Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 61D167: File—NSC 84 Series

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council1

top secret
NSC 84/2

The Philippines

1.
The United States has as its objectives in the Philippines the establishment and maintenance of:
a.
An effective government which will preserve and strengthen the pro-U.S. orientation of the people.
b.
A Philippine military capability of restoring and maintaining internal security.2
c.
A stable and self-supporting economy.
2.
To accomplish the above objectives, the United States should:
a.
Use all appropriate measures to assure that the Philippine Government effects political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms in order to improve the stability of the country.
b.
Provide such military guidance and assistance as may be deemed advisable by the United States and acceptable to the Philippine Government.
c.
Extend, under United States supervision and control, appropriate economic assistance in the degree corresponding to progress made toward creating the essential conditions of internal stability.
d.
Continue to assume responsibility for the external defense of the Islands and be prepared to commit United States forces, if necessary, to prevent communist control of the Philippines.3
[Enclosure]

National Security Council Staff Study

top secret
[NSC 84/2]

The Position of the United States With Respect to the Philippines

the problem

1. To determine the position of the United States with respect to the Philippines.

analysis

United States Interest in the Philippines.

2. The relationship, the military commitments, and the moral obligations of the United States to the Philippines are unique. The United States was responsible for the creation of the Philippine state and the independence and stability of the Philippine Republic are a fundamental interest of the United States. It is implicit in the agreement of March 14, 1947 that the mutuality of interests of the U.S. and the Philippines calls for common action, if necessary, to maintain the security of the Philippines.4

3. The independence of the Philippines testifies to the recognition by the United States that nationalism in Asia is a basic reality which cannot be ignored. Failure of the Philippines to maintain independence would discredit the United States in the eyes of the world and seriously decrease U.S. influence, particularly in Asia. Collapse of the present Philippine Government or any constitutional successor might [Page 1516] immediately and probably would eventually result in seizure of governmental power by the communists. Failure of the Philippine Government to maintain its pro-U.S. orientation would also probably result in the early seizure of governmental power by the communists. Such an eventuality would seriously increase the danger of communist control on the mainland of Southeast Asia and in Indonesia.

4. It is the policy of the United States to strengthen its position in the Pacific area, particularly with respect to the Philippines, Japan and the Ryukyus. As Japan reassumes her position as an independent Pacific nation, the United States favors the establishment of friendly political and economic relations between Japan and the Philippines and hopes that the simultaneous sound development of these two nations will contribute to the stability of the Pacific area.

U.S. Security Considerations.

5. The Philippines are an essential part of the Asian off-shore island chain of bases on which the strategic position of the United States in the Far East depends. The threat of further communist encroachment in Formosa and Southeast Asia renders it imperative that the security of the Philippines be assured. The United States is committed to the external defense of the Islands and cannot permit them to be taken by aggression or internal subversion. The strategic importance of the Philippines to the United States is such as to justify the commitment of United States forces for its protection should circumstances require such action.

6. From the viewpoint of the USSR, the Philippine Islands could be the key to Soviet control of the Far East. Soviet domination of these Islands would seriously jeopardize the entire structure of anti-communist defenses in Southeast Asia and the offshore island chain, including Japan. Therefore, the situation in the Philippines cannot be viewed as a local problem since communist domination would endanger the United States military position in the Western Pacific and the Far East.

7. From the military point of view, the immediate security interests of the United States in the Philippine Islands include occupied installations, certain bases under treaty provisions not now occupied or in use, and U.S. armed forces personnel and material. In addition, there are other areas in the Islands which may be needed for operational use.

8. There is implicit in the United States-Philippine Agreement of 1947 authority for the United States to determine the garrison strength required for the local protection of United States bases in the Philippines.

9. Military intervention in the Philippine Islands would be justified only on the basis of a clear, present, and over-riding military necessity. [Page 1517] Such a necessity cannot now be demonstrated. Although there may be some reason for concern regarding the local security of United States installations in the Philippines, strengthening of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), Philippines, has been accomplished and it is expected that it will contribute to the internal security of the country and to the security of U.S. installations. Present conditions do not indicate a requirement for stationing additional Army units there.

External Security.

10. External threats to the Philippines appear to be relatively remote at this time. An enemy invasion does not appear feasible at this time and, in all probability, would not be undertaken unless Formosa had first come under communist control. In view of the U.S. commitment for external defense of the Islands, a sound Philippine military policy justifies maximum emphasis on effective forces required for internal security and, under existing conditions, minimum expenditure for defense against external invaders.

Internal Security.

