Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

FMACC Files: Lot 54D5

Final Report of the Joint MDAP Survey Mission to Southeast Asia¹

secret

Washington, December 6, 1950.

To: The FMACC

I have the honor to submit herewith the final recommendations and report of the Joint State–Defense Mutual Defense Assistance Program Survey Mission to Southeast Asia,² together with my own final comments. The country reports for Indochina, Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia have already been submitted.³ Due to internal developments it was not possible for the Mission to visit or make a report on Burma. This final report includes our observations on an area basis together with a few changes in detail on the various country reports. Contrary to our expectations, we have found no call out of our area experience to revise any of our major judgments on any given country. Rather, developments in recent weeks in Indochina, for example, have only served to reinforce our conviction on the magnitude of the general problem, its growing difficulties, the importance of the area to the United States, and the serious menace which the threats and the disturbances in the area present to American security and interests.

In each report submitted by the Mission every member has been given the opportunity to express his views and recommendations. It will have been noted that although on numerous occasions these views and recommendations have differed on various phases and specific details of a given problem, these differences to a large extent have arisen from the particular viewpoint and the specific technical competence of the individual concerned. I am convinced, however, that out of our observations and experience, both singular and collective, the Mission has completed its task with an extraordinary community of views on the broad, general problem of Southeast Asia, its complexities, and its indicated solutions. Despite this general agreement I, of course, assume sole responsibility for the political interpretations and recommendations herein contained.

Throughout the entire extent of our travels, our observations, and our conversations, one major impression grew and developed, namely, the lack of definition and of coordination of American policy and objectives in Southeast Asia. The closest we could come in finding any precision of approach in policy was that American policy is designed to deny to the enemy the area and its resources, both human and material. This is legitimate as far as it goes, but it is not good enough, being both negative and vague. Unless this policy is developed further it will in all probability fail. And it will fail in an atmosphere in which, despite the magnitude of the problems to be solved, a positive and vigorous policy can succeed. We observed political, military, economic and propaganda programs, each doing the best it could in the given circumstances, and each at the same time failing to contribute that which should be expected and that which is obtainable. Wherein arises the difficulty? Wherefrom the failure?

I am convinced that the basic difficulty arises from the failure in responsible American policy circles to answer and define in detail two basic questions: (1) What is Southeast Asia worth to the United States? (2) What is the United States able and willing within the confines of its over-all commitments and its over-all resources to pay for Southeast Asia? Despite various attempts which have been made to answer these two questions we have found nowhere anything other than a reluctance to face up to them or than general and sometimes contradictory answers. Until these questions are answered and American activities oriented in line with the answers, we can only expect that American activities will be aimless, conflicting, and self-defeating. It is of course beyond the competence, the knowledge, and the terms of reference of the Survey Mission to provide the answers; nor will we attempt to do so. We suggest the problem because our own military recommendations for the area have been hypothecated on the intention of the United States to attach the countries of Southeast Asia firmly to the democratic bloc, and our specific military recommendations are designed to secure that objective. We have realized, however, that military activity is only one aspect of the problem and that without precise area and particular objectives, and coordinated over-all programs, the military effort is not only futile but will almost certainly fail at a not negligible cost. I would indicate the area alternatives, as we see them, which should be taken into account in placing the problem of Southeast Asia in the American world context.

There would appear to be three major alternatives of policy. These alternatives are presented on the assumption that loss of any one of the countries to the enemy would almost certainly result in the loss of all the other countries, with the possible exception of the Philippines which presents a specialized problem and where the unique American position and responsibility would, we assume, indicate a kind of intervention different from what we might undertake in other countries:

1. To cut our losses and disengage ourselves entirely from the mainland of Southeast Asia and probably also Indonesia. This decision would be based on a lack of resources to hold the area or a belief that it could not be held regardless of the cost. We have no opinion on available resources, but we are convinced that the area can be held if we are determined to do so. We are also convinced that the broad base of the area wishes to remain with us and to be assisted in doing so.

2. A holding operation which does not anticipate full success on its own merits but which would envisage holding as much as possible, even at a high price, and long enough for some other eventuality to develop which would of its own weight and magnitude automatically solve the general problems or, at least, the menace of Southeast Asia for the United States. However fumbling, open to criticism, and expensive such a solution might be, it could well be justified if there were some definite and properly timed eventuality in mind and planned. It could hardly be justified if that eventuality were only the “miracle solution”, which at times has appeared to be too much the last despairing and defeatist French hope in Indochina.

