795.00/12–2650
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Korean Cease-Fire Efforts
| Participants: | Mr. Hume Wrong—Canadian Ambassador |
| Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State |
Ambassador Wrong came in this afternoon to bring a message from the Minister of External Affairs Pearson concerning the Korean ceasefire efforts. He said that Mr. Pearson had been in touch with Nehru and Bajpai through Canadian High Commissioner Chipman in New Delhi. Mr. Chipman had reported that Panikkar had made little progress in their discussions in Peiping. Mr. Pearson asked Ambassador Wrong to inform us that the Indian Government is attempting to secure further information about Chinese policy and intentions. He said he doubted that the cease-fire group could accomplish anything now by direct communication with Peiping. Bajpai has said that the Chinese are not likely to be impressed by U.S. assurances of post-cease-fire discussions as these assurances are couched in language too vague to be persuasive. Mr. Pearson thought that New Delhi underestimates the difficulty in going beyond the American position in the face of Chinese fighting in Korea and in face of the Chinese attitude at Lake Success and Peiping. Nevertheless, Mr. Pearson thought that if the United States could be somewhat more specific in describing the subjects which, among others, could be included in post-cease-fire discussions, it would be more difficult for the Chinese to reject this offer, assuming, of course, that Formosa and recognition were to be mentioned. Mr. Pearson said that if the Americans cannot do this, the Chinese may reject both cease-fire and discussions on the grounds that the U.S. assurances were too vague to be worth anything. Although this Chinese position might be unjustified, it might not appear so to many other countries.
Mr. Pearson also said that the Chinese may reject any proposition made to them and may be entirely insincere in referring to negotiations; their basic agreement with the Russians may be to drive us out of Korea and to create as much confusion in the rest of the world as possible.
Finally, Mr. Pearson said he doubted whether we should expect the Chinese to isolate Korea from other Far Eastern issues, especially Formosa. He thinks we might go even further than we have gone in linking up general Far Eastern discussions with the cease-fire. As long as it is clear that nothing will be done until a cease-fire arrangement [Page 1600] is actually effective, Mr. Pearson does not think that this would amount to blackmail or “appeasement”.
I told Ambassador Wrong that we had taken the position that we are prepared to talk about anything with the appropriate parties following a cease-fire. This arises from our basic commitment to employ peaceful methods of settling disputes and differences. I said I doubted that a more detailed statement of our views on the agenda would help, and it could make the situation even worse, I pointed out, for example, that if we now made it clear that we would want to talk about Indo-China, Tibet, the treatment of American citizens and property in China, the dismemberment from China of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, and Chinese fifth columns in other countries In Asia, it would not improve the atmosphere in Peiping. We would not be willing to say on our own initiative that we would specifically discuss Formosa and recognition following a cease-fire because that would imply that we were ready to make concessions on those points. A failure to make concessions later would be looked upon as bad faith. I stated that under the present circumstances the Chinese are in position to establish a cease-fire, obtain a solution for Korea which would leave that country under enormous Communist pressure, and be admitted to the UN regardless of the U.S. position. It seemed to me that our possible assenting to all-out discussions is as forthcoming as we could be under the circumstances. In any event, a further statement from us specifically pointing to discussions on Formosa or Chinese recognition would appear to go beyond a mere willingness to negotiate and would become involved with substantive concessions in exchange for a cease-fire. I further pointed out to the Ambassador that it is beyond the realm of possibility that the Chinese Communists would make their own decision about a cease-fire on the basis of the vagueness or preciseness of the expression of our willingness to negotiate. Obviously, if they decide to deliver a major attack across the 38th parallel, as now seems inevitable, they will seize every flimsy pretext for presenting their action in the best possible propaganda light. But we should not confuse cause with pretext. I told the Ambassador that we would consider Mr. Pearson’s views further and let him know if there were any change.