Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795B.5/7–1350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

confidential

[Washington,] July 13, 1950.

Subject: Korean Blockade

Participants:	Mr. Ford, British Embassy1
	Mr. Johnson, Department of State, NA.

Yesterday I called Mr. Graves of the British Embassy and told him that I would like to discuss with him, or anyone else in the Embassy that he might designate in the absence of Mr. Fossett who is in New York, the subject of the Korean blockade. He stated that he would have Mr. Ford see me. This morning Mr. Ford called and said that in the meanwhile they had received a communication from the Foreign Office, and arranged to see me at 11:30.

Mr. Ford handed me the attached memorandum.² After a hurried reading, I informed him, that without presuming to speak on all of the technical legal aspects, it appeared that the general approach of the Foreign Office was very closely allied to ours and that I could see no points of major disagreement in the first two pages. With regard to page 3 which contains the suggestion that General MacArthur, in his new capacity, formally should declare the existence of a blockade, I informed Mr. Ford that we, ourselves, had given careful consideration to this idea but had rejected it as we felt that there was ample justification under the Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27 for the President’s declaration. Therefore, we did not feel it necessary to take any additional action which might even imply that there was not a sound legal basis for the President’s declaration.

I then informed Mr. Ford of our plan to include in our first report to the Security Council, under paragraph 6 of the Security Council Resolution of July 7, our action to prevent aid being given to the North Korean authorities including the prevention of ingress to and egress from Korean ports.³ I said that we hoped that like-minded members of the United Nations would take any necessary action themselves to prevent their nationals or ships giving aid to the North Koreans. In reply to his query, I informed Mr. Ford that the United States had already taken administrative action to prevent any shipments from the United States to North Korea. Mr. Ford stated that while as a practical matter it was his understanding that no British shipments were being made to North Korea it would probably require legislative action to actually embargo such shipments.

I then informed Mr. Ford,-in absolute confidence, of the limits of patrol of the Korean coast and the instructions to the patrolling vessels with regard to Soviet vessels. I stated that in the view of the limited patrol of the coast, it was our view that the only possible legal question that could arise with regard to the blockade would be its effectiveness, and that, at the worst, we could possibly lose a lawsuit. In the meanwhile supplies were being kept from North Korea.

In reply to Mr. Ford’s query concerning the possible establishment of prize courts in Japan, I said that we have not gone into this subject but preliminarily it would appear highly doubtful whether this could be done, and it was my understanding that it would be necessary for any prizes captured by American vessels to be brought into the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court for adjudication. Mr. Ford said that it was his tentative understanding that under British law prize courts were a matter for the Admiralty and that he thought there was a possibility that prizes could be adjudicated without necessity of their being brought within British territorial jurisdiction.

I told Mr. Ford that I would refer the memorandum from the Foreign Office to the Legal Section of the Department and would inform him as soon as possible of their comments. Mr. Ford stated that he would immediately refer our views on the blockade to the Foreign Office and inform us as soon as a reply has been received. I assured Mr. Ford of our desire to confer freely with them on these questions as they arose and to keep them informed of our views.⁴

1. Joseph F. Ford, First Secretary, British Embassy.
2. Not printed.
3. The text of the first report from General MacArthur was released and read on July 25, at the 477th Security Council meeting; see U.N. document S/PV.477.
4. For the text of the reply by the Department of State on August 2 to the British note of July 13, see p. 516.