3. The third solution is the decision that Southeast Asia can be held and that the United States can pay the price. It is not for us to attempt an answer on American ability to pay the price. As I have stated before, we are convinced that the area is willing and able to become and remain in a community of interests and relationship with the United States if we will do the necessary. We are equally persuaded that American interests dictate the accession of the area to the American camp if it is within our capability to bring this about. The local factors which argue for workability of this solution are simple and persuasive.

(a) The strategic location of the area on the communications lines of Asia is self-evident.

(b) The manpower of the countries concerned is larger than that of the United States itself. Its peoples are industrious, intelligent, and in most parts possess ancient and impressive cultural traditions.

(c) Though largely undeveloped, the area possesses great natural wealth and many strategic materials of basic importance to the United States.

(d) Although the standards of living do not begin to approach those of the Atlantic community, the problem of Southeast Asia is nowhere complicated by the corrosive poverty which so tragically characterizes the masses of China and India. Nowhere is there the gnawing cancer of the land problem, except in the Central Luzon plains and in Java, and in these two instances there is a solution to be found in adjacent empty lands—again in distinction to China and India where there are too many people for the land available and simply no plausible place for the large surplus population to migrate.

(e) The overwhelming motif of Southeast Asian thought and emotion is nationalism. There is no need here to explore its whys and wherefores. It is a fact which dominates all Southeast Asian life and a wind which can be slowed-down or speeded-up, changed somewhat in course, but now never reversed or brought to a halt. Now, whatever the cost or whatever the time interval involved, the peoples of Southeast Asia will for all practical purposes in the end become self-determining. The United States has never denied the validity of this concept, and in general has for that matter expressed its sympathy with the movement, thereby incurring the regrettable, if understandable, resentment of the slowly receding colonial powers. The peoples of Asia, on the other hand, are quite aware of this American attitude and have given us a full measure of appreciation for our understanding. Where we have lost sympathy—and we are losing it today at an alarming rate—it is because we have been less vigorous in our support of nationalism than Asia would have wished and because, be it admitted, the problem for us is not simply one of Southeast Asia versus the colonial powers, but has been gravely complicated by issues which are larger than just Southeast Asia. The tragedy is that in several of the countries the Communists have succeeded in capturing the leadership in the nationalist movement and in identifying themselves with it. The Communists have been and are the one organized force which has bitterly and uncompromisingly fought colonialism. Communism as an ideology is understood only by pitifully small groups, and in the areas where the impact of its practices and excesses have been felt it retains its hold only because it can still persuade that it is centrally nationalist and only peripherally something else. Sufficient effort has yet to be made to demonstrate that it represents a tyranny far more onerous and degrading than European colonialism at its worst and the complete negation of those values of religion, community organization, and personal worth which are the very heart-beat of Asian life and culture. If Southeast Asia could be convinced of these ugly facts and strengthened in its inherent belief that they are also the core of America and of American interest in self-determination, there would be no question of which way it would go.

Full recognition should coincidentally be given to the difficulties which would confront this solution. Granted the emphasis in Asiatic thinking on the all-important goal of nationalism, it will be exceedingly difficult for the United States to sell the menace of communism unless it can identify itself with nationalism. In most of Southeast Asia there is no fear of communism as we understand it. For them communism so far is the by-product of nationalism whose ideological doctrines, in so far as they are known at all, do not appear necessarily evil and, in some respects, appear to offer acceptable solutions for some of the many pressing economic problems which beset the area. The task of persuasion will be the more difficult for the lack of experience with their practical application. Although it appears as a unit on the map, the area has historically been largely a prey to centrifugal pulls. Since the war against Japan, progress has been made in building up a cohesiveness largely, it is true, through the impact of nationalism and, in more aware circles, the fear of communism. Much yet remains to be done, however, and must be reckoned with in any area program. Most important perhaps is the appalling amount of illiteracy, the lack of communication among the broad masses, and the absence of any real starvation pressures which result in a significant and widespread apathy. The spoils will go to the leader who can promise something more that is understandable and within the limited horizons of the recipient. In this respect, the appeals and the approach of local leaders have much to teach us. On balance, however, we believe that the strength of our position can be greater than our weakness.

