795.00/7–350: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State


16. 1. During talk July 3 with Bajpai, SYG MEA, he emphasized that, in opinion GOI, it was extremely important for maintenance [Page 284]world peace that Russia and Communist Chinese take seats soon as possible in SC. At this moment SC should be functioning with all 11 members since there was possibility, even though perhaps faint, that discussions could convince Russians and Communist Chinese that it was mistake to resort to armed force. GOI felt so keenly in this matter that it had instructed Radhakrishnan, its Ambassador to Moscow, to endeavor persuade Soviet Government to take its place in SC, informing it at same time of India’s efforts favoring admittance Communist China.1 Indian Ambassador had also been instructed undertake persuade Soviet Government use its influence prevail on North Korea cease fighting and withdraw troops from ROK, suggesting at same time that India would be glad participate if desired in discussions on this subject with US and Russia.

2. Indian Ambassador had talked to Zorin, Deputy FonMin, who had received him somewhat coldly. Zorin insisted Russia could not return to SC except in company with Communist China. Zorin also said that Russia could not intervene in Korea, particularly at time When US armed forces were killing Asians. He added significantly that Russia would be at disadvantage in conference with US and India since there would be two against one. Bajpai said, judging from Radhakrishnan’s report, latter had not displayed strong attitude GOI had hoped. He had not, for instance, pointed out that North Koreans began killing of Asians and were still killing them; that it could be no comfort to Asians who were being killed and wounded that their attackers were Asians.

3. I asked Bajpai what, in general, was Radhakrishnan’s attitude toward recent GOI decisions. (He had told me previously that Radhakrishnan frequently displayed certain amount of “wooliness” and “naiveté” in his dealing with Russians.)

4. Bajpai said Radhakrishnan had not thus far given GOI his personal views on subject. He imagined, however, that logic of situation was so clear that Radhakrishnan must believe that GOI decisions were correct. It is possible, although in my opinion not probable, that Radhakrishnan might have sent telegrams re Korean situation to Nehru which were not seen by Bajpai.

Department pass Moscow, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

  1. At 5 p. m. on July 3, the Department of State sent the following message to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as telegram 9:

    “In view Korean situation Dept considers it wld be undesirable for Chi representation question be raised SC at this time. In event you receive evidence that question may be raised, you shld express this view other UN Delegations. In addition, you may as appropriate indicate that during Korean crisis we wld be even more disinclined see change Chi representation.” (310.2/7–350)