330/6–2850: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
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[Received June 28—3:02 p. m.]
955. 1. I handed Bajpai Secretary General MEA this morning at 9:30 o’clock formal note addressed to Nehru containing substance information set forth in Deptel 640 June 27.1
2. After reading note Bajpai said he had assumed my call was to discuss with him resolution understood to have been introduced by US into SC on June 27 recommending to members of UN that they furnish assistance to ROK. I replied in negative stating my only knowledge thus far of resolution was that derived from alleged text appearing in Delhi morning papers. I might well, however, receive instructions later in day which would prompt me get in touch with him again.2
3. Bajpai said he had as yet received no message from Rau on subject but one would probably come in later. In meantime he had been discussing matter with Nehru. Both he and Nehru were of opinion that decision as to attitude which GOI should take re this resolution would be extremely difficult. On one hand GOI desired throw its moral weight against aggression in framework UN; on other hand, GOI vote for resolution in present form might initiate chain of events which would have unfortunate consequences in Asia. For instance, if GOI should support resolution it would in effect be calling on countries like its close associate Burma or like Siam to furnish assistance to ROK. Situation of Burma vis-à-vis Communist China at present most precarious. Latter might under pretext that India and Burma were favoring policy of rendering assistance to ROK move into Burma in force. Furthermore, matter had become somewhat more complicated by introduction on part of US of Formosa and Indochina into picture. There seemed to be merging of problem resistance to aggression with that of extension of assistance to certain forces which millions of Asians including many Indians considered to be imperialistic, colonial or reactionary. GOI could not overlook possible internal reaction to any decision which Cabinet might take.
[Page 219]4. I told Bajpai that in my opinion support by GOI of resolution as published did not necessarily involve GOI in US decisions re Formosa and Indochina. I hoped that in talking with Prime Minister or with Cabinet he would bear in mind essence of problem was whether now that UN was faced with clear-cut armed aggression, India would display sufficient moral courage approve action which would cause aggressors realize they would not be permitted by free nations of world to force one by one various peoples of Asia and Europe under their domination. I was never more proud of being a servant of Government of US than I was today. After having just gone through one terrible war, US in spite of its ardent desire to remain at peace had taken courageous step for purpose, not of defending its own territory but of showing aggressors and world at large that it took its UN obligations seriously. Would Indians in years to come be proud of stand taken by their government if latter failed even to vote for a resolution which was the logical sequence to one already supported by it branding North Korea as an aggressor.
5. Bajpai visibly somewhat shaken said GOI had no military forces to send to Korea, I said that although I was talking without instructions I was convinced and I was sure after giving some thought to subject he also would be convinced that every nation which supported resolution would not be expected furnish armed assistance. I went on to point out that hesitation and wavering at this historic moment might encourage aggressors to go on with an aggressive program which would inevitably result in world war. Positive and speedy action by GOI would have tremendous influence among all peoples of Asia. Hesitation on part GOI might well strengthen those elements in Asia which were endeavoring confuse issue and prevent any effective action on part UN. Issue was not between two power blocs but aggressor and UN.
6. Bajpai promised discuss matter further with Nehru. I said that if Prime Minister would care to talk it over with me I would be at his disposition at any time.
7. Referring to our conversation June 27 (Embtel 943, June 27) I told Bajpai it was clear that element of time had prevented my government from discussing resolution of June 27 without previous consultation with GOI. Carefully planned North Korean invasion was moving so rapidly that there was no time for consultation with other governments. Similarly the President had been compelled to issue his statement on June 27 without previous consultation. Department in brief time its disposal had endeavored to apprise GOI of its intentions. It had called in Madame Pandit for instance shortly before issuance of President’s statement to inform her in advance of substance of statement. Bajpai said that thus far nothing on subject had been received from Madame Pandit.
[Page 220]8. I told Bajpai our decisions re Formosa, Philippines, Indochina and so forth were undoubtedly taken as result of lesson learned in Korea. Soviet-inspired North Korean action made it clear that international communism was now embarking on policy of using undisguised force in order achieve its objectives. We had no choice in our own self defense as well as in interests of world security other than to move quickly and decisively. We could not afford again to be taken by surprise particularly in area vital to defense of US. There would undoubtedly be criticism of our action. Nevertheless if brunt of defense of free nations against aggressors must for time being be borne by US we could not afford to permit petty considerations and doubts to prevent us from making moves which would strengthen our ability to perform task we had undertaken. Bajpai said he did not wish me to obtain impression that anything which he had said was intended as a criticism of recent decisions made by U.S. He was merely trying to help me understand some of considerations which would possibly influence GOI decision.
- Telegram 3124, June 27, 1 a. m., to London, p. 186, was repeated to New Delhi as telegram 640.↩
- In telegram 954, June 28, 5 p. m., from New Delhi, not printed, Ambassador Henderson reported that he had spoken to Bajpai following receipt of the text of the Security Council resolution of June 27. The Ambassador explained the impossibility of advance consultation between the United States and India because of the press of time and Bajpai expressed his understanding. Mr. Henderson went on to inform the Department that he had gained the impression that India was relieved that the Security Council vote had been taken so quickly and decisively that there had been no need for India to take a stand. (330/6–2850)↩