357.AD/12–850: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 8—9:33 p. m.]
Delga 394. Re Chinese Communists conversations with Rau. Confirming Gross–Hickerson telecon this afternoon, following is report of Gross conversation with Rau December 8.
Rau said that yesterday Chiao had asked Menon with regard to Asiatic declaration what assurances there would be that the UN forces would not cross the 38th parallel at some later date. Rau asked me what our position was on that matter. This led to a general discussion of the cease-fire situation and our attitude toward it along the following lines.
I said that we were not soliciting a cease-fire arrangement of any kind, were not taking any initiative looking toward one, and were not suggesting that anyone else take such initiative. However, in the event that someone else entirely on his own initiative proposed a ceasefire arrangement, we would be prepared to consider it on its merits, provided it contained no political conditions of any kind and provided that in all respects it was a clearly fair and honorable suggestion. I repeated that these comments on my part were not intended to suggest or imply any encouragement of initiative, and to stress this point I described the present military situation as from our point of view making it possible for us to “let nature take its course in the UN.”
With regard to the specific question Rau had asked, I said that while I had no instruction on the matter except to listen to any comment [Page 1483] or questions that might be raised by others, it seemed to me that the basis of the question was not clear. I said that, of course, looking at the matter from a purely logical point of view, the UN forces would respect any cease-fire line or else it would not be a “cease-fire line”. I added that the main problem was to avoid any political implication of any kind with regard to future settlement. This, I repeated, we were not prepared to consider at the present time in connection with any cease-fire discussion. On the other hand, if the point of the question asked by Chiao was what sort of assurances might be given that any cease-fire arrangement would be respected, that was another question and one on which I would seek advice from my government. I said I assumed that the mere fact of agreement on the part of the UN to a cease-fire arrangement with a fixed cease-fire line should in itself constitute sufficient assurance that the UN would respect that line. However, if the Chinese Communists were fishing for some implication concerning future political disposition or settlement, that was, in our view, an entirely separate matter which I was not prepared or authorized to discuss.
Rau said that his present instructions were that he was not to participate in a vote on six-power resolution until his government had had an opportunity to consider the matter in the light of reports they expected to receive from Rau and Pandit summarizing the results of the Truman–Attlee talks and the attitude of the UK delegation here based on those discussions. Rau, who is conferring with Madame Pandit at Lake Success this afternoon, told me that he expected to see the UK delegation this afternoon or evening following the conference with Attlee here which will take place in New York sometime this afternoon or this evening. For these reasons, Rau hoped we would not press for a vote on the six-power resolution at least until Monday.1
He said he thought he would be instructed to table the same proposal which he had circulated informally to the SC members on November 12.2 I asked him what this signified with respect to both the cease-fire proposal embodied in those amendments and the use of the POC. Rau asked whether I thought it would be best to table the proposal as amendments to the six-power resolution or as a substitute resolution. I said that I thought we should proceed on normal schedule with the six-power resolution but that if the cease-fire proposal were tabled entirely on his own initiative, we would favor immediate consideration of the cease-fire proposal on its merits and subject to the conditions I had already specified. From this point of view it seemed to me to make little difference whether the proposals were [Page 1484] tabled as amendments of [or?] separate proposals. Rau thought that one advantage of tabling them as a substitute resolution was that the Chinese Communists might be more ready to consider them since they had already announced their firm opposition to the six-power resolution and had warned Rau in their discussions with him that anyone who voted for the six-power resolution would have to be prepared to assume responsibility for the consequences.
Rau engaged in a long conversation re Formosa. It was perfectly clear from his belaboring of this point, and indeed he said so in so many words, that he felt it would probably be essential to “do something about the Formosan situation” in connection with the Korean question. When I pressed him on this, he said that the Chinese Communists had made it clear to him that they considered a solution of Formosa to be at least as important to them as a satisfactory settlement of Korea. Rau indicated he was playing with the idea of adding to his cease-fire proposal or amending the six-power resolution by some reference to disposition of the Formosan question. What he had in mind, he explained, was to propose that the UN should proceed to consider the Formosan question (this reasoning underlay his suggestion made to me on Thursday during the SC meeting and which I dissuaded him from including in his SC statement. This has previously been reported to Department).3 I argued most strongly against relating these two questions and this precipitated a long discussion concerning the underlying motives of the Chinese Government.
Rau insisted that his information which turned out to be primarily from Peiping was that the Soviets “were attempting to exercise a moderating influence in the situation” and that the UN was facing not so much Communist imperialism as Chinese nationalism. On this appraisal, said Rau, the UN must beware lest it take action frustrating and driving the Chinese people closer to Moscow.
Saying that I was without any instructions on the Formosa question, it seemed to me that his appraisal of the threat to the UN was different from ours. I expressed the view that the UN was here faced with a revolt against it by an aggressive Communist movement and that if Chinese nationalism were being misused by its leaders, this was no different from what was happening in Russia where the Soviet leaders were perverting Russian nationalism in the direction of foreign adventures.
Rau indicated his awareness of our analysis and he did not press his analysis which in any event I said involved matters of such grave importance that I did not really feel competent to discuss them. I said that these were clearly issues which should be discussed at the proper political levels. Rau agreed and he did leave me with the impression [Page 1485] that he would not take the action re Formosa which he suggested unless both we and the British were in agreement. However, he repeated the importance which he attached to some handling by the UN of the Formosan question. He particularly stressed the 7th Fleet referring to the President’s statement last January and I made the usual explanation and attempted to point out the vast change in circumstances and the gravity of the threat to the free world which had emerged since the President had made his statement in January.
I outlined to Rau on a very tentative basis our suggestion that after the adoption of the six-power resolution the next step should be consideration of a resolution naming the aggressor, calling upon all UN members to assist the UN in repelling that aggressor and perhaps calling upon the Collective Measures Committee to consider the matter and to make recommendations. He said he would report these views to his government for comment.
Reverting to the cease-fire discussion, Rau said that he believed that the demilitarized zone to which he had previously made reference, would under the present circumstances probably be the whole of Korea north of the 38th parallel. He agreed with me that the Chinese Communists must be called upon to withdraw their forces from Korea. He thought that the POC could supervise the implementation of the cease-fire. I did not discuss the question beyond this point fearing to become too deeply involved with Rau in a discussion from which he might imply that we were encouraging him to take an initiative on a cease-fire proposition.
Rau had opened the conversation by advising me he had received no further word from Wu and that no reply had been received concerning the Asiatic declaration. In answer to my question he said that he had no present plan for another meeting with the Chinese Communists.
- December 11.↩
- See footnote 3 to telegram Delga 368 from New York, received at 3 p. m. on December 4, p. 1357.↩
- For related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.↩