694.001/12–250
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
I have been thinking over our conversation yesterday with particular reference to that portion in which you suggested we should make an immediate study of Far Eastern Commission decisions and the surrender instrument with Japan with a view to ascertaining how far we can go without a Treaty toward giving Japan freedom of action in local and international affairs, I believe the time has come and the situation is so serious that more drastic measures are necessary. In my opinion, attempts by the United States to give Japan a larger degree of freedom than she now possesses within the limits of existing FEC policy decisions would not only be extremely difficult, but would expose us to a charge of insincerity by our allies and would not, in fact, get the results desired. Exhaustive studies have been made as to what cart be done within the framework of present FEC directives and they [Page 1355] have shown it is comparatively little.1 Also, General MacArthur has vigorously opposed this conception. I do not believe the Japanese would be satisfied with what we could do in this limited way. Therefore, serious consideration should now be given to going to our friends on the FEC and pointing out frankly and forcefully that the present situation is so serious and present conditions so utterly different from those contemplated at the time the Far Eastern Commission was set up, that we are no longer in a position to abide by the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission or its previous decisions. This would be an honest straightforward position to take, and I believe would be understood by our friends. We would naturally want to assure them that we have no intention of allowing Japan to become a threat in any way to this interest, and that we would take steps to see that such a situation did not develop.
I believe we would then be in a position to recommend to them that they acquiesce in our desire to bring Japan back into our family of nations as a free and independent member, with which we could make agreements for military assistance on a basis of equality in an attempt to get Japan on our side voluntarily and not by force. In my opinion, we should endeavor to get the Japanese to agree, with respect to their own defense and the defense of the Japan area, to furnish ground forces (the U.S. furnishing ground forces only until Japanese forces could take over) while the United States and such other of our allies as agreed with us and would come in on our terms, would furnish air and naval forces. The fact that Japan would not have air or naval forces would go far, it seems to me, toward reassuring our allies that Japan would not be in a position to threaten their interests, and that the arrangement would be one primarily for defense of Japan and the Japanese area. This agreement should be couched in U.N. Charter [Page 1356] terms in so far as possible and consideration might well be given to having Japan become a co-signatory of any possible mutual defense arrangements which might be entered into with New Zealand, Australia and the Philippines.
With the exception of the preceding sentence, which he has not seen, Colonel Babcock concurs with the above.
- In a memorandum to Mr. Johnson of December 4, 1950, Conrad E. Snow, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, reviewed relevant international agreements and FEC directives and concluded in part: “If a massive military invasion is to be anticipated, self defense would require the creation of a Japanese army, properly trained and equipped. There is no way, within the framework of the Far Eastern Commission directives, that this can be done.” Such a step would require SCAP to act against United States directives issued in accord with FEC decisions or the United States to issue new directives in excess of authority granted by the Moscow Agreement. “In such an event it might be advisable for the United States to denounce parts of the Potsdam Declaration and the Moscow Agreement. Such a denunciation could be based on a declaration that both of these instruments … were based on an assumption that a new order of peace, security and justice had come into the world, and that there existed no possibility of either of the co-signers, China or the Soviet Union, threatening Japan with aggression.” Mr. Snow advanced as a final reason for denunciation his opinion that Japan would not be free to amend Article 9 (renunciation of war and armed forces) of the Constitution of 1947 until released from its undertaking (in the Instrument of Surrender) to carry out in good faith the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and to take whatever action required by appropriate Allied authorities for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration. (794.001/12–450)↩