795.00/7–1050: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
niact
[Received July 10—5:52 p. m.]
210. Eyes only for Secretary.
“Communication to Sir David Kelly.1
“I am glad to note Mr. Gromyko’s statement at your last conversation that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful settlement. That is also the earnest desire of HMG.
“As regards his question whether we have any specific proposals to make, I am well aware of the precise and concrete sense attached by the Soviet Government to the word ‘proposals’. (The Russians read into the word ‘proposals’ far more than we do and are apt to regard them as something by which the proposer is irrevocably bound just as they regard ‘a basis of discussion’ as something which is firmly agreed. Hence my use of the phrase ‘preliminary suggestion’ in this telegram). The Soviet Government will understand that HMG can only take action in this matter in the light of their position as a member of the UN. The SC made certain recommendations in connection with Korea which have since received the overwhelming support of the members of the UN as a whole. HMG therefore could not come forward with any ‘proposals’ as such. We could not properly do so unless we had assured ourselves that what we proposed carried with it the assent of [Page 353] the other members of the UN chiefly concerned. In view of our collective responsibility as a member of the UN we could not as an individual government run so far ahead as this. We therefore think it best to make a preliminary suggestion. The Soviet Government may well make the comment that they see nothing new in the preliminary step which we propose, but this step is tremendously important if it leads to a cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of difficulties among members of the UN. It therefore seems to us that the influences making for peace ought to join together in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal by the North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel, without concerning themselves for the moment with other causes of difference which have arisen in the more distant or more recent past in connection with the Korean question.
“We, as a member of the UN are anxious to use our good offices to promote peace. Mr. Gromyko has stated that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful solution. Therefore there is common ground between us. But Mr. Gromyko should be quite clear in his mind that there is nothing in the action being taken by HMG which will justify the assumption that there is any weakening in the determination to carry out the UN’s recommendations regarding Korea.
“I want you therefore to emphasize to Mr. Gromyko that irrespective of any other consideration the plain fact is that the hostilities in Korea have arisen from the movement over the 38th parallel by the forces of North Korea. It follows that the best suggestion which HMG as a member of the UN are in a position to put forward is to urge that the Soviet Government—who, HMG are glad to note, have expressed their desire for a peaceful settlement—to add their efforts to those of other members of the UN by using their influence as a member of the UN with the North Korean authorities to bring them to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel. Mr. Gromyko will appreciate that the aggression of the North Korean forces was a challenge to the UN who are handling the resultant situation. We feel sure therefore even if it can be arranged that the North Korean forces should withdraw to the 38th parallel that the UN would not entertain any proposal that the UN forces in Korea should thereupon be withdrawn from Korea and will insist that there shall be no diminution of the responsibilities of the UN Commission on Korea.
“If, as is possible, Mr. Gromyko tries to get you to say how you would see matters developing if the Soviet Government were willing to use their influence with North Korea and to produce the desired result, you will have to say that the working out of these matters would fall to be dealt with by the SC. What you are now concerned to do is to suggest a step whereby, in the view of HMG, the way might [Page 354] be paved for an ultimate solution. If Mr. Gromyko for his part, has any suggestions to make, you should of course say that you would be very glad to convey them to me. But as said above it is the aggression of the North Koreans which is blameworthy and no suggestion which failed to take account of that fact could bear fruit.
“Mr. Gromyko may also raise other questions such as Chinese representation on the UN or Formosa. I suspect that he may also be angling for an opening to suggest a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers. This would have the advantage for him, since it would arise out of a free issue, of opening the way for the Soviet Government to bring the question of the Japanese peace treaty into this forum, which they have (unjustifiably in our view) always wanted to do. You will have to avoid such traps. Your best line would, I think, be to say that, without prejudice to other questions which remain to be settled, the cause of peace is of such overriding importance that we feel entitled to call upon the Soviet Government to lend their assistance. What do they think? Have they any suggestion to make? They and we have an equal interest in bringing hostilities to a close. You are not speaking for any other government or organization but for HMG who feel deeply about the dangers of the present situation and make an earnest appeal to the Soviet Government to join their efforts to those of other members of the UN and to use their influence in the interest of peace. I want you to drive home the thought that it is essential to stop the fighting in Korea, get the North Korean forces to withdraw beyond the 38th parallel and to get back the methods of peaceful settlement and to promote the restoration of peace.”
Department pass niact Moscow 18, eyes only for Ambassador.