795.00/12–1350: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India
niact
916. Reurtel 1466,1 you are authorized to inform GOI the US wld be agreeable to cease-fire, establishment of demilitarized zone north of 38th parallel, and subsequent negots to determine future settlement; for Korea.
Mil arrangements for a cease-fire wld have to be worked out in some detail in order not to subject UN forces to increased dangers under [Page 1551] the cloak of cease-fire. For example, if enemy forces are permitted to concentrate massed strength and to build up supplies on a cease-fire line without interference by UN air, the Mil position wld be seriously and fundamentally changed in favor of the enemy and wld expose UN forces to sudden enemy onslaught with or without pretext or justification. Further, cease-fire wld require observation by joint teams comprising personnel from both sides and UN Reps which wld have right of observation compliance with the cease-fire throughout Korea. We do not suggest you discuss these details with GOI except as illustrative of problems which will have to be dealt with in any effort at Lake Success to bring about cessation of hostilities.
In respect to the two resolutions introduced in the First Comite, as you know, although we took no initiative re either, we did support and vote in favor of the res adopted Dec. 13. The second res recommends that reps of Govts (not named in the res) meet to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues. Our position with respect to that res is that discussion of it now is premature. The first step, namely, to agree upon and put into operation a cease-fire, must be completed before there can be negot of polit issues.
In the event that a cease-fire is agreed to by the Chi Commies and suitable arrangements made, and if thereafter agreement is reached concerning procedures for negots with the Chi Commies, we shld seek to have the agenda of those negots confined initially to Korea. We wld not however reject inclusion on the agenda of other questions, including Formosa, but we wld reject the linking up of such other questions to a Korean settlement and wld not make any prior commitment as to our position on the substance of such other questions.
Accordingly, you shld inform GOI that US is always willing to consider any issue through processes of peaceful settlement and wld take part in any reasonable machinery for that purpose. We are not willing to purchase a seat at the conference table by advance concessions nor are we willing to make concessions the effect of which wld be to convert a blatant act of aggression into a profitable transaction for the aggressor.
You shld feel free to emphasize with GOI the consistent record of the US over the past several years in trying to find appropriate means of pacific settlement of outstanding issues with USSR and countries under its control. The record is filled with dozens upon dozens of cases of initiative (both public and private) on the part of the democracies to open the way for peaceful settlement. But the record does not disclose instances of initiative on the part of the USSR directed toward genuinely negotiated results.
The record of wartime and postwar agreements with the Sov Union clearly shows that the Sov Union has collected the benefits [Page 1552] which it expected to receive from such agreements, has denied, often by force, the rest of us the benefits to which we are entitled under such agreements, and then has sought to “negotiate” all over again the question of whether we get our part of the original bargain.
A striking example of this technique is shown in the Sov attitude toward the present Far Eastern situation. The very existence of a Commie regime in Chi is the result of a major breach of a wartime agreement by the Sov Union which had committed itself to support and assist the Natl Govt of Chi and to recognize it as the only govt in Chi. At the 1945 Moscow Conference USSR reaffirmed adherence to policy of noninterference in internal affairs of Chi and support for the Natl Govt (ref. Chi White Paper pp. 116–1252). The Sov violations of these several obligations were not merely dipl but were supported by energetic action on the part of the Soviet Union to bring about a Commie regime in Chi. Similarly, the Soviet Union has consistently blocked the fulfillment of that part of the Cairo Declaration which provides for the freedom and independence of Korea while at the same time it invokes that Declaration on the Formosan problem. GOI might be reminded that US took initiative in 1949 GA sponsoring res on integrity of Chi and that Sov bloc alone voted against it.
It is important that GOI understand that Commie aggression in Korea was initiated months before the attack was delivered last June. For substantiating details, see info contained Seoul’s 525 Dec. 6 relayed to you as 917.3
Nehru and Bajpai shld also be reminded of the many efforts which have been made both by the US and others, both publicly and privately, both directly and indirectly, to ascertain whether Peiping is being motivated by any concern about legitimate Chi interests which cld be dealt with by processes of peaceful adjustment. Most of these efforts were merely rebuffed; the others have not disclosed a Chi desire to protect its own interests by peaceful means but rather a full partnership of Peiping in a Commie conspiracy of aggression against non-Commie areas. Refusal of Peiping’s amb New Delhi to talk discreetly with you, rebuff of many Dels by Peiping Del Lake Success, Sov veto of Indian-Swedish comm to settle early charges US bombing Manchurian terr are readily available examples of efforts made to find basis peaceful settlement and of rebuffs by other side.
[Page 1553]After review Korean situation, you may in your discretion wish to raise with GOI broader problem as to how Commie aggression in Asia is to be met. Massive intervention in Korea, reports of preparation of Russian-held Jap POWs for possible operation against Japan, increasingly active assistance and potential direct armed intervention in Indo-China, use of force to change historical autonomy of Tibet, reported deals for assistance between Burmese and Chi Commies, increasingly active penetration Indonesia are samples of present phase Commie aggression. It is not our purpose to exaggerate this danger in discussions with GOI for any passing political benefit. What we shld greatly appreciate is benefit GOI’s thoughts on subj which must be of most serious concern to India’s own security. If security of Southeast Asia is important to the US, it is absolutely vital to the freedom and independence of India. The great problem confronting the free world now is how to defend those areas, the loss of which wld be so serious to the free world. Just as defense of Japan and, eventually, of US is directly related to success or failure of aggression in Korea, defense of India is intimately concerned with stability and independence of Southeast Asia. If situation continues deteriorating, India may need help. If consideration joint action comes too late, joint action will be far more difficult, and may be impossible. We are not suggesting any formal direct talks between US and India. We shld be glad to exchange informal views about this more serious situation. If GOI prefers to consider this matter within framework Commonwealth, we wld not wish to intrude. The important thing is that GOI know that we are conscious of increasing difficulties being created for India by Chi Commie aggressiveness in Asia and that we wld be ready to exchange views in any way in which GOI thinks helpful.
In conclusion (1) we shall act with determination in Korea and shall not voluntarily give up efforts to resist aggression being committed there, (2) we are willing to accept a cease-fire with mil arrangements which adequately insure the elementary protection of UN forces, (3) we believe it wld contribute to the success of a ceasefire to establish a demilitarized zone with its southern edge along the 38th parallel, (4) it wld be expected that a cease-fire in Korea wld be immed followed by efforts to settle the Korean question in UN by peaceful means, (5) insofar as other issues are concerned the US is always ready to attempt settlement by peaceful means and not under duress, (6) the US has tried persistently to settle outstanding issues by peaceful means, (7) intl Communism has apparently embarked upon a program of aggression which raises the gravest issues for the free world, and (8) the US wld be glad to discuss these problems informally with GOI in any way which wld be helpful.
- Received at 3:45 p. m. on December 13, p. 1538.↩
- Department of State, United States Relations With China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949).↩
- Not printed. It contained information obtained from North Korean sources on provision of Soviet military aid to North Korea in the form of equipment and the sending of units of ethnic Koreans from the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China to bulwark the North Korean army long before the outbreak of fighting in June 1950. (693.95A/12–650)↩