357.AD/12–950: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
Gadel 177. For Gross. Fol Dept’s views Delga 397:1
[Page 1523]1. This plan or any like it must be kept to one side for the present in order not to confuse and prejudice the Rau negotiations looking to a cease-fire.
2. The approach of the plan is basically defective in attempting to spell out in detail both as to substance and timing the full disposition of the future of Korea. It is not possible to forecast, especially in point of timing, a rigid program for this purpose. Any effort to develop a plan based on this approach shld therefore be discouraged. If some del wishes to initiate cease-fire desirable method of proceeding wld be to get the cease-fire into effect then work out details of settlement in easy stages by negotiations. Of course if agreement is reached on details of settlement they cld later be confirmed by resolution.
3. As to specific paragraphs of the res Dept has fol comments for Romulo’s interest and information.
2(c). While para 1 of the proposed res repudiates charges leveled by Chinese against US and re-emphasizes that US troops in Korea are UN forces fully authorized and indeed requested by UN, the body of the res, no doubt unintentionally, gives the impression that status of the US troops in Korea is no more legitimate than that of Chinese Communists. This para for example wld make it seem wrong for US troops to be in Korea. Any plan along these lines shld emphasize not withdrawal of US troops, but rather the character of UN troops which will remain.
2(d). This para referring to Formosa entirely unacceptable to US. We have made it clear that US has no designs on Formosa and wants no special interests there. We have indicated our desire for a peaceful settlement of the Formosa question, and have agreed to UN consideration of the question of Formosa at sometime after the Korean situation clears, but cannot accept any provisions dealing with Formosa in a res on the Korean settlement.
2(e). Disarmament ROK forces difficult to justify and might endanger stability ROK Govt.
2(f). The US has repeatedly expressed the hope that other nations wld contribute more forces, and particularly that forces of other nations shld carry maximum burden post-war occupation of Korea. Judging from past response it is far from clear that effective force of 50 thousand troops can be obtained from small nations for task envisaged.
2 (h thru k). These paras far too detailed and seek to anticipate too far ahead. Time table attempts to be specific about matters as to which it is impossible to be this definite at this time.
Para 3, Not acceptable of course in present draft since some of the provisions which the US is called upon to accept are objectionable. Also US does not favor advance determination of circumstances in which state wld be automatically branded as an aggressor; it is always difficult to determine the facts and to examine possible justifications, arid other factors which might go into a determination of whether aggression has taken place. Finally, a new para along these lines shld be directed more specifically at the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, and not permit the possibility that it would be held to apply against other members of the UN playing some role in Korea.