to the Soviet Union. Also, any reuniting should involve U.N. auspicies, not merely U.S. unilateral action.