Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/11–650

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of that Office (Allison)

confidential

[Washington,] November 6, 1950.

Subject: Attached British Note

In regard to the attached British note,¹ a copy of which was left with me shortly after the original had been handed you, it is assumed that you and Mr. Dulles either will reply to the British directly or, if you wish the Department to reply, that you will give us your views.

It appears to us here in NA, and to Mr. Hamilton, that we should not agree to make the Working Party Report, prepared six months ago and reflecting all degrees of agreement and disagreement among the considerable number of nations which participated, the vehicle for the further expression of our treaty views. It is believed that the British should be advised, in effect, that their proposal would seem to constitute a retrograde step in view of the recent submission of our views to them for comment; that we assume that the views of the Commonwealth nations have changed in some respect since last May; and that we are prepared to clarify any portions of the summary statement of U.S. views handed them in September on which they wish further details, as we have already done for the Australian Government.²

1. In this aide-mémoire, apparently of November 2, not printed, the British Embassy had stated the United Kingdom found it difficult to contribute to the informal talks then in progress until American views were more sharply defined than in the 7-point memorandum of September 11 handed to Sir Esler Dening on September 22. The Embassy asked for comments of the United States on the Working Party Report, particularly in regard to major points on which views in it diverged from views of the United States and in regard to the importance attached by the United States to the divergencies.
2. In its reply of December 20 to the document cited in footnote 1, the Department stated that the Working Party Report, because it reflected degrees of disagreement as well as agreement among the drafting nations, was a difficult vehicle for further United States comment. In general, the divergence between the United States view and that of the agreed portion of the report lay in the omission from the 7-point statement of matters which Commonwealth nations apparently wanted included in a treaty. “As was made clear at the time Mr. Dulles handed the United States paper to Sir Esler Dening in New York, those matters which are not included in the United States paper are matters which in the opinion of the United States Government should not be included in a peace treaty with Japan.” The Department offered to clarify in detail those subjects covered in the 7-point summary. (694.001/11–250)