11. The sole apparent military threat to the internal security of the Philippine Republic at present lies in the guerrilla operations of the Hukbalahaps (Huks), who now call themselves “Peoples Liberation Army”. Although on the basis of military factors alone the Huks lack the capability to acquire control of the Philippines, their continued existence, growth, and activities reflect the ineffectiveness of the Philippine armed forces and the generally unsatisfactory social, economic, and political situation in the Philippines.

12. The large Chinese minority in the Philippines is a potential source of subversion. As the influence of the Chinese communists becomes greater in Asia this important ethnic group might contribute to a situation in which an armed and militant communist minority could seize power from a corrupt and discredited regime.

13. Opposed to the Huks are some 26,0005 relatively well-armed troops who are supported by the civil police. JUSMAG, Philippines, is now engaged in assisting and stimulating the Philippine armed forces. If these forces are trained, adequately equipped, and financed, they can develop the military capability for the eventual elimination of the Huks. In fact, the Philippine armed forces, in accordance with present plans, should, by aggressive and well-directed action and leadership, be able to eliminate the Huks as a serious threat within one year, provided that the Huks receive no substantial materiel support from outside and provided further that the political situation in the Philippines can be stabilized.

[Page 1518]

Political Considerations.

14. Denial of the Philippines to communist control depends not only upon military measures but even more upon prompt vigorous political and economic action. The present situation in the Philippines is of such gravity that military assistance may prove unavailing unless solutions are found rapidly for the pressing political and economic problems now facing the country.

15. The Philippine Government has lacked the courage and initiative to take bold, vigorous measures to wipe out corruption in government, to create a stable administrative system and to encourage confidence in the government and in the future of the country on the part of the people. Leadership in the Philippine Government has been largely in the hands of a small group of individuals representing the wealthy propertied class who, except in isolated instances, have failed to appreciate the need for reform and the pressures generated among the less prosperous and more numerous groups of the population.

16. The leadership of the Philippine Government, while friendly to the United States, is extremely sensitive and suspicious of actions by the United States which would appear in Philippine eyes to be an infringement of national sovereignty. Not only Philippine public opinion but Asiatic opinion generally would prove particularly sensitive to any step by the United States which could be interpreted as implying a revocation or abridgment of Philippine independence.

Economic Considerations.

17. Due to the effect of the war and the failure of the Philippine Government to take adequate measures to increase productive efficiency since the war, the economic situation in the Philippines has deteriorated to a grave degree. The basic economic problems in the Philippines are inefficient production and extremely low incomes. Although substantial recovery in production occurred after the liberation, agricultural and industrial output per capita is still below the pre-war level, government finances have become steadily worse and are now critical, and the international payments position of the country is seriously deteriorated.

18. In agriculture, the area under cultivation was brought to the pre-war level and the livestock population partially restored. However, almost nothing was done to open new lands for the increased population, to improve methods of cultivation, or to better the position of farm workers and tenants.

19. The opportunity to increase production efficiency and to raise the standard of living during the post-war period has been wasted, largely due to misdirected investment and excessive imports for consumption. [Page 1519] Inequalities in the Philippines, always large, have become greater during the past few years while the standard of living of the mass of people has not reached the pre-war level. The profits of businessmen and the incomes of large land owners have risen considerably.

20. The deterioration of the economic system has caused a widespread feeling of disillusionment among the population. Most agricultural and industrial workers have no faith that the economic position can or will be improved. Filipino as well as foreign businessmen are fearful of the economic future of the country. The uncertainties created by these doubts are strengthened by the recent tendency toward unemployment.

21. The communist-led Hukbalahap movement has taken advantage of the deteriorating economic situation and exploited the antagonistic attitudes of the people toward the government in order to incite lawlessness and disorder.

22. The President of the United States dispatched to the Philippines an Economic Survey Mission, which has completed an exhaustive survey of the Philippine economic situation and has submitted recommendations for improvement.6 The Mission’s recommendations contemplate governmental reforms, reorganization and improvement of agricultural and industrial production, increased rates of taxation, and more efficient collection of taxes.

23. The Mission stresses the necessity of a program of widespread social and economic reforms, which, coupled with increased production and more competent management, the Mission finds necessary to restore the elements of sound and stable government. The Mission recommends, contingent upon the institution of these reforms by the Philippine Government, a substantial program of financial assistance through loans and grants to be carried out under supervision by representatives of the United States Government.

Method of Action.

24. The security interests of, the United States require that the Philippines become and remain stable, anti-communist, pro-American, and an example for the rest of the world of the intention of the United States to encourage the establishment of progressive and responsible governments. This entails the reassertion of U.S. influence to the extent required to eliminate prevalent corruption, provide efficient administrative services, and restore public faith in the concept of government in the best interests of the people.

