330/7–1150: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received July 11—8:43 p. m.]
65. 1. I saw Bajpai, SG MEA, this morning at his request. He showed me copy of telegram dated July 10 from Pannikar, Indian Ambassador to China, setting forth substance of conversation between Pannikar and Chinese Communist Vice MFA and copy of GOI reply thereto of July 11, and suggested US Government might be interested in contents these two messages. I said I would be glad telegraph Department but must admit I always disliked relying on my memory in conveying to my government with accuracy contents of important documents which I had not had opportunity carefully to study. He promised to send copies to Embassy as soon as they could be made. Copies have been received and texts are set forth in subsequent telegram No. 66 of July 11.1
[Page 366]2. After I had read two documents, Bajpai again argued with great earnestness importance of early admittance of Chinese into SC. He said he saw little hope of resolving Korean conflict or of preventing its spread unless China and USSR could begin participating in proceedings of SC. Statements made by Peiping Vice Minister seemed to him to be encouraging. He was relieved to note desire Chinese Communists to keep problem of admission to UN separate from that of Korea. GOI was not inclined to ascribe particular importance to insistence of Chinese Communists that all major decisions of UN organizations in absence of representatives of USSR and Chinese Communists were illegal or to Chinese Communists’ reference to US invasion of Taiwan, et cetera. GOI hoped that when once Communist China was seated in UN organizations, it would assume more reasonable attitude towards developments. First step in direction of replacing use of violence in Korea with conversations would appear to be admission of Communist China. In opinion GOI such admission should be unconditional. He had learned from conversation yesterday with Roberts, acting HICOM of UK, that during recent conversation between UK Ambassador in Moscow and Gromyko, former had obtained impression that Russia might be willing to make some concessions re Korea in return for admission Communist China. GOI considered that attempts to attach strings to admission Communist China would lead to nothing: that atmosphere for achieving solution of problem of Korean aggression would be much better if Communist China could be admitted immediately and unconditionally.
3. I told Bajpai that I wished I could share his optimism; that it seemed to be [me?] international communism was now seeking admission of Communist China into UN as a reward for having committed aggression in Korea; that, if and when Russia and Communist China would be participating in SC, they would endeavor use that organization as forum for attacks on US and those forces which have been endeavoring combat aggression and to prevent SC from functioning effectively in its efforts to stop aggression. I was inclined to agree with him that it would be useless to try to lay down conditions for admittance Communist China. In my opinion, Russia would not agree to imposition of conditions and, if it should for some unexpected reason agree to conditions, it would probably not live up to them. It seemed to me that by hinting at its readiness to consider peaceful mediation after its admission to SC, Communist China was already beginning to divert attention from fact that aggression had been and was still being committed to other problems.
4. In view of Bajpai’s earnestness and his evident keen desire that US Government be apprised of GOI views re urgency of admission [Page 367] Communist China, I did not consider it advisable argue with him at length at this time. I told him, however, it would be impossible for US in view of both international and internal situation to vote for admission Communist China into any UN organization.
5. Bajpai said he appreciated this fact, but was still hoping that US would not take such hard attitude with regard admission Communist China, that other members SC would refuse to vote for such admission in order not to offend US. Egypt, for instance, at present took position that, after having failed to vote for recent SC resolutions, it did not wish further to offend US by voting for admission Communist China. Ecuador and Cuba, in his opinion, also would not vote for Communist China unless they had reason to believe that US reaction would not be too unfavorable.
6. I told Bajpai that US was not carrying on campaign against admission Communist China; that it would not, however, in my opinion, vote for admission of Communist China; and that I continued to believe that admission of Communist China at this time would not be likely to strengthen cause world peace. Nevertheless, I would endeavor to present fairly to my government GOI views re this matter.