795.00/7–1150: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
top secret
niact
niact
London, July 11,
1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 11—4:08 p. m.]
[Received July 11—4:08 p. m.]
241. Eyes only for Secretary. I saw Bevin at hospital this afternoon and delivered your message contained in Deptel 132.1 There follows a brief summary of the points which emerged from a long and somewhat rambling discussion.
- (1)
- There is no deviation from the instructions sent to Kelly; that in his conversation with Gromyko or others he is to stick strictly to the UK’s position as a member of and within the framework of the UN. I pointed out that in my conversation on Saturday with the PriMin the latter had said that the position of HMG was that the Korean problem and the question of seating the Chinese Communists in the UN, Formosa and other matters were unrelated (see Embtel 156).2 This Bevin confirmed.
- (2)
- Bevin seemed somewhat surprised and a little taken aback at the vigor of your response. He was rather defensive in explaining the motive which had prompted him to send his message to you saying that although Kelly’s instructions confined any discussions the latter might have strictly to Korea, he felt that it was well to explore in advance what the position of the US would be in the event that the Soviets should respond with proposals which on the surface might appear to be honest and inviting. He said that he wanted to provoke the question in order that we might have consultations in anticipation of a Soviet question or proposal. He was indefinite and did not give a direct answer to my frank question as to what possible practical advantages he sees in trying to get Communist China into Security Council and return to Security Council of USSR in present situation. He said he would have to consider the matter carefully. In passing he said that he had never doubted the wisdom or justice of Britain’s decision to recognize Communist China but had expressed doubts to us in London as to a satisfactory outcome. I had the impression that Bevin had not quite appreciated the significance of his message to you and it may well be some of his subordinates with less fortitude than he persuaded him to despatch his telegram to you without explaining its implications.
- (3)
- Bevin said that he wished to enter a caveat that UK’s position with respect to Korea is not to be construed as a commitment that the same position is taken with regard to Formosa as that of the US. UK is willing to consult with US, the Commonwealths—especially [Page 362] India—and others with respect to Formosa but that great care must be taken not to weaken UK–Commonwealth relations particularly with India and Pakistan. Moreover, India was an important influence in the Orient.
- (4)
- I then raised the question of India and made the suggestion contained in Embtel 214.3 Bevin seemed to be impressed by this proposal and suggested that Washington might be appropriate place for discussions with Indians. When it was pointed out that the Indian representative would be Madam Pandit, he immediately withdrew the suggestion but stated that in no event should talks be held in London. I then suggested the possibility of New Delhi and Bevin said that he would study my suggestion concerning India and let me know in the course of a few days.
- (5)
- Bevin said that he could make no final comment on your message to him as it would require careful study by HMG; that it would receive immediate and careful attention and that he hoped to communicate with me again in a few days time.
- (6)
- Please give me date and hour of Bevin’s message to you so that I can determine whether it was sent before or after my meeting with Attlee on Saturday morning June [July] 8. This might reveal whether Bevin himself initiated message or whether it was some subordinate’s handiwork—probably Strang’s It has marks of Strang’s spoor.4
Douglas