557.AD/12–1450: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 14—7:25 p. m.]
Delga 435. Re Korea—Gross conversation with Lie and Entezam. At 1 p. m. Lie asked me to see him and I had following discussion with Lie and Entezam.
Lie said that he had asked Wu to see him this morning and had had hour’s talk with him. Lie led off on subject of POW, asking Wu to assist in obtaining permission for representatives of IRO to inspect POW camps. Wu, taking blunt approach, said no and went on to say that CPG had nothing to do with situation in Korea. He asserted that only Chinese in Korea were there on voluntary basis and in the service of People’s Government of Republic of Korea. Therefore, any requests re POW camps should be addressed to that government. Lie reminded Wu that former was not raising point whether Chinese troops in Korea were volunteers, but was merely asking Wu for whatever assistance CPG could render in obtaining entry for IRO in POW camps. Wu remained intransigent.1
Lie then turned to question of cease-fire resolution. He asked Wu for Wu’s reaction, saying that as SYG he would undoubtedly have to make arrangements for conferences between Entezam’s cease-fire committee and Chinese Communist delegation. Lie told Wu that since we were coming close to end of Assembly, it would be helpful for Lie to [Page 1547] get from Wu any ideas latter might have concerning length of time of discussions between Chinese and Entezam committee. Wu replied by asserting that resolution was “illegal and not in any way binding on the CPG”.
Wu proceeded to comment that Chinese could not participate in negotiations regarding a cease-fire under any conditions “other than those mentioned in Mr. Malik’s speech yesterday”.2 Wu then summarized conditions as involving withdrawal of “all US and UN” troops out of Korea, leaving Korea for the Koreans”. Wu also said that question of Taiwan must be settled in connection with any cease-fire discussions and that any negotiations concerning foregoing matters must be “on equal terms”. Lie did not press Wu for explanation of what he meant by “on equal terms”, but it is Lie’s personal impression that this was reference to seating of CPG in UN.
Lie said that Wu, before replying to Lie’s question concerning conferences with cease-fire committee, had a long talk in Chinese with his second man, Chiao, and that Wu’s replies appeared to be calculated.
Lie expressed his personal judgment that it was now clear that Chinese delegation here was “under the thumb of Moscow”. Lie suggested that best course would be for cease-fire committee to address a letter to Wu, forwarding copy of GA resolution and requesting a meeting in order to discuss cease-fire conditions. Lie said that he was satisfied from Wu’s answers to him that there was no hope whatever now for a cease-fire and that sooner the matter was disposed of and a vote was taken on 6-power proposal and GA adjourned, the better.
Entezam, who I thought indicated some dissatisfaction with initiative taken by Lie on eve of attempts by cease-fire committee to establish contact with CPG, disagreed with Lie’s suggestion that he address letter to Chinese delegation. With some warmth, Entezam said that if it was Lie’s idea that cease-fire committee should be used as political tool for forcing public negative reply from Chinese, “then I am not your man”. I interjected at this point view that procedures for establishing contact both with UC and with Chinese should be left to committee and I expressed personal view that it might be better not to force public response by addressing letter. Lie withdrew his suggestion.
Lie, however, with some show of annoyance, said that in any event he wanted Assembly to adjourn this week. This led to rather lengthy discussion, in which both Entezam and I expressed view that Assembly must be in a standby position at least until cease-fire committee had submitted its report in accordance with GA resolution. Lie’s arguments [Page 1548] for adjournment of Assembly this week were (1) that many delegates would be leaving this weekend, (2) in his experience Assemblies which went beyond December 1 remained on almost indefinitely, and (3) his staff was overworked.
In a confidential talk with Cordier later this afternoon latter commented that SYG was not in good mood, to some extent because he was not a member of cease-fire committee and, more particularly, since he was very anxious to go to Norway for Christmas.
Entezam undoubtedly will discuss with other members of his committee problem of duration of Assembly and I am confident that committee will insist that Assembly be in standby position until committee has reached some conclusions, whether negative or affirmative.
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In his telegram Delga 440, December 15, from New York, not printed, Ambassador Austin sent the Department a detailed record of the conversation between Lie and Wu on the question of prisoners of war, which record had been transmitted to the U.S. Delegation on a strictly confidential basis. This document contained the following concluding section:
“The SYG then summarized as follows the replies which he had received from Ambassador Wu:
- ‘(1) There are no POW’s of the UN army in China or Chinese territory.
- ‘(2) The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China had no responsibility for POW’s in North Korea.
- ‘(3) Chinese POW’s in the hands of the UC are the concern of the People’s Government of the People’s Republic of Korea.
- ‘(4) Ambassador Wu could offer no help to the SYG in contacting the authorities of the People’s Republic of Korea.’
“Ambassador Wu agreed that this was a correct summary.” (357.AD/12–1550)
↩ - See footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Noyes, December 13, p. 1536.↩