Lot 56D527
The Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald)
Dear Bill: A telegram1 has just gone out to you quoting the text of an announcement to be made by the President in a couple of hours regarding a Japanese peace treaty.2 I am sorry that we could not inform you of the announcement earlier but word that the President had approved and planned to make the statement today was only just received.
As pointed out in the telegram, the announcement is being made pursuant to a joint memorandum from the Secretaries of State and Defense, copy enclosed, approved by the President on September 8. This memorandum is the product of a series of exchanges during the last few weeks with Defense which finally brought the two Departments together on a security formula patterned on a memorandum furnished Mr. Dulles and Secretary Johnson by General MacArthur last June. With the security provisions agreed, the Defense Department withdrew its objection to our initiating treaty discussions with the friendly Allies, but insisted that a treaty not become effective until the Korean war had been brought to a favorable conclusion. Since it will probably be over a year before a treaty can be negotiated and ratified the Department was willing to accept this condition. The Secretary will discuss the matter briefly with Messrs. Bevin and Schuman3 during the current Foreign Ministers Conference, and Mr. Dulles and John Allison will hold a series of meetings in New York during the coming weeks with representatives of all the FEC nations except the U.S.S.R. to exchange views on the procedures and the substance of a treaty.
[Page 1304]Also enclosed is a copy of the Department’s latest treaty draft.4 It was Mr. Dulles’ view on studying the August 3 draft,5 a copy of which was left with you by Mr. Harriman, that the draft contained a considerable amount of technical material which was not essential and tended to reduce its value as a political instrument. He accordingly personally prepared another draft, taken for the most part from the August 3 draft but reduced to eight double space pages without any annexes. This draft has subsequently become somewhat longer through the reintroduction in condensed form of material which the legal and economic offices and NA have felt essential for a reasonably precise and comprehensive treaty, but the process has not been permitted to go so far as to compromise the document’s desired very brief and general character. The fact that the discussions with other nations will probably result in the addition of further material has been considered an additional reason for starting out with the shortest draft possible.
The main substantive change from the earlier draft has been the deletion of the requirement that Japan preserve the essentials of the reform programs. The principal reason for this change has been Mr. Dulles’ reluctance to include any obligations in the treaty which are not clear and readily enforceable or which, outside of the security field, would constitute an infringement of sovereignty. It is possible that the best means of ensuring Japan’s continuation on a democratic course will be one of the matters discussed with Japanese political leaders during the trip to Japan, envisaged in paragraph 5 of the joint memorandum, of a United States political representative.
You will notice that the joint memorandum has been drafted in brutally frank terms, a concession to the military’s desire to avoid any possibility of future misunderstanding within the U.S. Government as to the terms of the agreement reached. Public disclosure of a document so phrased could be disastrous for the whole treaty project. It is therefore requested that the memorandum be kept under closest security and no copies whatever be made thereof. It is understood that a copy has been provided General MacArthur by the Defense Department.
Sincerely yours,