330/6–2850: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received June 28—8:18 p. m.]
554. President’s statement and US Resolution 27 June on Korea generally acclaimed by delegations, secretariat, correspondents and public at Lake Success with powerful surge support our policy and [Page 224] action, in particular decision to work with and through UN in suppressing unprovoked Communist-controlled aggression. Obviously desirable to ride on top of and not fall behind this wave.
Following is checklist items raised with US by various delegations and secretariat on which Department’s guidance soonest would be helpful:
1. Legal basis for US action.
- (a)
- Broad UN approach by US and political, military and moral necessity and justification for our action thus far generally understood and appreciated by all delegations. Friendly delegations agree action taken pursuant 25 June Resolution also legally justified, but there is some undercurrent of opinion this not so and we have therefore to some extent at least given assist to Russian propaganda.
- (b)
- Without questioning legal basis continued action pursuant 27 June Resolution, there is some question whether continued action by US and under US command on behalf of UN should not be formalized. For example, Chauvel at lunch today with Gross and Ross questioned whether some formal action by SC should not be taken as further logical step beyond generality operative clause 27 June Resolution in order establish clearly right of US to act on behalf UN and continue extension aid through US command; in other words, quoting Chauvel, “to establish link between SC action and US action”. We do not favor such action.
- (c)
- We have had considerable questioning along lines Bajpai’s questioning of Henderson concerning specific chapter VII articles under which SC action taken.1
2. Co-ordination of assistance.
- (a)
- Confirming telephone messages to Department last night and again this morning, a number of delegations and secretariat have approached us to ask what “we” wanted and from whom. So far at least as a number of delegations here are concerned there seems to be strong desire to participate this broad UN effort.
- (b)
- Does “assistance” cover economic as well as military assistance to ROK and if so, what kinds of economic assistance?
- (c)
- Does “assistance” cover “sanctions” against North Korea and if so, what would be nature of such sanctions; for example, are there any commercial relations which could or should be cut off?
- (d)
- What should be machinery for coordinating assistance? To what extent, if any, should MSG be used; if it were to be used, under what charter articles would it be used? We oppose use of MSG in any form and strongly recommend against.
3. Should SC action be taken to establish Soviet complicity?
- (a)
- Feeling that Soviets behind invasion virtually universal. There seems to be equally wide feeling US wise in avoiding up to now asking UN to accuse USSR of illegal actions. In the absence of adequate evidence of aid to North Koreans as basis for charging USSR in SC, [Page 225] would there be basis for putting them into SC dock because of their failure to disavow and disassociate themselves from North Korean invasion and to comply with SC recommendations?
- (b)
- Should fact our direct approach to USSR (Deptels 538 and 540 to Moscow)2 and Soviet reply or failure to reply in reasonable time be brought formally to attention SC in order to maintain UN approach and in order to expose Soviet position?
4. Special session General Assembly.
- (a)
- If armed hostilities continue or expand in next few days or if evidence develops of Russian intervention, direct or indirect, would it be desirable for SC to request SYG call immediate special session of GA so that broad membership of UN could participate in grave decisions to be taken and publicly record su pport for SC resolution? We understand from Lie that special session could be convened within 3 or 4 days.
5. China and Formosa.
We have large number questions along following lines on paragraph in President’s statement dealing with Formosa.
(a) Apart from obvious military objective isolating conflict in Korea, what is legal and political significance President’s call upon Chinese Government on Formosa to cease air and sea operations against mainland and flat statement “Seventh Fleet will see that this is done?”3