Memorandum Handed to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) by the Canadian Ambassador (Wrong) on December 28, 1950
Korea: Action in the United Nations
Events have moved fast since the beginning of this month. The military situation in Korea appears to be becoming somewhat stabilized and it would seem as if there is now a good chance that a position in Southern Korea can be held more or less indefinitely. The General Assembly has suspended action on the six-power resolution and has appointed a committee to discuss the possibility of a ceasefire in Korea. It had been generally agreed that this committee must be given ample time to try to accomplish its purpose.
Decisions as to future action in the United Nations must be taken in the light of global strategy and of the present balance of armed forces between the Soviet world and the democratic world. Given determination by the democratic world, time is on our side and we should, therefore, play for time so long as we can do so without appearing to deny our obligations under the United Nations Charter. If, despite all our efforts, the Soviet Union and China should precipitate a war, it is essential that the democratic nations should be united in their resistance to aggression and this end would be more difficult to achieve unless there had been sustained common efforts to avert a catastrophe. The door should therefore be left open until the last possible moment for a settlement with the Chinese Communists by negotiation, and every opportunity for discussion of the issues with Communist China should be explored.
The principles of the United Nations Charter must be maintained but any action taken by the United Nations to cope with the aggression in the Far East should be decided primarily in the light of the main threat to these principles in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe.
The events of the past few months have demonstrated that the leaders of the Soviet Union are prepared to embark on policies which involve a grave risk of precipitating a general war. They may well have been encouraged to take these risks by their estimate of the present relative weakness of the forces which might be arrayed against them.
In these circumstances, the acceleration of defensive rearmament programmes will shorten the period of acute danger but will make the danger during that period even more acute. With China on the march [Page 1619] and all of Asia striking out on new paths, the strengthening of the free world which is now taking place may provoke the leaders of the Soviet Union to strike within the next few months before our defences reach the point where the Soviet leaders can no longer believe in the possibility of an easy victory in Europe and Asia.
It would therefore appear that the paramount consideration which the free nations of the world must take into account in determining their policy during the next twelve months’ period of increasing strength is the necessity of doing nothing which might increase the danger of the Soviet Union precipitating a general war during this period. This means that our diplomacy must be wise and unprovocative, and that, in playing for time in which to get stronger, we must continue to be as conciliatory as possible. We shall have to make up our minds which positions are, in terms of our global strategy, essential and on which we stand firm, and where, on the other hand, we may have to accept rebuffs and local reverses.
Applying these general considerations to the situation in Korea it would seem to be unwise to decide in advance at what point it might become necessary for the United Nations to name Communist China as an aggressor. In order to leave the door open for negotiations, the United Nations has so far deliberately and wisely refrained from naming Communist China an aggressor. The United Nations should continue this careful course as long as possible.
At some point, it may become impossible for the United Nations not to name Communist China an aggressor. However, before the United Nations is asked to make such a decision, the nations principally concerned should first agree on the proposals for action which they would wish to put before the United Nations after a resolution branding Communist China as an aggressor had been adopted.
Even now a war with the Soviet Union is not inevitable. The risks of war during the next year or so, however, will be great. After that period, the strength of the free world, although still less than that of the Soviet Union, should be sufficient to deter the leaders of the Soviet Union from precipitating war. The uneasy equilibrium thus established may then make possible the working out of a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.