Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Under Secretary’s Meetings Files: Lot 53 D 250: File—UM Minutes—Memos

Record of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, November, 1950¹

November 1950

top secret
UM M–264

The Position of the United States with Respect to the Philippines (UM D–122)²

1. Mr. Lacy³ reviewed the importance of the Philippines to the United States and discussed the present conditions in that country. He noted that Mr. Foster will discuss the Bell report with President Quirino in an effort to emphasize the internal reforms which are necessary prior to United States assistance.⁴ Mr. Lacy pointed out that this paper had been prepared at the request of the President and was drafted in the Department. It was also noted that the military agreed generally with the stated position. It was emphasized that this paper suggested direct and indirect participation by the United States in the Philippine Government. It was also noted that the assistance proposed would be long range, conditioned on the Philippine Government meeting certain minimal requisites. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the paper does not include the proposal that the United States should strengthen our own forces in the Philippines. Since this point is unresolved at the moment, it was decided to leave this matter out of this paper.

2. Mr. Armstrong⁵ pointed out that the reference to 33,000 well-armed troops is inconsistent with the G–2 report as of yesterday that Philippine forces amounted to only 25,000.⁶ Mr. Lacy suggested that the larger figure used in this paper included constabulary not yet drawn into the forces. He agreed to check this point.

3. Mr. Ohly⁷ objected to paragraph 1–b as it related to “deterring external aggression”. He felt that this reference was unrealistic in view of the internal economic conditions in the Philippines, which do not permit the Government to maintain a force sufficiently strong to deter external aggression. He agreed that as conditions improve in the Philippines these forces could be built up in order to discourage such aggression. Mr. Rusk pointed out that it should not be assumed that the Philippines would never be in a position to deter such aggression. It was agreed that the question raised by Mr. Ohly was a matter of timing, and changes in wording would be worked out with Mr. Lacy.⁸

4. Mr. Ohly stated that information which he has would indicate that the communists in labor unions are a problem with respect to internal security. Mr. Lacy doubted this report and pointed out that probably the communists in labor unions would disappear once the economic conditions in the Philippines improve.

5. With respect to paragraph 13, Mr. Ohly suggested that the wording was a bit too optimistic regarding elimination of the Huks. With respect to the first sentence of paragraph 14, Mr. Ohly suggested that the sentence be reworded so it would indicate that denial of the Philippines to communist control would depend less upon military measures and much more upon prompt vigorous political and economic action. Mr. Lacy said that this was the intended meaning of this sentence.

6. Mr. Humelsine⁹ pointed out that the Department had been slow to work with the Quirino Government. He suggested that it might have been wiser for the United States to work more closely with the Philippine Government rather than waiting until the situation had deteriorated so far. He felt that our reservations with respect to the Quirino Government probably had restricted our support of the Philippines and perhaps now that we are willing to support the Philippine Government it would be much more costly. Mr. Rusk pointed out that there had been some doubt as to whether President Quirino could carry the load expected of him in the present crisis. It appears now that he has recovered and we feel that he can now do the job. Mr. Lacy stated that if the United States had made a move to assist Quirino last January, for example, Quirino would have been very pleased and probably would not have corrected the internal situation within the Government. Things have now deteriorated so far that the United States has a lever in order to press for necessary internal reforms.

7. The question of working with governments such as Quirino’s was raised. Mr. Rusk referred to the important domestic public relations problem that the Department has in working with governments such as Quirino’s. He felt that the P area had an important job to do in this respect. The people of the United States must realize that we cannot dictate who rule foreign countries. They must also realize that we cannot make these rulers over in our image. Mr. McGhee¹⁰ agreed to this and pointed out that these governments, even though they are not ideal, are the instrumentalities to accomplish our objectives. The Department should be careful not to give adverse publicity to these governments and should continue to work through them in order to strengthen them, and, it is hoped, to correct some of their abuses. In every case we have no choice and must work through these governments. The United States must recognize the necessity of working through these governments in an effort to stabilize them and improve them. Mr. Webb agreed with this point and suggested that more be done with respect to the domestic public relations problem.

1. The top-level officers of the Department of State (Assistant Secretary of State-level) or their alternates met frequently, often several times weekly, under the Chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State, as the “Under Secretary’s Meeting”, to discuss important foreign policy problems. Agenda were prepared, documents were circulated to members, and meeting transactions and summaries of action were recorded. Secretariat functions for the Under Secretary’s Meeting were performed by officers of the Executive Secretariat. Twenty-two officers attended the meeting recorded here.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 1 to NSC 84/2, November 9, p. 1514.
3. William S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
4. Regarding the Foster Mission to the Philippines under reference here, see the editorial note, infra.
5. William Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.
6. See paragraph 13 of the National Security Council Staff Study on the Philippines, NSC 84/2, November 9, p. 1517.
7. John H. Ohly, Acting Director, Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
8. The Summary of Acting of this meeting (UM S–264), reads as follows: “This paper will be revised, prior to the meeting of the NSC Senior Staff, to include changes in wording suggested by Mr. Ohly.” Despite the efforts of the representatives of the Department of State, the proposed changes were not approved by the NSC Senior Staff and were included in the papers circulated to the National Security Council as NSC 84/1 (see footnote 1 to NSC 84/2, November 9, p. 1514). In a memorandum of November 8 to the Secretary of State, Ohly renewed his strong disagreement with the inclusion of the phrase “and deterring external aggression” in paragraph 1–b of the draft statement of policy on the Philippines and in paragraph 27–b of the accompanying staff study (NSC 84/1). In his memorandum, Ohly argued that the development, at least over a period of several years, of a Philippine military capability of deterring external aggression was an unrealistic and unwise objective, and that it would be a serious mistake to include in a statement of national policy a completely unrealistic objective. (Executive Secretariat Files, Dot 61D167, File—NSC 84 Series) Regarding the deletion of the phrase in question from approved policy statement and staff study circulated as NSC 84/2, November 9, see footnotes 2 and 7 thereto, pp. 1514 and 1520, respectively.
9. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.
10. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.