Arising from the foregoing generalities, certain specific problems must be considered. These concern not only the military aspect but also corollary problems and solutions. I should state at this point that in so far as my lack of military competence permits, I concur entirely with the military observations and recommendations made by General Erskine, as attached. (It was apparent from all my own observations and conversations that General Erskine, by his own abilities, accomplishments, understanding and growth, commanded the unqualified respect, confidence and admiration of all officials, both civilian and military, with whom he came in contact. His usefulness in and knowledge of Southeast Asia should by all means be put to the best possible use.)

1. Regional organization. Balancing the arguments for and against which are listed in enclosure 2.⁴ General Erskine has recommended the establishment of a regional MDAP organization. I concur with his reasoning and his recommendation. He of course assumes that the MDAP for Southeast Asia will be on a scale at least as large as that recommended by the Mission or its equivalent. A program of this scope seems to me obviously to require an area approach which would be unnecessary were the program to be limited in size to that of fiscal year 1950. To his reasons I would only add my conviction that even though Burma and Indonesia at present do not figure in the picture there are important political forces which can before long bring them in. My own preference would be for a separate theatre of operations rather than having Southeast Asia under CINCPAC or CINCFE. The problems of Southeast Asia are sufficiently unique, and there is enough growing cohesiveness in the area, to warrant its treatment as an area and avoid complicating it by the inclusion of such disparate areas as Formosa, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The same applies at the moment to India, although it is not inconceivable that developments in the predictable future would counsel a reappraisal.

Although I would agree that the commanding military officer in the theatre should have appropriate rank and authority over strictly military matters, I could not agree that his authority should extend into other realms. His relationship to the various ambassadors should be that of a partnership, with each having authority in his own field and differences to be resolved on a high level in Washington. This raises the question of a broader regional organization which I would recommend along the following lines:

Some time ago consideration was given to the establishment of a regional organization, possibly along lines somewhat comparable to the British organization in Southeast Asia which surrounds the person of Malcolm MacDonald. At that time the idea was discarded for good and sufficient reasons. I believe the time has now come when it might be profitable to reconsider that proposal. With the present state of the China debacle; with the events in Korea, Japan, and Formosa; with the unsettled attitude of India; and with the growing closeness of Southeast Asian countries, I believe that some form of regional American organization in the area could perform a useful function, not only for our own representatives but also to encourage the local countries to strengthen their own intra-area relationships, of which the first sign was the Baguio meeting last spring. Every one of our ambassadors with whom we worked at one time or another expressed the need for closer cooperation of the countries concerned and for a greater exchange of ideas and opinions among our own people in the area. None of this reflected any criticism of the coordinating work of the Department in Washington but, rather, a belief that there was a type of coordination to supplement Washington to be done in the area, arising from a greater closeness to the actual scene. The person designated for this job would have coordinating and advisory responsibilities, but without executive or administrative authority, similar to the case with the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia who must rely largely for his authority on his own personal persuasiveness and the common sense of his recommendations. He would necessarily spend much of his time traveling so that he could speak with the authority of intimate first-hand knowledge. He by no means necessarily need be a famous name in the United States and, in fact, might better not be too well known in order to avoid arousing undue suspicions of American intentions. His interests would include the political, economic, military and propaganda; and the regional MDAP organization would be attached to his office. In other respects his staff would be kept to an absolute minimum, probably not exceeding two or three officers with appropriate supporting staff. His headquarters should be in Manila since that is the focus of American activities in the area and has the most adequate administrative facilities. The reasons against locating him in any other country are obvious. I would suggest that the title of commissioner-general or commissioner not be used in order to avoid the association with British and French colonialism. He might be an ambassador-at-large, or better, diplomatic agent, with appropriate rank. Concentration of appropriate functions in his office could eliminate many of the conflicts and contradictions which will inevitably arise with expanding American activities in various fields.

2. Native troops. One of the most serious weaknesses in all countries has been the failure properly to develop the use of native troops. This has been particularly striking in Indochina. The arguments on the incompetence of these troops are too well known to need recapitulation. The answer is that the Viet Minh uses them exclusively. The bandits in Malaya, the dissidents in Indonesia, and the Huks in the Philippines all demonstrate that native troops can and will fight if they believe that they have something to fight for. Furthermore, white troops will always be associated with colonialism, and even granting as most Southeast Asians do that withdrawal of white troops now would precipitate an immediate Communist victory, the new governments and peoples cannot be expected to cooperate fully in the anti-Communist struggle until they are given that kind of confidence and psychological fillip which can come from having their own armies, and with it the knowledge that their views and opinions will carry the weight which they can acquire from having force at their disposal. There is, of course, danger that this force will be turned against us, but as contrasted with the certain danger arising from Southeast Asian determination that its peoples will be independent, it appears the lesser of the risks. The former is a risk, the latter well-nigh a certainty. It might even prove possible in time to organize a Southeast Asian expeditionary force available for use anywhere in the area.

