Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

790.00/11–3050

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles ¹ to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, November 30, 1950.

Between my morning and afternoon meetings with Senators Taft² and Millikin,³ I jotted down the enclosed notes which I read to Millikin and Taft in the afternoon, indicative of my own initial reactions to the Korean developments.⁴

John Foster Dulles

[Annex]

Paper Prepared by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington, November 30, 1950.]

Estimate of Situation

1. Developments in Asia confirm that there is a comprehensive program, in which the Soviet and Chinese communists are cooperating, designed as a present phase to eliminate all Western influence on the Asiatic mainland, and probably also in relation to the islands of Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and Indonesia. It would be reckless not to assume that such a program has been carefully worked out and that steps are being prepared to implement all its various aspects. What has happened shows that our policies have been sound in so far as they have recognized the impossibility of separating the Chinese and Soviet communists, at least for the predictable future. The mistake has been inadequate appraisal of the danger that resulted from the hostile alliance. Through underestimating the risks, we may have been sucked into a major military disaster in Korea which could not only gravely impair, for a time, the military capability of the United States everywhere, but which would have grave psychological repercussions upon the Japanese nation and the countries and islands of South East Asia.

The repercussions will not be limited to Asia, but will extend to Western Europe and the British Commonwealth. These countries have misjudged the situation in China even more seriously than have we. Nevertheless, they have until now deferred to our policies, particularly in relation to Korea. If these policies lead to a major disaster, they may be less disposed to follow us in the future, despite the fact that in reality our policies were more nearly right than were theirs.

2. As far as the future position in Asia is concerned, it would seem that we must now more closely limit ourselves to areas subject to sea and air power, which fits our natural role.

3. The question of whether we can hold on in Korea and if so, where, is of course a military one. From a political standpoint, however, it is important to hold at least a sizable beachhead in south Korea so as to deny this area to communist military concentrations which, with the concentration already present in Sakhalin Island, would put Japan in position where the nation would probably reconcile itself to falling into the Soviet communist orbit. It would not now seem practical to proceed with a formal Japanese peace treaty, but if Japan is not to fall under communist control, a major political effort is required. This would doubtless involve some sort of agreement with Japan which, while short of a formal peace treaty, would restore to Japan a large measure of self-government together with the capacity and, we might hope, the will to use her strength in the cause of the free world, or at least to make the exertions necessary to prevent communist conquest of this area, which with its industrial power and trained and disciplined manpower is a dominate [dominant] factor in Asia and the Pacific.

4. As regards Vietnam, it would seem that this situation would need to be reconsidered in the light of what might be a hopeless military situation, given the efforts which the Chinese communists seem prepared to make.

5. It would seem that there should be a review of our attitude towards Formosa. Our sea and air power and the presence of the Chinese Nationalists, should make it possible to salvage Formosa, and perhaps use it as a base for covert and perhaps open Chinese activities against the China mainland, which would at least divert the Chinese government (communist).

6. Consideration should be given to the possibility of stimulating guerrilla and insurrectional activities in China against the Communist government. We presently have good will and friends, but this will not be indefinitely available in the face of propaganda and purge.

7. It would seem important to accelerate some understanding with Australia and New Zealand, the only two dependable countries in the Pacific area.

8. So far as Europe is concerned, it must, I think, be taken as doubtful that there will be time to create an effective European army at the rate this is now moving, or perhaps even at the optimum rate. If so, the question of the best use of our economic, military and manpower resources would need to be reconsidered.

9. In general, it would seem that consideration should be given to the possibility of stepping up subversive activities within areas of Soviet control, where ever there are any elements available for such purposes. We can not safely go on playing a purely defensive role, as this enables the potential enemy to organize themselves at one place or another with a pre-arranged time table which we have no will or capacity to disarrange. Our best defense lies in exploiting potential Jealousies, rivalries, and disaffections within the present area of Soviet communist control so as to divert them from external adventures to the problem of attempting to consolidate an already over-extended position.

1. Consultant to the Secretary of State.
2. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio.
3. Senator Eugene D. Millikin of Colorado.
4. During the last week in November, United Nations forces advancing toward the Yalu River were driven back by Chinese Communist counterattacks: for documentation on Chinese intervention in the Korean War, see volume vii.