Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

357.AD/12–2750: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

New York, December 27, 1950—6:18 p. m.
[Received December 27—8:05 p. m.]

Delga 464. Re Korea: Following is report of Ross’ conversations today with persons indicated.

Grafstrom (Sweden) telephoned to ask how we viewed present situation and whether we had decided what course we were going to follow in First Committee. Ross replied we were of course giving most careful thought to situation confronting us in light Peiping attitude toward cease-fire group and its proposals and were in closest touch with Department on these matters. Said it would be most helpful to have benefit Grafstrom’s thinking. Indicated our understanding present status cease-fire group as given by Riddell yesterday.

Expressing earnest hope we would keep him very closely informed so that he would have time consult his government and get instructions, Grafstrom went on to observe he did not think it would be desirable for cease-fire group to attempt any new approaches. Said he thought very little if anything to hope for along cease-fire tack. He said of course Sweden would vote for six-power resolution but that he and his colleagues in Swedish delegation had been considering possibility of new resolution. He subsequently sent us, on understanding it was entirely confidential and personal, text quoted below of outline for such resolution. He was informed we would of course keep in closest touch with him and inform him our definitive views soon as possible.

Text of Grafstrom memorandum:

“(1) The responsibility for continued fighting rests upon the authorities commanding those troops which attack the UN forces during their fulfillment of the task given them in conformity with the Assembly resolution.

(2) On the same authorities rests the responsibility for the non-fulfillment of this task as well as the fact that the reconstruction commission may not be able, for the time being, to carry out its work.

(3) It is recalled that according to Articles 2, 5 of the Charter, every member shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action and that, consequently, a government which claims the right to represent a member state is likewise subject to this obligation.

(4) The GA maintaining the aims declared in the Assembly resolution recommends the member states not to recognize any political changes concerning Korea brought about in opposition to the principles of the Assembly resolution.

(5) The question of Korea should be maintained on the agenda.”

Sunde (Norway) came in at his request and inquired our views and decisions in much same sense as Grafstrom and was given same response. He said he thought Norwegian attitude was very well summed up in sentence which he quoted from article in last week’s Nation as follows: “We should learn to distinguish between processes of give and take which are essentials of all negotiations and on other hand appeasement in the Munich sense which involved buying an illusory security by giving away someone else’s freedom.” He said this rather exactly reflected general feeling of Norwegian Government and people. Asked to elaborate, he said that as matter of background, Norwegian Government had been very much in favor of negotiations since it was quite possible there may have been misunderstanding on both sides which could be clarified by negotiations. Further, he said he had thought great mistake had been made not to seat Chinese Communists last spring. He said he thought Russians had done everything in their power to prevent this. Said they were shrewd politicians and that it is not conceivable they would have committed the “blunders” if they had really wanted Chinese Communists in UN.

Sunde went on to say situation had of course now changed in view of Chinese Communists’ attitude and insolent response to approaches; of cease-fire group. He said he definitely was not in favor of seating Chinese Communists as condition of cease-fire. Said with regard to Formosa there was nothing in international law, in his opinion, which forbade US from intervening in favor of government which it recognized. He agreed with regard to matters such as Formosa and Chinese representation, aggression could not be rewarded.

Sunde said big question in his mind was whether US wanted or intended withdraw its forces from Korea. Ross replied that it seemed quite clear that UN would not wish voluntarily to withdraw UN forces from Korea or abandon objectives of unified, independent and democratic Korea.

Sunde went on to say that since we were not in position to give him our definite views today he would express his own assumption. It seemed very clear to him that in present situation US would want to proceed soon as possible with six-power resolution with strengthening amendments. Asked what sort of amendments he would consider as strengthening amendments, Sunde, emphasizing that he was speaking personally, replied he felt note would have to be taken of defiance of cease-fire group, that aggression of Chinese Communists would have to be condemned, and, of course, withdrawal provision of six-power resolution retained.

Asked whether he thought there should be any further strengthening provisions such as, for example, request to members to assist in repelling aggression, Sunde indicated he personally would find no difficulty with this, that such action with regard to Chinese Communist aggression would be analogous to SC action of June 27 with regard to NK aggression.

Sunde urged we let him know soon as possible what our decisions are so that he will have opportunity consult his government and avoid making last minute telephone calls to his FonMin.

