791.00/6–2950: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
niact
[Received June 29—3:54 p. m.]
973. 1. Before making my call on Nehru this morning,1 I had brief chat with Bajpai, SYG MEA. Among things Bajpai told me were:
- (a)
- Cabinet meeting yesterday discussed attitude GOI should take regarding SC resolution June 27. Atmosphere of meeting was one of relief that since resolution had already been considered and passed it was no longer necessary for GOI to take stand. While Cabinet was still in session Bajpai learned that Rau had not abstained but had taken no position whatever, pending instructions from Delhi. Bajpai immediately sent message Nehru stressing significance this new information and pointing out that GOI as member SC could not well avoid stating its position re resolution without losing respect of other members UN. This message arrived too late enable Nehru make definite recommendations to Cabinet and no decisions were reached.
- (b)
- Bajpai had long discussion with Nehru this morning endeavoring convince him that GOI could not logically fail support resolution June 27th. Nehru said he would make no decision pending conversation with me.
- (c)
- One unfortunate aspect of matter had been that more information re developments in Washington and Lake Success had come through UK rather than US sources. For instance, UK Government had informed GOI that it had studied press statement before issuance and had made several suggestions including elimination of phrase “centrally directed” and mention of Formosa.2 According UK Government, US had accepted first suggestion and rejected second. Furthermore, UK Government had had opportunity consider resolution June 27 and given instructions approving it before resolution submitted. Text resolution had come through UK channels rather than US channels. US tendency to consult with UK and not with GOI re matters primarily Asian had certain dampening effect on spontaneity of GOI desire support US in its undertaking.
2. I expressed appreciation to Bajpai of understanding attitude he was taking re resolution June 27 and read to him pertinent excerpts from Deptel 644, June 28,3 stating that it was our practice to consult with our friends, particularly India, prior to introducing major proposals for UN action and explaining why we had not done so in this instance. I said that he should bear in mind that communications between Delhi and Washington were extremely slow; that therefore it must have been obvious to my Government that it would have been [Page 235] physically impossible in existing emergency for Rau or for me obtain GOI views re President’s speech or resolution in advance. Text resolution itself coming through USIS channels via Bombay did not reach Embassy until afternoon June 28. We had been trying for some time persuade GOI permit Embassy have special teletype facilities with Bombay. I hoped events last few days would show both GOI and my own Government importance improving communication facilities between US and India. Department had direct teletype facilities with Embassy London.
3. Bajpai said he did not wish to stress prior consultation too much but hoped US would bear this delicate point in mind in connection future important international moves.
4. As I left Bajpai’s office I met Dutt, third ranking officer MEA, who has considerable influence in Ministry. He voluntarily congratulated me on courage and determination shown by my Government and said he personally hoped that GOI would decide support resolution June 27.
5. Nehru’s reception was friendly. After we had discussed briefly various aspects his recent trip Southeast Asia, I told him primary purpose visit was explain events which led to introduction by US of two resolutions into SC and to decisions of far-reaching character announced by President on June 27. After listening carefully to my clarifications and explanations Nehru said it would have been preferable of course for GOI to have had opportunity to give careful consideration to both resolutions before presentation to SC, since their passage had great political and historical significance. He could not be over-critical, however, of our actions in this respect since he realized importance of time element. Decisions announced by President involving Formosa, Philippines and Indochina made matter somewhat complicated so far as GOI was concerned. There was little sympathy in India for French policies in Indochina.
GOI had recognized Chinese Communist Government and was hoping to develop with it as friendly relations as possible. There could be no friendly relations if GOI should appear to be giving support to US decisions re Formosa. GOI had little concern re developments US-Philippine relations since there were special arrangements between these countries. GOI furthermore did not wish take any action which would embarrass its close associate, Burma, the relations of which with Communist China were particularly delicate, in view fact Communist China could at any time invade Burma under pretext disarming 26th Nationalist Chinese Army which had taken refuge there. India, Burma and Indochina [Indonesia?] had common policy of non-alignment with either of two power blocs and GOI must take care not to give impression that without consultation it was shifting [Page 236] its policy. Internally also GOI had certain problems. He and his colleagues were already being criticized by various elements in India as tools of “Anglo-American imperialists”. None of these considerations was over-riding. Nevertheless they could not be ignored. Furthermore, even if GOI should support resolution, it had no armed forces, money or materiel to contribute to campaign against Northern Koreans. Its support would be merely of moral character.
5. I replied that support of resolution June 27 would not mean GOI was passing either favorably or unfavorably upon our decisions re Formosa and Indochina. Our decision re Formosa had been taken primarily for defensive reasons. Deliberate and carefully planned attack of Communist force on Republic of Korea raised possibility Communists throughout all Asia might be preparing commit series of aggressive acts. We did not know where they might strike next. Since we had taken lead in resisting aggression, our fleet or our bases in Japan might well become targets. We could not afford permit Communist planes and ships to swarm over Formosa and use that island for base for attack on US in Japan and elsewhere. We also believe we must do all possible to impress upon potential aggressors gravity of an invasion of Indochina. A constructive feature our decision re Formosa was that it might lead to cessation of futile and wasteful hostilities between Communist and Nationalist China. We would of course receive no gratitude from Communist China; nevertheless, all Asia should benefit.
6. I pointed out that among difficulties in maintaining system of collective security had been tendency of powers faced with special problems to refrain from supporting or participating in collective action against aggressors. If GOI, because of its special problems, should fail to support collective action in this instance result, in my opinion, would be serious set-back to UN and to whole principle of collective security. India, as most powerful and influential free country of Asia, could not, it seemed to me, fail to give at least its moral support to collective action against aggression in Asia without making principles of UN meaningless so far as Asia was concerned. I added that I did not wish press him for decision at this moment, but I desired stress that time element was still important. Public opinion throughout Asia as to correctness of SC action was still in formative stage; if GOI could issue statement supporting SC before this public opinion had time to congeal, those forces opposed, not to Soviet Union or to any power bloc but merely to aggression, would be immeasurably strengthened. I would appreciate it if he could at this time tell me what I should report to my Government. Nehru’s reply was summarized in Embtel 971 of June 29.
[Page 237]7. When I left Nehru’s office, I was detained for a few moments by one of his secretaries. I then went back to Bajpai as agreed upon to discuss conversation. Bajpai was not in his office and I waited his return. He told me that immediately upon my departure, Prime Minister had sent for him to discuss matter further and that he was encouraged at what Prime Minister had told him. Present indications were that constructive statement would be issued shortly. He hoped that statement would be limited to discussion resolution June 27 and not contain passages disassociating GOI from US decisions re Formosa, etc. He was doing his best to bring this about.4
- See telegram 971, June 29, from New Delhi, received at 1:22 p. m., p. 230.↩
- See footnote 3 to telegram 3124, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, p. 187.↩
- Transmitted June 27 at 8 p. m., p. 210.↩
- On June 29, the Government of India issued and transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General a statement accepting the resolution of June 27 and adding that this decision did not involve any modification of India’s foreign policy (U.N. document S/1520). The statement made no mention of Formosa or of President Truman’s announcement of June 27.↩