330/6–2750: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
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[Received June 27—12:41 p. m.]
943. 1. Bajpai asked to see me this morning. He inquired whether I had any indication from my government as to what further action was contemplated in or out of Security Council re Korean problem. I replied in negative stating such information as I had received thus far was restricted to factual statements of what had taken place or was taking place. I believed that I had already given him this information and much of it had appeared in press.
2. Bajpai read to me excerpts from telegram just received from B. N. Rau which stated latter’s impression that US might be planning in case cease-fire resolution should be disregarded by North Korea, to introduce new resolution invoking Articles 40, 42 and 48 of Charter. [Page 205] He said Article 42 in particular seemed to him to be somewhat drastic and action under it might well lead to new world war. He was therefore instructing Rau to withhold vote on any resolution this character pending careful consideration of consequences by GOI and receipt instructions from New Delhi. He asked whether in my opinion US likely introduce such resolution immediately.
3. I replied I was entirely without instructions in this regard. It would appear however from rapid progress North Korean Army that if drastic action was to be effective it must be taken immediately.
I had some doubt however that my government would introduce resolution this kind into SC without first discussing matter either in Lake Success or through diplomatic channels with governments represented in SC. I thought that only in great emergency would US Government introduce resolution without previous diplomatic preparation which would require members of SC to decide on actions which might result in bringing additional countries into armed conflict. I would imagine that American officials responsible for formulation our foreign policy were exploring every avenue which might promise blocking or at least discouraging aggression without at some time seriously endangering world peace. It seemed to me that they were probably faced with several desperate alternatives; one of which would be advocating action which might lead to war; and another of which would be advocating action of such weak character that aggressors would be encouraged and potential victims of aggression would feel that since UN was impotent and there was no relief from any other source it would be futile for them to endeavor to oppose forces of aggressor. I thought that perhaps every member of UN, including India, opposed to aggression must be faced, to an extent at least, with similar perplexities. Korea was not primarily an American problem, it was UN and world problem. What was done re Korea might well determine world trends during immediate future. Disruption of world peace would be very serious; unopposed aggression throughout world would be still more serious.
4. Bajpai seemed to agree and remarked that he found Nehru1 very troubled re situation. He then read aloud excerpts from an instruction ready to go to Rau which he said had been drafted prior to receipt of Rau’s telegram. This instruction was based on recommendations apparently sent by UN Commission to Korea to UN. These recommendations seemed to suggest two alternatives to SC: (1) That SC should appoint at once mediator who would endeavor settle dispute between North and South Korea; or (2) Members SC themselves should undertake mediate dispute. Instruction authorized Rau to support either recommendation if it should be introduced in form of resolution. Rau was [Page 206] advised however not to vote for any resolution calling for sanctions without reference to his government. Bajpai said that he believed this instruction must go forward at once.
5. I said I had not seen text of recommendations of UN Commission. It seemed to me however judging from what he had told me that these recommendations took it for granted that North Korea would observe cease-fire. If North Korea continued to march I could see nothing left to mediate. If North Korea should succeed to occupy South Korea and to “purge” all persons of consequence opposed to Commie domination of Korea mediator would have nothing to do. Bajpai agreed and said that it looked as though North Korea was succeeding in bringing about a fait accompli before SC would be able to take effective action. He then read to me another paragraph in instruction to Rau approving Rau’s action thus far and stating GOI fully agreed that attack by North Korea was act of aggression.
6. I promised pass on to Bajpai any information received from my government which might be helpful to him and GOI in determining its policies.
- Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.↩