790.5/10–950
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Matthews)
Subject: Trilateral Agreement and Consultations with Australia and New Zealand.
We have been giving continuing consideration to the question of regional arrangements in the Far Eastern area, particularly to proposals for the formation of an association of Asian states and for the negotiation of a Pacific Pact. In accordance with the policy toward regional associations established in NSC 48/2, we have not taken the initiative to prod Asiatic states into organizing themselves or negotiating a treaty. Until there arises a clearer manifestation than exists now of desire on the part of Asian or Pacific states and of the practicality of forming a regional arrangement, it seems wise that the United States Government continue to remain open-minded on the subject and to refrain from pressing other governments to action.
Nevertheless it has become increasingly evident, most recently in conversations held with the Foreign Minister of Australia, that some diplomatic exchange between Australia and the United States which would include a more formal statement of mutual security commitments than now exists and would provide for military and political consultations, would be welcomed by the Australian Government. Mr. Spender has proposed a Pacific pact, to include Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the U.S. and the U.K. It seems to us that should we proceed to negotiate a pact of this nature, the choice of members would at the outset introduce problems Which might vitiate our position in the Far East, considerably weaken the effect of the pact, and highlight rather than resolve the differences now existing between our own policies and those of certain of the Asian nations whose friendship and cooperation we desire to secure.
There appears to be merit, however, in tightening our relationships with Australia and New Zealand. The cooperation and support of these countries will be of increasing importance to us during the coming year as we face the peculiarly difficult problems of the post-hostilities security and reconstruction of Korea and the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty. Therefore, if by trilateral agreement, the desires of Australia for some closer relationship can be met, it would appear to be likewise in our interest to proceed toward this objective. An agreement might set forth the general defense position of the United States in the Pacific area in case of war, such mutual military commitments as the JCS might propose or accept, and might provide for continuing tripartite conversations of a military and political character. [Page 148] These conversations might take the form of those recently held in the Department with the British and French.1
It is recognized that the JCS may not wish to enter into military commitments more specific than those implied in the general position of a defense line through Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines. It is unlikely that the Australians would press for more than this. They appear to be interested not so much in written assurances of military protection as in an opportunity to participate more closely in military and political planning. Their desires would therefore probably be met by an agreement as outlined above. Out of consultations might arise a discussion of a Pacific Pact and, depending upon developments in the Pacific area, some association of an acceptable type might eventuate. At the commencement of the consultations, this Government could indicate its willingness to discuss the problems of regional association and its desire to hear proposals which either the Australian or New Zealand governments might offer.
It is assumed that the United Kingdom would be informed and its sympathetic approval sought for any proposal for an Australian-New Zealand-U.S. agreement. In view of Commonwealth arrangements and the fact that no regional association is envisaged at this stage, it seems likely that the British would not object to the proposal as outlined.
It is suggested that, if the Secretary approves this project, Ambassador Jessup be authorized to discuss it informally with General Bradley, after which it be communicated formally to the Secretary of Defense for consideration.