795.00/12–850
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
| Participants: | Ambassador Bonnet |
| Assistant Secretary Rusk—FE | |
| Mr. Godley—WE1 |
Ambassador Bonnet called this afternoon at his request to inquire as to the details of the Truman–Attlee talks and to discuss the present situation in the Far East.
I said that notwithstanding certain areas of disagreement the talks have been most helpful. I then briefly reviewed for the Ambassador the military situation in Korea pointing out that we were somewhat encouraged by the report made this morning by General Collins. Although the situation remains serious our troops in Korea still had a lot of fight left in them and the retreat has been orderly. We were, however, fearful of increased enemy air activity and had noted reinforcements, particularly bombers, of the air forces northwest of the Yalu River. For the time being enemy aircraft were appearing in very small numbers, three or six at a time, and we continue to have control of the air. Our tanks were giving a good account for themselves and the latest American tanks definitely outclass the Soviet T–34s. The French battalion is not yet in action but is being “processed” prior to entering the line.
The Ambassador inquired whether General Collins’ report bore on the Truman–Attlee decision to continue the fight in Korea. I said [Page 1480] that it did not in that this decision was taken prior to General Collins’ report.
With reference to the communiqué issued earlier today the Ambassador asked if I could give him any information regarding the discussions concerning Formosa, future economic action against China, and the subject of Southeast Asia. I replied that the discussions only touched briefly upon Formosa and that this, of course, brought up one of the points of disagreement, namely our relations with Communist China. As the Ambassador knew, the President and the Prime Minister did not agree on future action, possibly economic, against Communist China. With reference to SEA I said that this had not been discussed at the top level, but that I had spoken of it to Mr. Scott. We had discussed the matter generally, welcomed the recent French political action and noted that there was unanimity of US–UK views on that area. The Ambassador inquired several times whether the possibility of staff talks regarding SEA was mentioned to which I replied in the negative.
There then ensued a general discussion of Indochina during which the disorders in southern China and the strategic importance of Hainan were mentioned. The latter led the Ambassador to mention the importance his Government attaches to obtaining an aircraft carrier which might be used most effectively in the gulf of Tonkin.
In reference to UN action the Ambassador mentioned conflicting reports he had received from Ambassador Chauvel in New York and the Department relating to our attitude toward a possible cease-fire resolution. He had gained from Ambassador Chauvel the impression that we were opposed to any such UN action and he requested information on this point. I pointed out that Ambassador Chauvel’s information was not quite correct in that although we could not take initiative on such action in the UN we would be interested in examining any such proposal in the light of existing circumstances. I added that while in view of the military situation we deemed it advisable to be neutral on this point, we were nevertheless interested in seeing whatever other countries might present. The Ambassador remarked that this seemed to be a logical and sound position.
The Ambassador then inquired as to the portion of the talks between the President and the Prime Minister relating to Europe and raw materials. I replied that although I had not been present at this portion of the conversations and could not discuss these points with him I understood there had been general agreement on these points. In this connection I remarked that we felt obliged to follow a rather straight and narrow path in that while we agreed that action in Europe must be intensified we could not permit this to result in a total disregard for Far Eastern matters and vice versa.
- G. McMurtrie Godley of the Office of Western European Affairs.↩