Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–1850

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, December 18, 1950.

Subject: The Australian Prime Minister’s Message Regarding the War in Korea.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, recommend that the reply proposed by the Department of State to the Australian Prime Minister’s message of 6 December 1950¹ be changed to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):²

“I appreciate your message of December 6, 1950, conveyed to me by your Ambassador. I am sure that you will understand that the present situation in Korea does not yet lend itself to exact determination of the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. However, from in view of the great mass of troops which they have committed, it can only be assumed military operations should proceed on the assumption that the immediate military objective of the Chinese Communists is to drive all United Nations forces from Korea. While it is hoped that it will be possible to stabilize a line, the terrain and mass of the enemy may necessitate formation of beachhead bastions in which the United Nations forces can be most effectively deployed and supported. While it may be initially desirable to stabilize a well-defined line across Korea, I am sure you will appreciate the impracticability, in view of the many imponderables in a fluid military situation involving maneuver, of predicting the moves and tactics which may be found necessary. While continuing every effort to localize the present hostilities, and while at the same time strengthening United Nations abilities to resist any further onslaughts that may be planned, I consider it vital that we to the United Nations that it not permit this aggression against Korea to succeed.³ while at the same time strengthening our abilities to resist any further onslaughts that may be planned.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. See the letter from Ambassador Makin to President Truman, p. 1426.
2. The underlined sections represent suggested insertions by the JCS while the portions crossed out represent deletions from the Department of State draft proposed by the JCS.
3. The JCS version of the text was approved by the Department of State and forwarded on December 21 to President Truman who assented to this reply to Prime Minister Menzies on December 22 (795.00/12–2250). The reply was then transmitted to the Australian Ambassador.