Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

330/6–2650: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

New York, June 26, 1950—midnight.
[Received June 27—1:35 a. m.]

546. Reports from USUN re Korea: The following telegram reports conversations by USUN officers with other delegations and Secretariat personnel and is substituted for usual USUN daily classified summary and separate documents of these conversations.¹

Views of Security Council Members:

UK—In exploratory talk on possible courses of action which SC might take in event North Koreans ignored resolution, Laskey (UK) indicated he had no instructions. He gave personal estimate of type of action which Council might be willing to take. It might make findings in more detail regarding invasion and determine it was unprovoked act of aggression, violation of Charter, et cetera. He also thought SC would be willing to authorize or give blessing to action which any member might take in support of south Koreans with respect to military aid.

Laskey doubted Council’s willingness to give blessing to direct military support, or to lay aggression at door of USSR. In any case, he felt Council would be swayed by events. If South Korea had fallen or was obviously about to fall, there would be no inclination to take strong action. If South Korea appeared able to hold out, chances for strong action would greatly increase. However, he felt there would be difficulty in assuming full moral responsibility for action which might result in third world war.

In confidence, Laskey indicated British Embassy Moscow had suggested SC take advantage of Russian absence to request USSR formally to support Council’s June 26 [25] action. UK delegation reaction, he indicated, was that it would be inappropriate to direct resolution to Russians but that this general line might be developed in speeches. He had no question in his mind that Russians were fully responsible. He seemed to hold view it might be advantageous not to lay attack at door of Russians in hope that if South Koreans proved strong enough to defend themselves, the Russians might conceivably ditch North Koreans since Russians had not committed their own prestige publicly. (Noyes, J. Hyde.)

Ecuador—at end of SC meeting June 25, Correa (Ecuador) said he had just been on telephone to Quito and had been instructed to keep in closest touch with USUN and to support US moves in dealing with problem. He added that continuing and strong Ecuadoran support in SC could be counted upon. (J. Hyde.)

Cuba—During the meeting, Ribas (Cuba) stated there was no question of their continuing support in handling problem. (J Hyde.)

China—Tsiang (China) telephoned and recalled that US Chargé in Formosa had been in touch with former’s government and that understanding was that US and China would keep in close touch on Korean ease. In light of this, he asked what last word on US thinking was. (J. Hyde.)

Views of Members not Represented on Security Council:

Australia (UNCOK member)—Indicating no reactions had yet been received from his government but that they were expected June 27, Shann’s personal view was that Australia would be prepared to support SC action calling for armed intervention and that its position would be as strong as that of any UN member. His conversations with other members had given him impression that most would gladly support a resolution which meant US would fight their battles. He thought UN might be prepared to support action placing responsibility on Soviet Union but he did not feel this would be of much value even though it resulted in their ouster from the UN.

Considering this action on part of Russians a clear indication that they did not intend to return to UN, and having thought for a long time that reorganization of UN without them would be advantageous, Shann now felt it was far preferable to oust them over an issue of this kind rather than for them to leave over an issue such as Chinese representation. In his opinion, events in Korea made it impossible to seat Chinese Communists at GA.

Shann thought there would be little advantage in a GA special session unless it were called to work out strong measures to save the situation. It might provide an opportunity for the small powers who feared starting a world war to exercise influence in the direction of mediation, half measures, et cetera, but he thought they might prefer to be faced with a SC decision binding upon them.

The UN had no alternative but to stand up to this test, in Shann’s view, for if it failed to do so, it would go way of League and situation in South East Asia would be worse than disastrous.

In earlier conversation, Shann indicated that although the June 25 resolution was vital, it was obvious to him that no attention would be paid it by North Koreans. He wanted to know what US could do in why of meeting force with force and thought perhaps the Australians were in position to help if UN decided to take strong action. (Noyes.)

Philippines (UNCOK member)—Ingles (Philippines) as usual had nothing to say in Romulo’s absence. Romulo apparently told him before departing for Manila that he would telephone or telegraph “some thoughts” to delegation here. (Maflitt.)

Canada—Although he had no word from his government on Korean developments, Holmes (Canada) expressed view that SC might conceivably give its blessing to any military action which US was willing to take. He agreed some action would be necessary June 27 or 28. (Noyes, J. Hyde.)

Dominican Republic—During SC meeting, De Marchena (Dominican Republic) said he had been on telephone to his Foreign Office and his government was firmly behind vigorous US approach to problem. In subsequent conversation, Henriquez-Urena did not appear unduly alarmed, seeing present situation as simply another provocative act in series occurring in past few months. He felt June 25 resolution was sufficient first step but next one should be stronger. He suggested possibility of Council calling on any country able to do so to go all out to Korea’s assistance. He felt SC vote had shown unanimity in free areas of world. (J. Hyde, Maffitt.)

Uruguay—Fabregat (Uruguay) was very much alarmed, said concept of aggression could not be tolerated and thought strongest measures should be taken. He had no specific suggestion but felt Henriquez-Urena’s idea should be tried. (Maffitt.)