Jamali (Iraq) at lunch expressed following views: He said that from beginning of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea he had felt it was essential to give them rope enough to hang themselves. For this reason he attached great importance to element of willingness to negotiate on outstanding FE issues after cessation of hostilities. For this reason he had felt it mistake to separate into two parts original draft of Asian resolution. This having been done he felt that Chinese Communists had been given no inducement (negotiations) to accept cease-fire. Resolution having been separated he thought it would have been better to pass second resolution calling for negotiations as extra length of rope.

Ross stated our views concerning future discussions after cessation of hostilities and called attention to fact that Chinese Communists had apparently chosen method of force rather than peaceful settlement, and pointing out in this connection Chinese Communists’ unwillingness enter into real contact with established UN authority, he asked Jamali’s views in light of tone and content of Chou En-lai’s statements in reply cease-fire group overtures. Agreeing that Chou En-lai’s statement did not seem to indicate real desire for peaceful settlement, Jamali said he viewed present situation as follows: first, it was essential that we not allow situation to deteriorate into first-class open conflict between US and China. Second, he considered it essential that we not allow US or UN to be in position of cutting rope that would hang Chinese Communists. He said we must remain true to Charter and exhaust every effort of peaceful settlement.

Asked how we would go about this in terms of parliamentary situation in First Committee, in particular his attitude toward six-power resolution, for example, Jamali said he thought that in order accomplish purposes he had in mind in light of Chou En-lai’s reply, it was necessary contemplate entirely new resolution. Such resolution in general terms, he said, should be appeal set forth in terms of ultimatum. Asked how he would develop this, he said he had in mind resolution which would make one last appeal for cessation hostilities, which would indicate a willingness to discuss outstanding FE issues with Chinese Communists after cessation hostilities, and which finally, having given Chinese Communists this last chance, would make clear that if they turned down once more appeal for cessation hostilities despite assurances to discuss other matters thereafter, they would have to bear full responsibility and consequences of their refusal. If they did in fact refuse, Jamali said next step would be perfectly clear to everyone. Chinese Communists would have to be condemned as aggressors and active steps would have to be taken immediately by UN to combat the aggression.

Jamali said Rau had called meeting of Asian group last Sunday night.¹ Seven members of group attended, including India, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan and Burma. Neither Iran nor any other Arab state was represented. At this meeting action along lines indicated by Jamali was apparently discussed. From Jamali’s report it seemed fairly clear Rau was taking his familiar line re Formosa and Chinese representation. Jamali said he had stood fast against Rau and against paying reward for aggression. He had insisted, he said, that it should be made clear that negotiations on outstanding FE issues should take place only after cease-fire had been put into effect. Said he had also taken line with Rau that if UN stood fast in Korea Chinese Communists might be able to push UN out of Korea but then they would certainly lose any chance they might otherwise have of getting through negotiations Formosa or Chinese seat in UN.

Jamali said it was agreed at Sunday night’s meeting that Rau would get in touch with us in order determine our attitude toward future negotiations and that he would also get in touch with Chinese Communists in order to determine whether assurance of future negotiations would induce them to cease-fire. Rau was then supposed to report back to Asian group. Jamali was surprised to learn Rau had not gotten in touch with us. He was in a mood to burn Rau up and find out why Rau had not carried out decision of group but agreed not to do this for moment. He asked us to let him know at earliest possible moment our views concerning new resolution of type he outlined which we promised to do. He said he did not have any very strong ideas about sponsorship of such resolution but he thought that psychologically and politically there was great deal to be said for such resolution being sponsored by Asian group.

Fawzi Bey (Egypt) reports that Asian group will meet tomorrow (Thursday) or at latest following day to consider what should be done about second Asian resolution (negotiations). In considering this resolution they will consider interrelationship of all three pending resolutions, namely, six-power, Soviet, and Asian resolution. He said it was very important to consider our basic attitudes and what we are prepared to have UN do. Arrangements have been made for lunch with Fawzi tomorrow before Asian group meeting.

Riddell (Canada) reports this afternoon that cease-fire group met this morning and that in fact they are just marking time for moment, (awaiting result apparently of some contact made through Delhi). He thought preparation their report would take place actively over weekend, anticipating they would make report to First Committee next Wednesday. He said they do not contemplate anything other than straightforward, factual report, although he said they might decide certain amount explanation would be necessary. (This sounded a little like Rau). He said group had really not considered question its future status. Although they did not want close door and would of course remain available, he did not think any member of group felt there was very much further for them to do.

Austin

1. December 24.