795.00/12–1150
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Notes on Meeting of the National Security Council
December 11, 1950
At the beginning of the National Security Council meeting this afternoon, the Secretary of State asked the President’s permission to take up at once a problem which has arisen at Lake Success about a cease-fire in Korea. The Secretary outlined briefly what the Asian group of states have in mind as a cease-fire resolution. He then said that in discussions in the Department of State today representatives of the armed services had raised some question about the desirability of a cease-fire in the present situation. The Secretary felt it of the greatest importance, in view of the Truman–Attlee discussion on the same subject, to discuss this matter in the NSC in order that the President might give us guidance as to how to proceed.
I was then asked to amplify the discussion in the Department of State with representatives of the armed services. I said that serious military questions arise from the cease-fire proposal, some of them affecting the basic security of UN forces. I said that the military representatives had raised the question of the continued buildup of enemy forces at the front without being subjected to UN air attack and the great danger which could be created by an enemy concentration [Page 1519] with large stocks of supplies immediately available in the event the enemy decided to break the cease-fire. I pointed out that there is a serious question as to the action of the Tenth Corps in Northeast Korea. I also referred to the desire of the military to hold certain strong points which are in fact north of the 38th parallel.
I continued by relating the cease-fire problem to our longer-range intention to liquidate our commitments in Korea when possible. I said there were three broad possibilities: (1) A complete UN victory throughout all of Korea, which the enemy is now militarily capable of denying to us; (2) A complete evacuation of Korea by being forced out of Korea militarily; and, (3) Some stabilization inside Korea either on a military basis or on a cease-fire basis in connection with which military and political factors should operate. I said that our attitude on the cease-fire ought to be connected with our longer-range problem of disengaging U.S. forces from Korea.
I then stated that we had considered as an alternative to the type resolution which the Asian countries were planning to introduce a suggestion that Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly, should be asked to constitute a small committee of perhaps himself, Rau and Pearson to negotiate the military conditions of the cease-fire prior to the introduction of the resolution in the General Assembly. Another alternative would be, if the Asian countries insisted upon introducing a resolution, to let them file a resolution asking the President of the General Assembly to constitute a small committee to negotiate the conditions for a cease-fire.
The President indicated that he thought these latter alternatives would be preferable to the type resolution which the Asians were now considering. It was pointed out to him that we could not, of course, guarantee that the Asians would not in fact introduce their resolution without regard to our view.
Secretary Marshall then asked Admiral Davis what the views of the Military Staff are about the specific military conditions of a ceasefire. Admiral Davis indicated the types of questions which would have to be considered but said that the Staff had not come up with any conclusions as to the exact requirements which would be needed.
Secretary Marshall then emphasized the indispensable condition that any cease-fire arrangements must be supervised by a UN commission with access throughout all of Korea. He said that otherwise we would not have any protection against major violations—and that he had had plenty of experience with such violations in the year in China during which he was dealing with the same people. He also indicated that this condition might in fact result in the Communists refusing the cease-fire—but that that was a result which we could accept.
[Page 1520]General Bedell Smith raised the question as to why it would not be desirable to move immediately a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th parallel. He said that although certain UN Forces were now north of the parallel, he understood that it was not the intention or the capability of the UN Command to hold north of the 38th parallel. He said that there had been some indications that the Chinese Communists might not in fact go below the 38th parallel and that it might be possible to get an agreed cease-fire on the basis of that status quo position. The President said that it was his understanding that General MacArthur wished to hold his present position north of the 38th parallel tenaciously and that the President thought that was the proper thing to do. Secretary Marshall intervened to say that although General MacArthur was establishing a definite line in positions north of the 38th parallel, he would not favor any order to General MacArthur which would limit in any way his withdrawal to positions further to the south. Both Secretary Marshall and General Bradley indicated that the positions north of the 38th parallel were temporary but that if the enemy continued to attack it would be desirable to let him hold those lines before having to fight on lines further to the south. No decision was taken on the point of the 38th parallel and this is a point which will have to be resolved.
The Vice President said that he thought that any conditions attaching to a cease-fire should appear in an actual resolution of the UN and should not be behind-the-scenes understandings of any sort. He also said that it was very important that the United States not be in the position of opposing a cease-fire and said that it was very important that the other side bear the onus for rejecting a cease-fire if the terms were honorable.
Following the above discussion the Secretary of State asked the President if he would accept the following as guidance for the present and the President directed that the following be accepted as guidance:
We will consider a cease-fire in Korea but must insist upon a cease-fire which does not place UN forces at a military disadvantage and which does not involve political concessions.
Details of the cease-fire should be negotiated, in order to protect the security of UN forces before a cease-fire is accepted.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff will prepare as a matter of urgency the military conditions on which a cease-fire would be acceptable.
Although the following was not approved by the President, it clearly represents the sense of the meeting:
To insure compliance and to prevent a worsening of the military situation of the UN forces, there must be UN observation throughout Korea of the operation of a cease-fire agreement.