795.00/6–2950: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

top secret
emergency

JCS 84681. 1. This directive consolidates, broadens and supplements existing instructions governing your actions with regard to situation in South Korea and Formosa.

2. In support of resolutions of United Nations, approved on 25 June (transmitted as WCL 29851, 28 Jun 50) and 27 June (transmitted as WCL30453):

a.
You will employ naval and air forces available to the Far East Command to provide fullest possible support to South Korean forces by attack on military targets so as to permit these forces to clear South Korea of North Korean forces.
b.
Employment of army forces will be limited to essential communications and other essential service units, except that you are authorized to employ such army combat and service forces as to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area Pusan-Chinhae.
c.
By naval and air action you will defend Formosa against invasion or attack by Chinese Communists and will insure that Formosa will not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalists.

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3. Seventh Fleet is assigned to your operational control. CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT will support and reinforce you as necessary and practicable.

4. You are authorized to extend your operations into Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such purely military targets, if and when, in your judgment, this becomes essential for the performance of your missions as given in paragraph 2A and B, or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces. Special care will be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union.

5. You are authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from resources at your disposal which you deem necessary. You will submit your estimates of amounts and types of aid required from sources outside your control.

6. The decision to commit United States air and naval forces and limited army forces to provide cover and support for South Korean troops does not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The decision regarding Korea, however, was taken in full realization of the risks involved. If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation, and you should report the situation to Washington.