Lot 54D423
Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Kennan) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)
Referring to the memorandum of July 10 from Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Allison1 concerning the Japanese Peace Treaty, I should like to say the following.
1. While the procedural steps outlined on Tab A of the reference memorandum may be irreducible, it seems to me that the situation calls for even more rapid action. The schedule allows for a month for us to agree within the U.S. Government on a draft of treaty terms. While admitting that this is optimistic in the light of past experiences, I think the situation calls for more rapid action here, and we can take such action if we really want to. Perhaps the President’s authority should be invoked to get immediate decision on the points involved rather than further wrangling among working parties.
It does not seem to me that we should require long and involved consultations with the other FEC countries before going into the general negotiations. I should think that a simple notification to the friendly countries of the proposals we intended to make, with an invitation for their comments, would be sufficient in all cases except perhaps the British and the French. As far as those governments are [Page 1249] concerned, I would suggest that if we can prepare our position at an: early date, we try to clear it with them through the ordinary diplomatic channels at once, and not wait for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in September.
I do not see why we need to call the initial conference a “Preliminary Peace Conference”. Let us avoid designations and simply ask the other FEC members, together with the Japanese, to join us for a discussion, of this subject.
I have never been able to understand why we must have some special voting procedure for this conference. We are all sovereign governments, and nobody can make us do anything about this matter which we do not wish to do. When we get our partners to the table, can we simply not place on the table the terms which we are proposing and ascertain to what extent they are acceptable to the others? After going as far as we can to meet the views of the others, we can then ascertain how many governments will probably be willing to join us in concluding such a treaty and how many will not. If the delegates lack instructions, they can seek them as the conference goes along. We can then suggest that those who find the terms acceptable associate themselves with us in the final signature of such a treaty with the Japanese. Those who do not can be left to do what they please. It seems clear to me that the treaty with us, provided it is the first treaty signed, will be the only one which the Japanese will sign on the basis of unconditional surrender.
2. As for the content of the treaty, it fills me with dismay to think that it has got to be one of these long, legalistic documents, containing paragraph after paragraph concerning matters which are of extremely minor importance—if any. The European satellite treaties and the Austrian draft,2 as worked out to date, stand as examples of the sort of treaty which one should not conclude with the defeated enemy. In the case of Japan, I would really recommend that the treaty be extremely brief, succinct, and in the nature of a simple termination of the state of war and expressing confidence in the Japanese people to cope with the responsibilities of sovereign independence in the future. A great many of the matters treated in the peace treaty concepts which have become traditional since Versailles are ones which, in the case of the Japanese treaty, might better be placed in an annex not intended for attention by the wider public. The text of the treaty should be regarded as an instrument in political warfare, and not as a legal document.
3. Mr. Hamilton’s memorandum correctly observes that I am against binding the Japanese to anything in the field of domestic policy. I [Page 1250] think our reform program in Japan, taken in its entirety, has been of dubious wisdom and see no reason for trying to perpetuate the memory of something which has been at least partially a mistake. Furthermore, we have no means of enforcing such injunctions on the Japanese; and in my opinion it is high time we stopped saying things we are not able to back up or asking others to make promises to us in instances where we are not able to compel their obedience.
4. In general, I have a feeling that we have permitted ourselves to become confused in our thinking by traditional concepts about peace treaty problems. Normally a peace treaty was a contract between victor and vanquished, defining the terms on which a state of war would be terminated. In the present instance, however, we have had five years of actual U.S. administration of the country in question. This has given us ample opportunity to establish by fiat all the initial conditions of the peace. All that remains is to terminate the state of war, define the future military arrangements governing the protection of Japanese territory, and give the Japanese the best possible psychological boost for their entry upon the new era. Anything more than that, and particularly anything reflecting a continuation of the school-masterish and smug attitude which has detracted so much from the excellent achievements of our occupation, can only be unhelpful.
- Ante, p. 1237.↩
- For the text of certain articles of a draft Austrian peace treaty as of September 1, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1131.↩