320.2/12–2050: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
priority
602. In view of the undeniably heightened danger of general war, we should overlook no honorable possibility of bringing about a peaceful settlement in Korea. We believe it therefore wise not to become overly entangled in the procedural maze into which cease-fire and other proposals have developed and to take stock of our basic purposes.
1. The reason for United Nations action in Korea was to repel North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea. There has now been added the aggression of China. If the Free World is to survive, we cannot voluntarily permit aggression to be rewarded. On this point we will not compromise or bargain.
2. Our objective in Korea has never varied from that of the United Nations resolutions: the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic country. We had hoped and still hope to bring that about [Page 1584] by peaceful means under United Nations procedures. Neither we nor the United Nations were committed to bring it about by whatever force would be required; the enemy is now in fact capable of preventing a UN military success in all of Korea.
3. We have consistently desired and still desire the earliest possible withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea; this must as a minimum be accompanied by a cessation of North Korean attacks across the 38th parallel and withdrawal of Chinese forces. It is our earnest desire that the Entezam Group will be successful in arranging a cease-fire which could lead to a generally acceptable peaceful settlement for Korea, including acceptance by Korea’s neighbors. To this end we are willing to discuss the matter in a forum or procedure which would include the Chinese Communists. Despite undoubted basic differences in ultimate purposes, there may at least be room for discussion leading to modus vivendi. If they desire, as they have stated, a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, then some accommodation might be possible and we should be able to discuss a peaceful settlement. The holding of such discussions should not depend upon prior commitments from either side as to positions to be taken in discussions, and discussion itself does not constitute appeasement.
Our obligations under the Charter and our consistent record of seeking peaceful settlement of disputes make discussions in the present instance for us a natural course of action.
Therefore, if our friends in the UN, including Entezam, Pearson and Rau, and the Chinese Communists understand our basic willingness to talk and to use peaceful methods, they may be able to work out a situation to bring this about.
We have immediately in mind a cessation of hostilities with the military situation stabilized at the 38th parallel. We believe an effort to achieve this prior to any Communist offensive across the parallel is of great importance.
We suggest that you use the foregoing as a basis for discussions with Rau, Entezam and Pearson.
If the question of negotiation on other matters is raised you should be guided by fourth paragraph of Department’s 916 of December 15 to New Delhi.