Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/10–2350

Memorandum of Conversation, by Colonel Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defense

secret

[New York,?] October 23, 1950.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants:	Dr. Wellington Koo, Ambassador of China
	Dr. Tang, Chinese Embassy1
	Mr. Dulles
	Mr. Allison
	Colonel Babcock

1. Dr. Koo said that he, and he felt sure his government, would support the U.S. position with regard to no military restrictions on Japan. He said that China was naturally worried about a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism but that she recognized the impossibility of enforcing indefinitely any military treaty clauses. He felt that the presence of U.S. troops in Japan for a period was the best guarantee against Japanese militarism and was the most that anyone could hope for under conditions now existing.

2. Dr. Koo indicated that China would “like” something in the way of reparations. He said that China’s economists were working on a plan which would combine reparations with a Trade Agreement over a long-term period “in a way which would be mutually helpful to Japan and China.” When pressed to explain how this could be accomplished, Dr. Koo indicated that he was not thoroughly familiar with the details but that his government was hopeful of submitting a plan which the United States would find acceptable.²

3. Dr. Koo’s principal objection to the proposed treaty was the provision that the status of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations. Mr. Dulles replied that he understood the Chinese viewpoint but that he wanted to be absolutely sure that China understood the United States stand. He pointed out that it was only because we took the view that Formosa represents a problem which should be settled by international agreement that we were able to protect Formosa with the Seventh Fleet. Were we to accept the Chinese point of view our use of the Seventh Fleet would constitute an interference in China’s internal problems. Dr. Koo said that his government could not change its attitude but indicated that there would no serious attempt on China’s part to embarrass the United States in “a continuation of its helpful attitude.”³

1. Possibly Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan, Minister Plenipotentiary.
2. In a memorandum of a conversation held October 19 by Mr. Dulles, Mr. Allison, and himself with J. Barrington, Ambassador of Burma to the United States, Colonel Babcock stated in part that Ambassador Barrington had indicated his government would probably be disturbed over the lack of military restrictions and very much concerned over the waiving of reparations. “Mr. Dulles stressed in reply that the United States attitude was not motivated by any desire to ‘forgive and forget’ but was based on the realization that Japan could not pay reparations except to the extent that she received economic aid from the United States.” (694.001/10–1950)
3. For documentation on United States policy regarding the status of Formosa, see pp. 256 ff.