Office of the Historian

694.001/8–1150

Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State

secret
[Washington,] August 11, 1950.

In pursuance of our talk last evening, I enclose a memorandum outlining possible next steps with relation to a Japan Treaty.

[Enclosure]

Japan Treaty Procedure

August 11, 1950.

The next steps in relation to the making of a Japanese Peace Treaty might be as follows:

1.
Agreement by September 1st by the Executive Branch of the United States Government as to what it wants in the Treaty.
2.
Informal discussions to be initiated by the Secretary of State at New York about September 12th with the representative of the British Commonwealth group. (They have already twice met among themselves to discuss the Treaty.) Particular attention should be paid to India.
3.
After the reaction of this group has been received and any adjustments made as a result, then the draft would be informally discussed with the representatives of other FEC powers at the United Nations General Assembly.
4.
Concurrently with the foregoing proceedings, a U.S. political representative would go to Japan with the draft and confidentially discuss it with the Japanese Government and also seek a procedure for Japanese participation in the Treaty-making process which will assure genuine acceptance by the representatives of all important non-communist political groups in Japan.
5.
Concurrently with the two foregoing steps the draft would be discussed informally with members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.
6.
At this point, presumably November, decision would be made as to future procedure. It might be decided to hold a preliminary and/or final “Peace Conference” or it might be decided to proceed by diplomatic channels. The latter course has advantages in that it would avoid the problem of Chinese participation in a Peace Conference. Also, it might facilitate slight and acceptable variations as between the different countries. For example, the India-Japan Treaty might omit security provisions which were primarily of concern to the United States and Japan.