330.1/7–550: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received July 5—4:56 p. m.]
16. I met with Chauvel and Jebb at former’s office at eleven this morning to discuss proposals for SC action at next meeting on Korea. Lacoste, Ordonneau, Shone, Cole, Gross and Ross present.
We gave colleagues copies alternative texts draft resolution first alternative consisting of draft contained Deptel No. 15, July 4 through numbered paragraph 6, and second alternative consisting entire text set forth this reftel. I explained numbered paragraphs 7 and 8 reflected our present line of thinking should there be strong pressure to establish committee at this time. I pointed out difficulties involved in establishment committee at this time and particularly re composition, and question whether colleagues foresaw any embarrassment, particularly to commander designated by US pursuant paragraph 4, in postponing action on committee now but possibly taking up question of committee at later date should this seem necessary or desirable. I mentioned as wholly personal thought possibility at some stage committee consisting of president SC, president GA, and SYG in order to maintain maximum universality UN approach to Korean conflict.
Jebb said he sure UK Government would prefer short form of resolution (through numbered paragraph 6) and that in view of difficulties particularly re composition concerning committee would prefer to postpone question of committee time being. He read from instructions indicating his government view SC itself could meet as often as necessary to consider offers from member governments or further measures to be taken. In this way SC would demonstrate its active and continuing interest in Korean conflict. Meanwhile it should be possible unofficially and informally outside of SC to guard against undesirable resolutions or measures which might embarrass commander designated by US. Jebb said his government had suggested that ROK might be requested to report nominally to SC thus avoiding any embarrassment if such there be in requesting US directly to make such reports.
Chauvel indicated desire his government also to avoid embarrassment US commander. He said important question was to avoid going [Page 307] back again to SC (attitude India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, possibly others) in event conflict spreads (Formosa, Indochina). Therefore Chauvel said important that resolution not be too precise. He had prepared personally draft resolution (sent separately as USUN 15)1 which was very much along lines our short draft. He said he thought most essential point was asking us to designate commander. Neither we nor British reacted very favorably to Chauvel’s idea of committee composed of Norway, US, UK, France and SYG. Chauvel stressed principal concept he had in mind was set forth in numbered paragraph 2 his draft resolution, namely that Sunde as individual might be named as rapporteur to continue in this role after expiration his presidency. Principal purpose Chauvel saw in committee was “negative” in sense blocking off SYG and preventing his trying to do “everything”.
Neither Jebb nor Chauvel reacted very favorably to getting GA or Romulo2 involved.
Both Jebb and Chauvel said they would have to get instructions concerning the use of UN flag (our No. 5).3 Neither voiced strong objection this point nor enthusiasm.
Gross pointed out Department opposed putting non-members of SC on a SC committee on ground this would open field for effort various governments get on committee and that Department proposed naming Government of Korea to sit in on committee since committee itself would of course have ample power to request representative Government Korea to attend meetings. Jebb asked re paragraph 3 US draft whether we had intentionally omitted reference to Korean forces being placed under MacArthur command and I explained this had been intentional since Korea not member UN but forces UN members being unified in support of Korea. Neither Jebb nor Chauvel dissented from this point; both however considered point important.
Jebb and Chauvel appeared to agree it would be appropriate for their two delegations to introduce draft resolution.
It was agreed tentatively that we were not ready yet to decide on the committee and that we should proceed with consultations on basis short draft (through numbered paragraph 6). We agreed Jebb would inform Sunde our consultation, that the three delegations would meet with Dune [Sunde?] tomorrow afternoon, and that we would ask him to call a meeting of SC for Friday morning.4