Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/6–2750: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Moscow, June 27, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received June 27—8:55 a. m.]

1743. Indian counselor Kapur called at Embassy June 26 to obtain information re US position on Korean situation, saying his Embassy had received urgent instructions to find out how far US prepared to go both within and without UN to assist ROK in throwing back North Korean invaders. Embassy officer said he was not in position to give authoritative answer to such a broad question and asked whether it was correct to assume that Ambassador Pandit¹ would be keeping in close touch with responsible US officials in Washington on this important question. Kapur answered that Pandit had received same instructions as Indian Ambassador Moscow but that frankly she had proved such a “bust” in Washington that he doubted she would ascertain what GOI wanted to know, i.e., “whether US was prepared risk World War III over Korea”.

Kapur then proceeded expound in similarly frank vein views which he said reflect present GOI outlook on situation Asia in light Soviet military move Korea:

1. He said that Indian estimate has been that US not prepared follow firm line in Asia if possible risk of war with Soviets involved.

2. Soviets are not themselves prepared for full-scale war but being aware underlying lack of firmness in US position will continue extend their power by indirect means with minimum risks until such time as they have developed necessary military and economic potential to engage in all-out war if latter at that time necessary achieve their final objectives.

3. When Ambassador Radhakrishnan² asked Stalin³ last January, whether US intervention in Indochina would not make a difference, Stalin replied “the people will decide first,” this being interpreted by Kapur to mean that Soviets would not be deterred by kind of aid US now contemplating furnish Indochina.

4. Indians believe that US action or inaction re Korea will be key to our subsequent policy (and thus also to Soviet policy) in SEA.

5. If US takes a firm stand on Korea, doubtful that war with Soviets will occur, but if it should materalize over that issue, India will come into US camp.

6. GOI very skeptical efficacy UN action if confined to vague restraining moves and not accompanied by clear-cut and forceful application of US military power.

7. India’s reluctance thus far place itself squarely in anti-Soviet camp not based on lack realistic appreciation of threat to India arsing from link between Soviet power and Indian Communists but rather on peculiar domestic and regional considerations which US has so far failed utterly to understand, most important being that for India to adhere unequivocally to US camp would almost certainly drive Pakistan into Soviet bloc, and Soviet “Communism would quickly entrench itself only an overnight’s journey from Delhi, i.e. at Lahore”.

8. If US makes firm and successful display its military power in Korea, not only will this have heartening effects in Japan, SEA and India but it will also impress Communist China.

9. Reports just received from Indian representative Tokyo do not, however, indicate that such application US military power forthcoming in Korea.

Kapur was told at end conversation that his frank expression of views appreciated and that since US particularly interested in Indian attitude on such Asian questions as Korea, it was hoped that at this critical juncture Indian representatives at Washington and New York, not to mention MEA Delhi, would not fail to transmit to responsible US officials candid expressions of GOI views on this latest flagrant Soviet threat to peace.

Though Kapur purported be taking official line, his remarks probably mixture personal and official opinion. Nevertheless, Embassy believes that views expressed by him sufficiently authoritative to warrant conclusion that GOI policy on Korea will be shaped to considerable extent by their estimates as to firmness US counter-moves.

View nature Kapur’s approach, Embassy would appreciate receiving any appropriate information on US position Korea which can be passed on to Indian Embassy here. Also please protect source.

Department pass New Delhi, USUN; repeated info New Delhi 28. USUN 41.

Kirk

1. Madame Pandit was Indian Ambassador in the United States.
2. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was Indian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
3. Iosif V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.