694.001/12–2150
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
| Participants: | Madame Pandit, Indian Ambassador |
| Mr. Vaidyanathan, Attaché, Indian Embassy | |
| Mr. John Foster Dulles | |
| Mr. John M. Allison |
Madame Pandit called to give the initial reactions of the Indian Government to the United States memorandum on a Japanese peace treaty. Madame Pandit talked from a memorandum prepared by her Embassy, a copy of which she left, and it is attached.
The chief points on which there would be difficulties with India are, as might be expected, (1) security provisions, (2) territorial matters (i.e. Formosa), and (3) the desire of the Indian Government to include both the USSR and the Communist regime in China as Parties Principal in drafting a peace treaty with Japan. On most other points in the American memorandum, the Indian Government was in agreement; for example, it agrees that Japan should become a member of the United Nations, that Japan should adhere to multilateral treaties dealing with narcotics and fishing, and that Japanese trade relations could best be regulated by bilateral negotiations between the Japanese and the signatories to the peace treaty. India also agrees that no reparations should be taken from Japan from industrial facilities, but does raise the question of ‘whether Japanese gold and bullion would be made available for reparations and also the possibility of making available Japanese assets in neutral countries and Siam.
With respect to the parties to be included in drafting a Japanese peace treaty, Mr. Dulles stated that it was because of the procedural problem raised by the desire of certain nations to include Communist China in any peace discussions that we had, up to the present, conducted [Page 1380] our negotiations through the diplomatic channel on a bilateral basis. He said that it might be found advisable to continue in this manner and that we might possibly end up with several identical, bilateral treaties which could be signed by any powers who so desired. Mr. Dulles made clear that the United States had no hard and fast ideas on this point and that it would appreciate suggestions, from the Indian Government as to how this rather difficult problem might be met. With respect to voting procedure, which Madame Pandit raised, Mr. Dulles stated that it was hoped that sufficient agreement would be reached through diplomatic negotiation so that it would be possible for a conference, if there was one, to be able to proceed by agreement on a basis of unanimity, without having to worry too much about the traditional type of voting procedures. Mr. Dulles also pointed out that, in view of the changed situation since the United States had first prepared and distributed its memorandum on the Japanese peace treaty, it might be necessary to devise some more rapid method of procedure so that in the shortest possible time Japan could be brought into a state of peaceful relations with the rest of the world.
Madame Pandit made clear that India believes that Formosa and the Pescadores should be returned to China and that this means Communist China. Mr. Dulles said that it might be possible for the treaty merely to require renunciation by Japan of any claims to Formosa and the Pescadores, leaving open the final determination of the status of the islands in question. With regard to Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, which India feels should be returned to the USSR in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, Mr. Dulles pointed out that he had told Mr. Malik, in discussing this point, that it had been the contention of the United States that, should the Soviet Union participate in a treaty with Japan and the other nations, such a treaty would confirm the rights of the Soviet Union in Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, but that, should the Soviet Union not participate, the United States did not feel that it should require Japan to hand over those territories to a nation not adhering to the treaty. While India is agreeable, apparently, to the United States view, as stated in its memorandum, that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be placed under UN trusteeship with the United States as administering power, nevertheless India feels that this question should be discussed at a peace conference and raises the possibility of these Islands’ being returned to Japan. It was agreed that any conference could discuss such matters.
India’s most serious concerns are with the problem of security, and in general it feels that Japan should be demilitarized and its security guaranteed by the UN. Madame Pandit expressed the personal opinion that such guarantees might not be worth a great deal under present circumstances, but that they might well have a good psychological effect. The Indians believe that any re-armament of Japan will provoke [Page 1381] the USSR and Communist China and would probably be opposed by Australia and the Philippines. India also feels that if bases are to be maintained in Japan for the defense of the islands, they will in practice constitute a military occupation and thus limit the free exercise of Japanese sovereignty; and it points out that the Japanese themselves do not seem to be keen on re-armament. Mr. Dulles agreed that the problem of security was one of the most difficult ones to solve and that, if possible, any re-armament by Japan should be for defensive purposes and should, if possible, be linked in some manner with a UN or regional security arrangement which would be for the benefit of general peace and order in the area. Mr. Dulles also suggested that it might be possible to link any creation of Japanese defense forces to the recent UN Resolution on Uniting for Peace1 which provides that members of the UN shall maintain certain forces for use in the common good. However, at present this Resolution applies only to members of the UN, and thought might be given to amending it at some time in the future to extend to non-members so that it might apply to Japan, should Japan not be admitted at an early date to the UN. Madame Pandit gave the impression of not personally being enthusiastic about her Government’s views on security, and she seemed to recognize the merit in Mr. Dulles’ arguments for a realistic approach to the matter which would make possible Japan’s contribution to her own defense and yet prevent the excesses which might arise should there be a mere reconstitution of military strength in Japan not linked with some international arrangement.
As stated above, in other matters India generally agrees with the United States position, though apparently it would favor placing restrictions or prohibitions on Japanese industries directly engaged in the manufacture of armaments and war materials. It was agreed that further clarification was perhaps desired with regard to the disposition of Japanese external assets, as well as the disposal of Japanese gold and bullion; and Madame Pandit was informed that the United States Government would be willing to discuss these matters, although its preliminary view with respect particularly to Japanese gold and bullion was that it should be retained by the Japanese.
Madame Pandit made clear that these were India’s preliminary views which were being tentatively presented for United States consideration.
Mr. Dulles informed Madame Pandit that in view of the Korean situation it was believed useful to make some attempt to get again the viewpoint of the Japanese and that, for that purpose, he and Mr. Allison and perhaps some others might shortly make a trip to Japan. On the basis of the re-assessment of Japanese views after such a trip, [Page 1382] it would be possible for us to talk further with our friends about the course we should follow.