795.00/6–2650: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
540. Dept appreciates importance considerations set forth Embtel 1734, June 26 and recognizes disadvantages of involving Sov prestige more directly in Korean aggression. Our proposed approach was predicated on belief, so ably set forth in Embtel 1726, June 25, that Sovs not now prepared risk possibility full-scale war with West and hence will not permit themselves become directly involved in Korean hostilities. We wld expect them for this and other reasons, assuming that UN and [Page 177] US reaction to Korean attack is firm as it has been, to reply to our approach by denying their responsibility for action of “North Korean Govt” and hence to refuse to permit themselves to be directly involved.
Our reasons for considering an approach along these lines desirable at this time were fol: We incline to view that, as long as Sovs can utilize their satellites or stooges to take aggressive action without serious danger of becoming involved themselves, they will be likely to employ this device with increasing boldness. If, on other hand, it can be made clear to them that aggressive action by satellites risks involving their prestige directly, they may, in light considerations set forth Embtel 1726, be more cautious in pushing such tactic to extremes.
Second reason prompting Dept’s proposal is that excellent opportunity is here offered to disrupt Sov peace offensive1 which, as Emb is aware, is assuming serious proportions and having a certain effect on public opinion in many critical areas. Prompt and explicit exposure of Sov responsibility for clear-cut case of aggression shld go far, appropriately played by Western propaganda, to destroy effectiveness of peace offensive.
In light these considerations, Dept believes that approach outlined Deptel 538, June 25, shld be made promptly. In deference Emb’s views, however, opening clause third sentence of reftel shld be altered to read as fol: “In view universally known fact close relations between USSR and North Korean regime”.
- Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume iv.↩