Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Lot 56D527

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)¹

secret

[Washington,] August 2, 1950.

Yoshida’s Reported Views on Military Bases in Japan

On July 29 the Prime Minister is reported to have told the Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee: “I am against leasing military bases to any foreign country”, and he proceeded to deny reports that the Government had been requested to lease bases, asserting the “Allied powers do not intend to present such a demand, as it is the desire of the Allied powers to keep Japan out of war.” On August 1 Mr. Sebald reported that he was informed by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ohta) that the above statement was considered one of the most important made to date of the Prime Minister. In reply to Mr. Sebald’s inquiry how Japan expects to have security, Mr. Ohta replied that Japan would rely upon UN protection as in the case of the Republic of Korea. Under further questioning, Mr. Ohta said that the Prime Minister was opposed to any foreign troops remaining in Japan upon the conclusion of a peace treaty.

It is difficult to determine what Yoshida had in mind in making the foregoing statement. He has previously implied in many public statements, and privately through his emissary, Mr. Shirasu,² that he did not believe neutrality answered Japan’s security problem which required protective US bases in Japan in the post-treaty period. While it is possible that the Prime Minister issued the above-quoted statement for political reasons, hedging against a future date when US bases might prove unpopular in Japan, it nevertheless seems curious that Yoshida should not have taken this position earlier, during the recent election campaign for the Upper House, when political considerations were supervening. To make his statement now is all the more mystifying in view of the Korean war which has pointed out the true character of Communist aggression and the need for firstclass armament and bases to stave off aggression. That the withdrawal of US bases from Korea was followed by the Red invasion of that country provided a clear-cut object lesson to Japan. As reported in a PolAd despatch dated July 11, 1950,³ Mr. Ohta informed Mr. Sebald that the hostilities in Korea resulted in the question of security no longer presenting a problem to Japan, inasmuch as Japan would now gladly accept any reasonable proposition which the United States might put forward regarding Japanese security.

A possible explanation of why Yoshida made the above-quoted statement at this time is provided by Mr. Sebald in his August 1 cable.⁴ He speculates that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office “appear to be laying the groundwork for future bargaining.”

The war in Korea has pointed up the need for US bases in Japan, Just as US bases in Japan made it possible for the US to go to the defense of South Korea, so it is now clear that US bases in Japan will prove a critical factor in protecting the whole US position in the Far East. Japanese leaders must be fully aware of this fact, and it would be logical for the Japanese (who have never hesitated to play power politics on a grand scale) to intimate that the price for these all important bases in Japan is greater than the US had perhaps reckoned. Certainly the Japanese are in a position to refuse a treaty imposing any disabilities on Japan. They are also in a position to seek—and to obtain—treaty terms recognizing Japan’s right to self-defense. Because acceptance of US bases is the price Japan knows she must pay for an early treaty, Mr. Yoshida is probably prepared to accept them at least for a defined short period of time, provided the other treaty terms and supplementary concessions (such as economic aid) are adequate.⁵

1. Mr. Allison handed this memorandum to Mr. Rusk on August 3.
2. Mr. Jiro Shirasu was in the United States for two weeks ending on or about May 9, 1950. In a memorandum of a conversation held with Mr. Shirasu that day, Mr. Green had stated in part that Mr. Shirasu had said permanent neutrality for Japan was illusory. (694.001/5–950)
3. Not printed.
4. Telegram 294 from Tokyo, not printed. (794.00/8–150)
5. In a memorandum of August 3 to Mr. Rusk, Mr. Allison said in part that Mr. Yoshida’s reported statement indicated at least superficially an about-face from the Japanese position as revealed in the Ikeda–Dodge conversation of May 10 (p. 1194). Mr. Allison stated that both he and Mr. Kennan urged further clarification of the matter. (794.00/8–350)