795.00/7–650: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received July 6—4:58 p. m.]
22. Kardelj confirmed to me at Bled last night remarks he made to Reams in Belgrade (Embassy’s 6, July 1). He repeated that equivocal position Yugoslav Government had taken on Korean case had been due primarily to considerations of Yugoslavia’s own immediate security. Yugoslav Government did not wish to give Soviets any color of reason for creating “second Korea here”. He added that Yugoslavia, as Communist country, faced some awkwardness in aligning itself with US now because certain American newspapers and statesmen were calling for “crusade against Communism”. He said if action by North Korean troops were characterized as aggression by “Soviet type Communism”, Yugoslavia would find much less difficulty in aligning itself clearly on our side. However, he said that despite these and other considerations Yugoslavia nevertheless recognized overwhelming fact that North Koreans were aggressors and that supreme necessity for Yugoslavia was for aggression to be banished. Consequently Yugoslavia was glad SC had taken action it did, which Yugoslavia accepted as fully legal. Refusal by North Korea to accept this decision had freed Yugoslavia’s hand.
I replied that many people in US regarded Communism, like Fascism and other dictatorships by one group or class, as synonymous with aggression and that only way Yugoslavia could convince these persons that Yugoslav Communism was different would be for Yugoslav Government to come out publicly and categorically in opposition to aggression of North Korea and in support of UN action to stop it. I pointed out that if occasion ever arose for US to ask SC to take action in support of Yugoslavia, it would be difficult to arouse enthusiasm among American people if Yugoslavia maintained neutral position in Korean case.
Kardelj, who was clearly making point of informing me of firm decision taken by Yugoslav Politbureau, said Yugoslav Government [Page 320] would seek early appropriate occasion to “get off the fence” and make declaration in support of SC resolution. He said recent troop movements in Bulgaria made Yugoslav situation delicate for the moment but they thought appropriate occasion for Yugoslav declaration might be when fighting returned to 38th parallel if not before.
While I have taken consistently strong line with Yugoslav Government since beginning of Korean case, urging open support of our position in UN, I recognize that valid arguments may be adduced that neutral position of Yugoslavia is advantageous to us for time being, and I would welcome any instruction or thoughts Department may have on subject. Otherwise I shall continue to press for early and categoric declaration. It seems to me that in present case desirability of clear Yugoslav position against aggression outweighs all other considerations, however persuasive contrary considerations may be.1
Department pass Moscow priority; repeated info London 1, Paris 1, Moscow 6. (Delayed in transmission from Bled July 4.)
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The Department of State sent the following message to Belgrade in telegram 6, July 7, 5 p. m.:
“Conversation with Kardelj reported Ur 22, July 6 undoubtedly made before receipt Deptel 2, July 3 [see footnote 5 to telegram 6, from Belgrade, received at 8:24 p. m. on July 1, p. 280], which after due consideration here was believed best course for US in present circumstances to follow in dealing with Yugo over Korean issue. In light that tel you shld defer pressing for Yugo declaration.” (795.00/7–650)
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