25. Owing to the extreme sensitivity of Philippine officials and the [Page 1520] people in general on the question of their national sovereignty, the extent and manner in which the necessary influence is brought to bear on the Philippine Government to accomplish essential reforms presents to the United States Government a most difficult and delicate problem. It is not to be expected that broad social and economic reforms can be brought about quickly or easily, even with the best of intentions on the part of the Philippine Government. Extreme care must therefore be exercised in the methods used to persuade the Philippine Government to take the necessary action.

26. It would appear, however, that this Government has no choice except to attempt to help the Filipinos bring about the necessary reforms since to do nothing would result in disaster. It should be made clear that disaster can be avoided by vigorous action on the part of the Philippine Government accompanied by the economic and advisory assistance which the United States will be prepared to extend.

conclusions

27. The United States has as its objectives in the Philippines the establishment and maintenance of:

a.
An effective government which will preserve and strengthen the pro-U.S. orientation of the people.
b.
A Philippine military capability of restoring and maintaining internal security.7
c.
A stable and self-supporting economy.

28. To accomplish the above objectives, the United States should:

a.
Persuade the Philippine Government to effect political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms in order to improve the stability of the country.
b.
Provide such military guidance and assistance as may be deemed advisable by the United States and acceptable to the Philippine Government.
c.
Extend, under United States supervision and control, appropriate economic assistance in the degree corresponding to progress made toward creating the essential conditions of internal stability.
d.
Continue to assume responsibility for the external defense of the Islands and be prepared to commit United States forces, if necessary, to prevent communist control of the Philippines.8

  1. This policy statement and accompanying staff study were circulated to the National Security Council as document NSC 84/2 under cover of a title page reading “A Report, to the President by the National. Security Council on The Position of the United States with Respect to the Philippines, November 9, 1950,” and a brief explanatory note of November 9 by Council Executive Secretary Lay.

    A policy paper on the Philippines by the National Security Council was originally requested by President Truman in late May 1950. The earliest draft of such a paper, prepared by the Department of State, was circulated to the National Security Council Staff on June 20 (see p. 1461), and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were circulated to the Council Staff on September 14 (see NSC 84, p. 1484). Based upon a new Department of State draft which incorporated the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the results of the United States Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, the National Security Council Staff during October developed a draft statement of policy on the Philippines and an accompanying staff study on the position of the United States with respect to the Philippines. Versions of the draft policy statement and staff study were circulated to the Under Secretary of State’s Meeting as document UM D–122, November 2, not printed. UM D–122, which differed little from the text subsequently circulated as NSC 84/1 (see below), was discussed at the Under secretary’s Meeting of November 3 (see p. 1509). The final version of the National Security Council Staff’s draft policy statement and staff study were circulated to the Council as document NSC 84/1, November 6, not printed. Differences between NSC 84/1 and the approved version printed here are indicated in footnotes 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8, below At their 71st meeting, the National Security Council considered NSC 84/1, adopting the version of the policy statement printed here and modifying the staff study to correspond to the amended policy statement. A note of November 13 by National Security Council Executive Secretary Lay for the Council, not printed, reported that President Truman on November 10 approved the statement printed here and directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

    Full documentation, on the genesis of NSC 84/1 is included in the Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 61D167, File—Philippines: NSC 84 Series.

  2. In NSC 84/1, this paragraph included the following additional phrase: “and deterring external aggression.” At their meeting on November 9, the National Security Council approved an amendment proposed by the Secretary of State providing for the deletion of the phrase.
  3. The clause “and be prepared to commit United States forces, if necessary, to prevent communist control of the Philippines” was not included in NSC 84/1. The addition of the clause was proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was approved by the National Security Council at their meeting on November 9.
  4. In NSC 84/1, the final sentence of this paragraph read as follows: “The security and defense of the Philippines are guaranteed by the United States under the terms of the agreement of March 19, 1947, between the two countries.” The revised sentence printed here resulted from an amendment adopted by the NSC Staff and further modified by the National Security Council at their meeting on November 9.
  5. In early versions of this staff study, the number 33,000 was used at this point.
  6. For the Report to the President by the United States Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, October 9, see p. 1497.
  7. In NSC 84/1, this paragraph included the following additional phrase: “and deterring external aggression.” At their meeting on November 9, the National Security Council modified the paragraph to make it correspond with the amended statement of policy (supra).
  8. The phrase “and be prepared to commit United States forces, if necessary, to prevent communist control of the Philippines” was not included in NSC 84/1. At their meeting on November 9, the National Security Council modified the paragraph to make it correspond with the amended statement of policy (supra).