White manpower is strictly limited and its commitments are heavy. The Russians have learned the trick of using others to fight their battles. It is time that we learned the trick of at least having Asians fight Asian battles before we find that our manpower resources have reached the danger point of exhaustion. Even though there is and will continue to be great need for American aid in various forms, it is now in order that Asia learn to do more for itself in the military as well as in other fields. It is also high time that those Asiatics who are allied with our enemy learn that they do not represent all Asia and that most of Asia opposes them when given the chance. Much of the stigma of colonialism can be removed if, where necessary, yellow men will be killed by yellow men rather than by white men alone.

3. Counterpart funds. Consideration should be given to greater flexibility in the counterpart funds expected from the countries in the area. Despite their basic wealth, none of these countries is today in the kind of financial position where it can afford the cost of modern warfare on anything approaching the scale to which we are accustomed. By no means the least important aspect of denying Southeast Asia to communism is that the countries must be self-supporting and prosperous. That is the aim of our economic program. If, at the same time, the military phase requires unduly onerous contributions from the recipient governments, the economic program will be defeated. It can be accepted as axiomatic that no amount of force will succeed unless there is a reasonable minimum of economic stability. Forces which are now at work in Southeast Asia are greater and more powerful than force itself. It is therefore recommended that financial contribution to be made by Southeast Asia be adjusted in the light of its capacities.

4. Caliber of MAAG personnel. Since our recommendations for matériel necessarily include provision for widespread training by American cadres, selection of personnel is of supreme importance. With the spread of nationalism American training must be far more persuasion than compulsion. The extent of persuasion will in no small measure depend upon the abilities, caliber, and understanding of the men selected. They should therefore be among the finest in the American armed services. In this respect, the selections made so far are anything but encouraging and must be remedied at the earliest possible moment unless much of our impact is to be wasted, if not positively harmful.

5. Intelligence. One of the most depressing lacks we encountered was the quality of intelligence available to us wherever we traveled. Almost without exception we were compelled to do the basic work which should have been available in each office we visited. Not only was the information inadequate, its interpretation was faulty. These observations apply not only to Southeast Asia, but also to Hong Kong which we visited briefly. In the latter case, we expected comprehensive coverage and understanding of developments in China and of our particular interest in the Indochina border. We did not find them. This deficiency applied to all agencies concerned with intelligence work. None were performing satisfactorily and, with only a few honorable exceptions, the individuals concerned were not qualified to discharge their responsibilities. Considering the imminent peril in which the United States finds itself, it is at best shocking that those who are charged with formulating policy should be forced to do so on the basis of faulty and even misleading information. It is little exaggeration to say that in the circumstances the situation approaches malfeasance. The dreadful lesson of Korea should be enough, but even a drastic improvement in personnel is not enough.

We also found a great need for intelligence coordination on an area basis. Although there is some exchange between countries and some between services, it is inadequate. Much of the exchange which does exist goes from a given country back to Washington and thence is returned to other countries. When it is received it is frequently too late to be of value and lacks in the kind of intimate area understanding which comes best from within the area. It is therefore recommended that a central coordinating intelligence organization for all concerned services be established in Manila through which all information would be filtered for checking, correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the area. The output, in addition to local dissemination, could be sent directly to Washington, if any particular service so desired it. But we do feel strongly that the process described above should be going on coincidentally within the area.

6. The Philippines. The unique American record and position in the Philippines creates a special problem. To Asia the Philippines is the American show window on Asia and the tangible evidence of American intentions and performance. Asia does not find the results encouraging at the moment. The President and the Secretary of State have said publicly that aggression against the Philippines will not be tolerated. We assume this includes internal as well as external aggression. We assume that communism, however Filipinized it might appear, will be considered as aggression and a threat to the security of the United States. In brief, we assume that the Philippine experiment must and will succeed, and that any measure necessary thereto will be undertaken. I shall not consider here the economic aspects of the problem, which have been so ably analyzed and handled by the Bell Mission⁵ and whose report is now in process of implementation. I shall suggest three points on the military side which are in addition to our general military recommendations for matériel and training:

(a) Stockpiling. Wherever we went in Southeast Asia we found a disposition to believe that the United States means what it says about military aid. There was, however, a skepticism as to our ability to provide such aid in a crisis, due to an intervening distance of more than 10,000 miles. This skepticism suggested to us the possibility of stockpiling in the Philippines, where the matériel would be available on short notice and would provide a certain flexibility in the redistribution of equipment between various countries in the light of developing circumstances. Stockpiling would not only have beneficial results throughout the area, but would have a particularly sobering effect upon certain undesirable and ambitious Philippine elements.

