694.001/12–2950
The United States Adviser to SCAP 1 (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
1280. Topad. Remytel 1279, December 29.2 Gascoigne said he had long conversations with highest levels British Government, including Bevin, other Cabinet ministers, chiefs of staff, et cetera, on question Japanese peace treaty. He said consensus UK governmental level is [Page 1393] that peace treaty must be negotiated without delay and that Foreign Office is presently drafting treaty for Cabinet approval.3 Draft will in due course be presented US Government when latter presents its draft. General concept of treaty in his opinion will be entirely acceptable US, former ideas concerning restrictions, controls, inspections, and similar restrictive measures having been abandoned. Two points concerning which US would probably not agree will be advance (1) some restriction of Jap shipping on ground Japan does not require shipping or shipbuilding facilities presently available to it (2) provision re division Jap gold bullion. In either event, however, Gascoigne felt these provisions would not be pushed too hard.
On question rearmament Japan, Gascoigne said chiefs of staff are agreed Japan’s rearmament inevitable and hopeful this can be undertaken earliest possible; it felt however, little can be done along these lines pending negotiation treaty of peace, as present regime of control precludes rearmament. When asked whether he felt Japan’s economy could stand strain of rearmament, Gascoigne replied British feel US must provide financial assistance and equipment for rearmament.
Gascoigne assured me consensus UK Government is that earliest possible peace treaty desirable and that it hopes measures will be taken as soon as practicable.
- Mr. Sebald had assumed this title, and the personal rank of Ambassador, on October 11.↩
- Not printed.↩
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In telegram 3536 from London, December 19, Julius C. Holmes, Minister at London, reported on his conversation the previous day with Robert Heatlie Scott, Assistant Secretary of State and Head of the South East Asia Department of the Foreign Office. Minister Holmes summarized the latter’s views in part as follows:
“3. Draft treaty such as that envisaged in Commonwealth discussions would necessarily be involved and entail considerable negotiation and ratification could not be expected before 1952. In view present crisis, this may be too late and Japan may be lost to West in meanwhile.
“4. Perhaps more practicable alternative therefore would be briefest sort of liberal, nonrestrictive treaty with Japan accomplishing little more than ending state of war and permitting Japan apply for entry UN and other international bodies. Such a treaty could be negotiated with relatively little delay and would have added advantage of being awkward for USSR to oppose. No objection to US and Japan making separate arrangements on security problems.” (694.001/12–1950)
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