Editorial Note
The Chief Public Affairs Officers of 11 United States Missions in Asia met in Singapore from February 22 to February 26, 1950. Posts in the following countries were represented: Burma, Ceylon, Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaya, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet-Nam. This conference convened to consider implementation of the recommendations of the Bangkok Conference [Page 22] of Chiefs of Mission, evaluate the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program, determine ways to create a favorable climate for United States foreign policy in Asia, and devise means to combat the spread of communism. Certain British officials, including Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, participated in the conference discussions on Southeast Asia.
In despatch No. 82, March 9, William R. Langdon, Consul General at Singapore, reported that the Conference had adopted unanimously the following general policy recommendations:
“1. Because of the extremely critical situation which exists today, and will probably continue to exist in the next few years, the entire USIE program should be stepped-up markedly at the earliest possible moment if the United States is to preserve and support free institutions still existing in Asia. Experience in China has shown that USIE must fight an aggressive war if it is to counteract Communism. Efforts to temporize in China were completely unsuccessful. The U.S. Congress should be requested to appropriate substantially increased funds for intensified USIE activities.
2. If it is to achieve success in its counter-offensive against Communism, USIE must use a “double-barreled” strategy: the positive approach which vigorously and dramatically sets forth the benefits and blessings of human freedom and the democratic way of life; and the negative approach, which exposes the inhumanity, duplicity and other evils of the Communist way of life, as it now exists in China and other parts of the world. Recent developments in China prove conclusively that appeasement and attempts at rapprochement have no effect on the inexorable march of the Communists toward their ultimate goal of world domination. The United States has nothing to lose and everything to gain, therefore, in adopting a more vigorous, positive, forthright counter-offensive against an enemy who threatens the progress, welfare and freedom of mankind.
3. The stepped-up program, unanimously and urgently recommended by this Conference, involves the following:
- a.
- Reaching a higher percentage of the total population of each country than has been possible in the past. Experience in China and elsewhere emphasizes the primary importance of reaching youth of all ages and its teachers, the overseas Chinese, labor groups and the masses generally. While millions in China have passed behind the “iron curtain,” there are still vast additional millions in the Far East who have not yet succumbed to the blandishments of the Communist way of life or been forced against their will, as yet, to submit to Communist domination.
- While it is obviously impossible for USIE to reach directly the hundreds of millions who comprise the great undecided Asian masses, this conference believes that it is both feasible and imperative to extend its program downward to reach as high a [Page 23] percentage as possible of the low-level literates. This can be done indirectly through their own natural leaders. The importance of reaching the literate masses of all levels is revealed in a survey made among the PAOs at the Conference. In most cases, they rated the literate masses as their number one target, followed by a secondary audience of government officials and professional classes. See Enclosure No. 5. [Not printed.]
- b.
- If the USIE program is to become increasingly effective in its influence on the peoples of Asia, carefully tailoring its materials (books, pamphlets, posters, moving pictures, etc.) to local interests and conditions, languages, mental maturity and degrees of literacy of the different countries and of the different groups within each country. With this in mind, every operating section of INP, IBD, IMP and ILI should regionalize its output to the fullest extent possible, and extra funds should be allotted to provide suitable material for individual countries of the Far East now menaced by encroaching Communism. In this connection, PAOs will submit to the Department specific data and recommendations on the most important targets within their area and the most effective media for reaching them.
4. Giving recognition to the importance of using all available intelligence and political data as an aid to developing an effective program in each area. Major effort should be made to take advantage of the knowledge acquired by other sections of the diplomatic or consular offices, including those of military attachés. Despite the extra burden and the extra hazard incidental to any identification with intelligence activities, the Conference emphasized the necessity of knowing as much about the area and its peoples as possible, which can be gained by deliberate and systematic efforts on the part of USIE officers to collect and report information relevant to the USIE program.
5. Because the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are a potential “fifth column,” devoting special attention to them. In order to avoid antagonizing all Chinese by accusations against the present Chinese Communist government, the theme of Soviet imperialistic intervention in China should be emphasized rather than the theme of Chinese Communist betrayal of the Chinese people.
6. Giving increased attention in the future to systematic, scientific evaluation and measurement of program results in all media and in all countries. Only in this way can the program be progessively strengthened and expanded and its ultimate goals successfully attained.
Full time USIE evaluation officers should be added to the USIE staffs wherever possible. Such an officer must be thoroughly familiar with techniques of market research and public opinion analysis in order to train local employees who will do the actual survey work in the country. Korea, Thailand, Malaya and Burma request the provision of such an officer at once. If only one can be provided at this time, a pilot project should be initiated with the assignment of one such officer to Manila.” (120.43/3–950)
In a circular instruction of May 26, the Department of State notified the posts which had been represented at the conference that it agreed with the views expressed in recommendations 1–6. (120.43/5–2650)