(b) It is further recommended that two American divisions be stationed in the Philippines. The presence of American troops would help to alleviate the military burden which the Philippine Government is now carrying and which is greater than its resources can long stand, it would discourage unruly elements, and would add greater stability. The President of the Philippines indicated to me that he would welcome additional American troops.

(c) Additional Philippine troops. The suggestion has been advanced that the Philippine Scouts be reactivated. There is much to be said for this proposal although it possesses the old disadvantage of American officers commanding Filipinos and Filipinos receiving advantages denied Philippine troops. Perhaps a better alternative would be for the United States to organize, train and entirely pay for two additional Philippine divisions for as long as necessary, thus establishing a future hard core of a good army which could be reduced in size when the Communist threat has been removed. During the period of danger the United States would at the same time, of course, need to be importantly concerned with the organization, training, and promotion system of the entire army, to ensure that it reached satisfactory standards.

7. Propaganda. If American activities are to have the desired impact, they must be well and properly advertised. Such is not the case at present. I recognize the handicaps under which the USIS is operating, its difficulties, and the limitations on its activities, but this must be changed. At present we are talking over the heads of Southeast Asia, and doing so inadequately. Wherever we went we found the same story—a mass of material of which relatively little was pointed directly at Southeast Asia and, therefore, was not only missing the mark but also causing important Southeast Asian elements to ask just what we were after, what did we think we were doing anyway, and what did all this mean? Everywhere we found agreement that the most effective instrument of USIS so far is the libraries. This is all well and good as a long-range program which by all means should be continued and increased, but it does not produce results today. Current activities need advertising today—not tomorrow.

Most importantly in talking to Southeast Asia today, we must learn the psychology of poor people—at best a difficult lesson for Americans to learn—a lesson which the Russians have already learned altogether too well. It is not enough that we try to teach Southeast Asia to understand us; it is perhaps even more important that we learn to understand them. Until we do learn that, we will never understand their apathy in the face of communism, nor will we ever really learn how to interpret America and American democracy to peoples for whom the United States is still a legendary land half-way around the world. Nor will we learn that we must first make clear to them the menace of Chinese and Russian imperialism, which they can understand, and thence identify communism with those imperialisms.

8. Economic. Since the economic aspects of the Southeast Asian problem have been most adequately covered in the report of the Griffin Mission, I shall not consider them here.

In conclusion I would state that if we are to ally Southeast Asia to ourselves, the decision to do so must be taken now. The issue of China has been settled. The future and meaning of Korea are still unsettled and uneasy. The role and attitude of India are a growing shadow across the face of Asia, influenced by events in China and, in turn, influencing Southeast Asia. Under these pressures the time of decision on the future of Southeast Asia has long since arisen above the horizon and is reaching for the zenith. Everything we have seen and heard convinces us that the area can be held if we will it. But it must be done now. In the eyes of Asia, failure will for the predictable future compromise, if not destroy, American influence and prestige. America without Asia will have been reduced to the Western Hemisphere and a precarious foothold on the western fringe of the Eurasian continent. Success will vindicate and give added meaning to America and the American way of life.

Respectfully submitted,

John Fremont Melby

Chairman, Joint State–Defense
MDAP Survey Mission

1. Circulated in the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee as FMACC D–33/11 Final Report, December 11, 1950.
2. Enclosure 1, “Area Report on Southeast Asia by the Military Group of the Joint State-Survey Mission to Southeast Asia,” is not printed.
3. With the exception of the covering letter of the Mission’s report on Indochina, August 6 (p. 840), none of the reports on individual nations is printed.
4. Enclosure 2, Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, U.S.M.C., re “Regional Group”, is not printed.
5. For documentation on the economic survey mission to the Philippines headed by Daniel W. Bell, which submitted its report in October 1950, see pp. 1399 ff.