Office of the Historian

694.001/7–1950

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

confidential
[Washington,] July 19, 1950.

Subject: Limitations Imposed by FEC Decisions on Japanese Rearmament and Remilitarization1

There are three FEC decisions bearing on the above subject: (1) FEC–014/9 of June 20, 1947 entitled “Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”;2 (2) FEC–084/21 of August 18, 1947, entitled “Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential”,3 and (3) FEC–017/20 of February 17, 1948 entitled “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of the Japanese Military Equipment”.4

Copies of these three papers are attached5 with the most pertinent sections marked.

You will note that the limitations imposed by FEC decisions on Japanese rearmament are sweeping. The Japanese cannot have a gendarmerie or para-military organizations and cannot have any weapons except the use of small arms by the police. The Japanese cannot develop, manufacture, import or export arms, ammunition and [Page 1245] implements of war. The construction or conversion of any vessels for military purposes is prohibited.

There are two important loopholes, however. The FEC decision reducing Japan’s industrial war potential allows (paragraph 10) the Supreme Commander “to except temporarily from the provisions of this paper particular primary war facilities, secondary war facilities and facilities in war-supporting industries, insofar as such facilities are required to meet the needs of the Occupation”. (In such cases an explanation to the ACJ is called for.) The other loophole is the FEC Terms of Reference6 which states (paragraph II, B): “The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.”

The question now arises whether standing FEC policy decisions would obstruct any plans which the U.S. might have for turning over to the Japanese increased responsibility for maintaining internal security and defense. These plans might range anywhere from an improved police force to the defensive rearmament of Japan.

FEC decisions impose ho restriction on the full implementation of present agreed U.S. policy for strengthening the Japanese police and coast guard, namely for (1) improving their numbers, equipment and training standards; (2) creating an adequate mobile police reserve; (3) establishing an investigative and surveillance agency similar to the FBI; and (4) reorganizing the police on a more efficient centralized basis.

FEC policies would, furthermore, appear to provide leeway for the procurement of civilian type items from Japanese sources for the defense of South Korea. Admittedly paragraph 3 of FEC–017/20 prevents the “exportation of materials intended for military use”, but, operating on the theory that the Japanese are under immediate threat—which is indeed the case—a liberal interpretation of the two “loopholes” cited above would give General MacArthur the authority to use the output of at least certain Japanese industries for emergency defensive measures. The broadest interpretation of these “loopholes” might confer upon General MacArthur not only the authority to allow Japanese industry to supply civilian-type items for military end-use but to permit the mobilization of Japanese armament7 industries for the same objective. However, it would seem highly advisable that prior understandings and agreements be reached with most FEC member governments before using Japanese industry as a source of [Page 1246] non-armament items for Far Eastern areas other than Korea (shipment of such items to Korea is already taking place and there is obviously no need to justify CINCFE’s action to FEC countries) or before using Japanese industry as a source of armament items for Korea.

The arming or mobilization of Japanese people (other than the police) is specifically prohibited by virtue of Japan’s constitution and of the FEC decisions noted above. Any move on our part, therefore, to turn over to the Japanese people such responsibilities for internal security or defense as the possession and use of arms larger than rifles and pistols, the training of non-police units for defense purposes, the equipping of Japanese coast guard vessels with torpedo tubes or even depth charges would, in my opinion, impose upon the U.S. or SCAP an obligation to amend FEC policies accordingly or to confer, through a new FEC policy decision, special emergency powers on General MacArthur to waive during the period of emergency certain provisions contained in standing FEC policies.

Provided the Soviets did not return to the FEC8 to fling their veto against such revisions or supplements to FEC decisions, it is believed that the FEC countries could be induced to accept certain limited, temporary, closely-supervised measures for increasing the capacity of the Japanese people to assist General MacArthur’s Command in the matter of internal security and defense, particularly at a time when that Command has been deprived of a major segment of its combat strength for supporting UN operations in South Korea. It is emphasized, however, that such agreed measures might be so limited as to be unsatisfactory from the point of view of our security requirements.

  1. In a memorandum of July 6 to the Secretary, H. Freeman Matthews, who had the previous day become Deputy Under Secretary of State, stated in part that Secretary of the Army Frank Pace was “being briefed” to raise in the National Security Council the possibility of limited military armament for Japan. (794.5/7–650) although documentation on when or whether the matter was taken up by the NSC during 1950 has not been found in State Department files, documents in files 794.5 and 894.501 from July 1950 indicate that officials within the Department gave the question intensive consideration.↩
  2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 3, 1947, p. 216.↩
  3. Text printed in Department of State, The Far Eastern Commission: Second Report by the Secretary General, July 10, 1947–December 23, 1948 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 25–30.↩
  4. Text is printed ibid., pp. 19–22.↩
  5. None printed.↩
  6. For text, see Department of State, The Far Eastern Commission: Report by the Secretary General, February 26, 1946–July 10, 1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 36–39.↩
  7. In the source text the word “armament” is inked in above the crossed-out term “war supporting.”↩

  8. The Soviet Union boycotted the FEC from January 18, 1950, on the ground that body had failed to expel the Representative of the Republic of China and to seat a representative of the Chinese People’s Republic. Documents in file 690.00 FEC for 1950 indicate that it was United States policy to regard the question of Chinese representation in the FEC as dependent on the outcome of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

    The Soviet Representative returned to the FEC beginning with the session held October 19, 1950.

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