795.00/12–1350: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

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niact

1466. 1. I saw Bajpai this morning at his request. He wanted again to discuss Korean problem and talked in greater detail than he had on December 12 re conversations which had been taking place in Peking between Panikkar and Communist China.

2. He said that oh December 8 GOI had instructed Panikkar approach Communist China inquiring whether they would be willing agree cessation hostilities in Korea under conditions as follows:

(a) Cease fire, (b) drawing up demilitarized zone, (c) holding of conversations for settlement Korean problem and subsequently for settlement of Formosa problem in all of which China would have equal participation.

With respect to setting up demilitarized zone GOI had expressed its opinion that Communist forces should not move south of 38th parallel and UN forces should be withdrawn from north of 38th parallel. Re question settlement of Korea GOI thought it would be unwise for Communist China insist on withdrawal UN forces from South Korea until government of united and independent Korea been established in compliance with decisions UN. Re Formosa GOI had expressed opinion that discussions should be based on decisions at Cairo and Potsdam that Formosa should go to China. Question of when and how Formosa should be turned over to China could be subject of discussions and Communist China should tear in mind that US at present considered Formosa important to maintenance peace and security in Far East particularly Japan.

3. Panikkar had reported in telegram received in New Delhi last evening that on December 11 he had had an hour’s conversation with [Page 1539] Chou En-lai in which latter had insisted the Chinese wished peaceful settlement problems of Korea and of “Far East in general” but that before opening of conversations re future of Korea there must be preliminary announcement on part US to effect that subsequent conversations re Formosa should be based upon Cairo and Potsdam declarations and that settlement of Formosa problem would be accompanied by withdrawal of US fleet from between Formosa and mainland. Chou En-lai had pointed out that while Formosa might seem important to US it was vital to China. Chou En-lai had also made it clear that settlement Korea problems would be interlinked with problem Far East in general. During course of conversation with Panikkar, Chou En-lai had asked what assurance if any did GOI have that proposals made by GOI through Panikkar would be acceptable to US.

4. Bajpai told me that late last night GOI had sent text of Panikkars telegram to Attlee since latter was acquainted with Washington’s way of thinking and might be in better position to feel out attitude US towards proposals which had been made by India. He had not sent copy Panikkar’s telegram to Washington and considered it unwise to give me copy since remarks of Chou En-lai re US contained in telegram were so critical that he was afraid text of telegram in US hands would do more harm than good. Nevertheless it would be extremely helpful if GOI would be able let Chou En-lai know through Panikkar whether US would be willing consider favorably proposals which GOI had made. Bajpai said he was inclined believe US would be agreeable to GOI suggestions re cease fire, establishment demilitarized zone, and participation of Communist China on equal basis in discussions re future Korea. He had some concern however lest US would not be willing go along with GOI suggestions that conversations re Formosa which would take place after future Korea had been settled would be on basis of Cario and Potsdam declarations. This concern was sharpened by fact that in announcement made following Attlee’s conversations in Washington no mention was made of Cairo and Potsdam.

5. I promised Bajpai transmit this information to Washington but pointed out that from such information as I had received from Washington and which he Would recall I had imparted to him December 12 (paragraph 1 Embtel 1459 December 12) I doubted US would be willing make any commitments at this time re Formosa other than those contained in the announcement issued following conversations between PriMin Attlee and President Truman.

6. Bajpai said that in any event it would be helpful to obtain US attitude but he was afraid that if US remained adamant on matter Formosa efforts GOI to bring about cease fire through diplomatic channels might fail. Bajpai indicated GOI did not place much hope [Page 1540] on obtaining cease fire through resolution in UN until after some understanding had been reached through diplomatic channels. He said that two resolutions introduced December 12 in GA had caught GOI by surprise. He would appreciate knowing what attitude US Government was with respect to them. Rau still under instructions not to introduce resolution in UN looking towards cease fire unless he had good reason believe such resolution would be acceptable to all of great powers concerned.

Henderson