357.AD/12–2250: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 22—7:41 p. m.]
Delga 460. Re Korea—cease-fire committee. Pursuant to Department’s Top Secret 602 of December 20, Ross and Hyde called upon [Page 1591] Riddell, Rau and Entezam separately and thereafter had luncheon with Chauvel, Colson, Ordonneau and Laskey. Jebb joined us after luncheon.
In calling on the members of the Committee of Three we stressed the US earnest desire to see the group succeed, our realization that an attack across the 38th parallel might occur at any time and the belief that the effort to achieve cessation of hostilities prior to any such offensive is of great importance. We wanted to be certain that any questions or views of the group should be discussed and each of the three at least touched upon the question of withdrawal of UN forces. In discussing this, we developed the points contained in reftel. We added that we would like to see the group succeed rather than simply make a record.
The press had telephoned the three about a radio report that Chou En-lai had declared the Committee of Three illegal and that therefore PRC would not deal with it.1
Riddell had just heard this radio report and having talked to Pearson by phone seemed discouraged. He felt that it remained only for the committee to write its report, assuming that the radio information was correct. He thought it unlikely that the committee would receive any direct communication from Peiping. He thought that the UC military terms for a cease-fire were eminently fair if only there were some way to communicate them. He felt that they were the answer to at least one point made in the radio report, that a cease-fire would trap the PRC into allowing UN forces to build up their strength. He was interested in the idea of examining the general principles which would cover the possible withdrawal of UN forces and felt this would have been very useful to use a week ago but with no channel of communication now open, he was doubtful how this approach could be communicated.
Rau had just heard the radio report and while he was waiting for a confirmation and he had not seen any text, he assumed that it was a rejection of the committee’s efforts. He considers the situation very serious as offering the alternative between war with China and the sort of negotiated settlement that is not likely to occur. He considered his own role extremely responsible and felt under great tension.
Early in the conversation he brought up the subject of Formosa and the 7th Fleet. In this connection he restated what he said in the conversation with Cohen reported in our topsec 434 of December 14. We pointed out simply that we would not reject the inclusion of such an item in any conversation following a cease-fire but that we thought his line looked in the direction of at least some advance commitment [Page 1592] on the substantive question. Rau commented simply that he wanted reaffirmation of what had previously been said by US Government officials and that that was in no sense a new element. He pressed the point that in his view the US had made a mistake which it should be willing to recognize by the restatement of its position on Formosa.
He then mentioned the withdrawal of troops as one of the things that the Chinese Communists are particularly interested in but felt this presented no real difficulty to them or us. He thought it simply would be part of an overall plan which he would like to be in a position to present to them—a cease-fire and progressive withdrawal of troops after the unification of Korea and assurances on broad discussions of FE problems.
He felt that the US was too much committed to a military solution of the problem of Korea and we corrected this view by pointing out that our objective was that of the UN resolution and that neither we nor the UN were committed to bring about a solution by force.
He was worried that he could not himself explain or understand the motivation of the PRC or the USSR. He referred to a “report from Washington” that the USSR was in fact acting as a restraining influence on the PRC and he also mentioned a rumor that the USSR had some concern that the large troop concentration in North China might be a threat to it.
He reflected general discouragement and indicated no particular ideas about what the group might do next other than verify the correctness of the radio reports and write its own report. He did mention a hint which might be developed that negotiations might be undertaken with the NK regime to carry out the fiction that they were in control of the situation and form the key toward the withdrawal of Chinese Communist “volunteers”.
Entezam was gloomy, stating that he had never wanted to be involved in the Committee of Three, he thought he had acquitted himself reasonably well in the GA and then found himself faced with this task which presented great difficulties for him personally in the light of his country’s situation. From the start he had not seen how the group could succeed, but he had been willing to try his best. His approach was rather more technical than the others in that he could see no point in discussing a possible cease-fire unless and until a channel is opened up to talk with the PRC. He thought the radio reports were probably true and that it therefore remained for the group simply to write the best sort of report to keep the record straight. He felt that the US is primarily interested in what happens next and therefore should think about what to do next and write off the cease-fire group. He did mention the thought that perhaps something [Page 1593] would come of trying to find out where the NK regime is and talk to them. He also suggested that the proposed CFM could deal with this. If there were any good will or willingness to negotiate the problem of Korea, it would not in his opinion be too difficult to-work it out. He felt that the terms of the cease-fire suggested by the UC were entirely fair. He commented that of course the withdrawal of UN forces would be one of the first topics that would be taken up if a channel were opened. As far as the CFM is concerned, there would then be the problem of how to include the PRC, they being a directly interested party.
During luncheon with Chauvel and the UK advisers, we reported generally the above and Chauvel picked up at once and developed the idea of attempting to discuss the Korean question and a cease-fire in the projected CFM.2 Jebb clearly disliked the idea of getting outside of European problems and wondered how the PRC could be heard. He also asked whether Chauvel would be willing for the CFM to consider IC. Chauvel replied he had no instructions but added that he felt that that problem was being effectively handled by France itself. Chauvel attempted to interpret our discussions with the members of the group of three and our desire to have them succeed as indicating a willingness to give them some mediatory functions for some indefinite period in the future. We pointed out that while we were willing to give them every assistance, we felt that if they received no answer or an equivocal answer from the Chinese Communists in the course of the next week, their usefulness will be largely at an end. He added that at least the committee was one device which could be used to attempt a political settlement. Jebb at once picked up and commented on the possible withdrawal of UN forces from Korea, which he characterized as a reestablishment of the status quo. We replied along the lines of Deptel 602 to show the incorrectness of that characterization. He did feel that possibility of withdrawal was an important element because it would be the next step after a ceasefire and the question would be how to convey the thinking along this line to the PRC. He suggested the possibility of a resolution in Committee I attempting to formulate the withdrawal principle. Laskey pressed strongly his feeling that we could not expect to negotiate a cease-fire until after an attack across the 38th parallel. If such an [Page 1594] attack should come and we have the military strength to meet it, then the PRC would realize the costliness of a campaign and be willing to negotiate, but until then they have no real motive.
Jebb and Chauvel felt that the initiative is now with the PRC and that there is little that the rest can do. They as well as the members of the group of three all showed a tendency to sit back and wait, although they realized that the first committee must meet on or about January 2 and the next order of business is the six power resolution.
We left it with all of them that we would keep in close touch during the next few days and we emphasized the importance in our view, with which Jebb agreed, of being ready for a meeting of the first committee almost at once in the event of a sharp military attack.
- See telegram Delga 461 from New York, infra.↩
- Telegram 612, December 27, to New York informed the U.S. Mission that the comments of Chauvel, Jebb, and Entezam reflected British and French thinking that a CFM meeting should and would be held. The Department indicated that the U.S. position was that such a meeting should be held only if preliminary talks indicated a mutually acceptable basis which would make a meeting worthwhile. The Mission was instructed to attempt to dispel the idea that a CFM meeting was certain to be held or that, if held, Far Eastern questions would as a matter of course be on the agenda. (357.AD/12–2250)↩