Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–2150

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 21, 1950.

Subject: Our Course of Action in Korea

1. General MacArthur has asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for all four of the National Guard divisions now in this country in order to reinforce his position in Japan.²

2. There is attached (Tab A) a memorandum of conversation which I had with senior members of the Department of Defense on December 19. The preliminary line I took in that conversation is contained in notes (Tab B) attached to the memorandum of conversation.³ These notes were prepared in consultation with Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, Jessup and Armstrong.

3. At Tab C⁴ there is a proposed broad line of action for us to take in the light of the present situation in Korea. (This is not yet agreed to by all concerned.)⁵

4. It will be desirable to arrange a discussion with Secretary Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter before Christmas.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

Course of Action in Korea

1. U.S. objectives in the present situation in Korea should be

(a) to maintain the solidarity of the UN in resistance to aggression, fully exposing the character of the Communist assault upon world peace;

(b) to stabilize, if possible, a position in Korea at the 38th parallel by political means, and to reinforce this effort by military means if that can be done without risking the destruction of U.S. forces;

(c) to prevent the extension of the hostilities in the Far East and to avoid heavier commitments of U.S. forces in that area in face of the danger of general war;

(d) to find means honorably to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea at the earliest opportunity;

(e) to use whatever time is available to strengthen Japanese and Korean ability to contribute to their own defense.

2. General MacArthur’s directives should be clarified in order to make clear

(a) which major unit or units, if any, he is authorized to withdraw from Korea to Japan as a security force in Japan;

(b) that he should make the fullest possible use of Korean manpower in further fighting in Korea;

(c) that he is not required to hold any particular position in Korea regardless of cost, but that he should attempt to stabilize a position in Korea wherever there is a reasonable chance of success;

(d) that maximum effort be made by air and sea power to punish enemy forces, and to reduce their morale and military prestige, to disclose any weakness in their ability to maintain effective forces in combat over extended supply lines;

(e) that if it becomes impracticable to stabilize any position in Korea, it is contemplated that UN forces would withdraw on Pusan and be evacuated as a matter of military necessity;

(f) that in the event of any attack or direct threat against Japan, the security of Japan continues to be regarded as paramount;

(g) that maximum efforts be made to enable the Japanese to contribute more effectively to their own security by the further organization of mobile police reserves, coast guard protection, air field security, home guard, civilian defense, etc.

3. Our political effort should be directed toward

(a) a cease-fire in the vicinity of the 38th parallel;

(b) a settlement for Korea permitting the phased withdrawal of non-Korean forces from the peninsula;

(c) a course of negotiations on Far Eastern questions, the purpose of which would be (1) to gain time, (2) to seek a modus vivendi which would bar further armed aggression by China, or (3) fully to disclose the real character of Chinese Communist aggression and to enlist the energies of non-Communist Asia to meet it;

(d) a consolidation of the free world coalition.

4. Our program in the UN should be based upon the following steps:

(a) a cease-fire, followed by negotiations on Korea and other Far Eastern questions;

(b) if there is no cease-fire and a continuation of Communist offensives across the 38th parallel, the UN should promptly pass (1) the six-power resolution on Korea and (2) a further resolution naming Peiping as an aggressor and asking the Collective Measures Committee to recommend to Members of the UN the collective measures it would be feasible to take under the circumstances.

1. A manuscript notation on the source text by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, indicated that Mr. Acheson saw this memorandum.
2. On December 22, the JCS informed General MacArthur that no additional divisions would be deployed to the Far East pending a governmental decision on future U.S. courses of action in Korea (Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 76).
3. See the memorandum of conversation by Rusk, December 19, p. 1570, and the annex thereto.
4. Printed as the annex to this document.
5. The parenthetical statement was written in manuscript on the source text, presumably by Mr. Battle.