Argentina—Situation was most serious and required energetic measures, Munoz (Argentina) stated. He thought it time to call things by their right names and therefore USSR should be named as source of this aggression. He greatly feared results in rest of Asia from successful aggression in Korea, (Maffitt.)

Pakistan—Chhatari (Pakistan) said formally that Pakistanis deplored this resort to arms and any government striking at foundations of UN through aggression should be dealt with very strongly. He thought June 25 resolution childish but seemed to be referring more to fact that only UN action so far had been a resolution. If all an aggressor had to fear from SC was paper resolution, he said aggression would not be deterred. He was worried at possibility an aggressor might get away with his act and present world with fait accompli of most illegal nature. (Maffitt.)

Netherlands—Luns had been instructed to impress on all members he saw how seriously Netherlands Government considered this crisis in UN. Discussing next SC step, Luns felt it necessary to go farther and probably attempt a resolution condemning North Koreans action, and making it possible not only for US but all members to supply at least material assistance to South Korea. He found President’s statement strong and very helpful.

Speaking personally, Luns felt if Council adopted resolution calling on members to assist Korean Republic with military supplies, Netherlands would be prepared to do so at least in token manner. He referred to strong Dutch forces now in Pacific and thought it possible that his government, if asked on basis of such resolution, would supply perhaps two destroyers. He stressed Dutch still had interests in Pacific and took very basic view as UN member.

Luns was critical of France, feeling they did not see clearly enough the implications of this attack on over-all Asian situation/Indochina and Korea were all part of Asia problem. He offered make preliminary check with his government as to what military assistance it would be prepared to give. He referred with some bitterness to statement by Indonesian spokesman that this was US-Russian fight in which Indonesians should be absolutely neutral. Commenting on immediate SC activities, Luns gave personal view, as was all of above, that escape hatch should be allowed for Russians to disassociate selves from what may prove to be unsuccessful adventure. (J. Hyde.)

Brazil—Ouro Preto fully supported resolution adopted by SC but, in absence of his ambassador, indicated he would have to ask for instructions as to general line to follow if cease-fire order ignored. Commenting on desire of number of members to admit Chinese Communists, he implied there would be considerable sentiment among such nations against taking strong action. He gave impression his attitude was one of extreme caution rather than that he had strong views against UN taking strong action. (Noyes.)

Sweden—Grafstrom (Sweden) felt this was most serious crisis that UN has faced in two years. He agreed that if North Koreans disregarded SC order, Council must take further action if UN was to survive. He was thinking in terms of resolution condemnatory of North Korean regime and permitting US and others to give military assistance to Republic. There was no implication that his government would be party to such undertaking, but Grafstrom stressed that further action should be taken. He was clearly thinking of sanctions. He felt strongly that handling of case should not point finger inevitably to Russians as responsible. He thought to attempt to underline Russian liability and supply military assistance to the Republic of Korea on that basis meant war. (J. Hyde.)

Thailand—Amatayakul (Thailand) had no instructions and said he did not expect any. He seemed most concerned to report to his government on (1) whether US at June 27 meeting would ask aid be given by members to Korea; and (2) what validity should be given to Pyongyang allegation that June 25 resolution was illegal because Nationalist Chinese participated. (Maffitt.)

Turkey—During SC meeting, Kural (Turkey) advocated a strong line in conversation with USUN and said he was sorry SC resolution had been watered down. It was first time in his view that Communists had undertaken direct military aggression without attempt to cover it up. He thought this was important test which must be met with strong action. He wondered what US was prepared to do when it was clear that resolution was being ignored. (Noyes.)

Indonesia—Palar (Indonesia) who was also interviewed at SC meeting, fully supported US resolution and course of action it contemplated. However, he was somewhat concerned that his people did not have full information necessary to convince them of serious significance of this attack. At outset, he expressed anxiety that Indonesians might think SC acted without full information in finding South Korea had been invaded. He was convinced SC resolution would be ignored by North Koreans and wondered what US was prepared to do in that case. Palar was most anxious to keep in close touch with USUN and planned to get in touch immediately with his government. (Noyes.)

Other Comments:

Mascia, Italian observer, stated his government was not only deeply interested but concerned because it saw in this case the future of the UN directly involved. He liked the US approach. (J. Hyde.)

Feller and Cordier (Secretariat) were both delighted at Lie’s strong statement in SC. Cordier was quite frank in pressing view this would help SYG in light of his current troubles with American public opinion. They felt this event helped Lie to prove he was a UN man right down the line regardless of which way the chips fell.

Both UN officials advanced idea that Council’s resolution would not be effective and indicated their understanding that major decision had to be made whether to meet force with force. They seemed to favor a strong line. Cordier indicated this development would completely upset all UN plans, including especially question of seating Chinese Communists. He considered it out of question that they would be seated either at ECOSOC session July 3 or at GA. (Noyes.)

Austin

1. The names of the members of the U.S. Delegation involved in the conversations are given parenthetically at the end of each section.