694.001/6–2750: Telegram

The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

secret

636. Visits of Secretary Johnson, General Bradley and Dulles1 have aroused in Japan a truly astounding amount of enthusiasm and speculation regarding possible peace treaty in the near future. This speculation may of course be ill-founded, but it is nevertheless real [Page 1229] and with natural desire of Japanese for early peace under some acceptable terms, is easily understandable. The events in Korea have demonstrated to Japanese the dangerous import of Communist line of over-all [garbled],2 no bases and connotation of immediate withdrawal of American troops. As matter of timing, therefore, it appears to me that a serious psychological let-down would result from further inordinate delays in arriving at some definite course of action designed to restore sovereignty to Japan either by treaty or other means. While it is generally appreciated that subsequent decisions and steps must necessarily await return of Dulles,3 I believe it essential that serious cognizance be taken of protreaty atmosphere presently prevailing here and that no time should be lost in the formulation of firm and dynamic US position on the question of the future of Japan.4

Sebald
  1. The Defense Department party was in Japan from June 17 to June 23 and hence its stay overlapped that of the Dulles group, which was in Tokyo during a plane stopover on the 17th and was again in Japan from the 21st to the 27th. In his memoir Mr. Sebald stated: “If they ever met as missions during their visits to Japan, I was unaware of it.” (William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965) p. 252.) However, in a letter of August 1 to Secretary Johnson, not printed, Mr. Acheson indicated his belief that Mr. Dulles had discussed treaty matters with Mr. Johnson in Tokyo as well as in Washington. (694.001/7–2750)
  2. Sent as “Peace”; not corrected on the Department’s action copy.
  3. That is, his return to Japan.
  4. In the course of an undated letter to Mr. Dulles apparently written soon after his receipt of Mr. Dulles’ note to him (not printed) of July 4, Mr. Sebald stated:

    “With an active ‘war’ under way in Korea, with its pressure of first things first, it is asking a lot to request our harassed policy makers quietly to sit down and think out an immediate course of action leading to peace with Japan. I feel strongly, however, that this should be done, not only for our own benefit, but also for the advantage of Asia as a whole. It appears to me that we are placing the cart before the horse when we speak of stabilizing Southeast Asia, where our influence is still relatively thin, and yet are unable to find a solution of the Japanese problem over which we hold the final decision. Once the matter of Japan is handled in definitive fashion, I believe our position vis-à-vis Asia as a whole would be tremendously strengthened. And finally, unless something is done soon to get the United States ‘off the hook’ in Japan, I have an uneasy feeling that the situation here will eventually get out of hand and result in a severe political defeat for us in Asia. But as you so rightfully say, all this is a generality, true enough, but how to do it is the kernel of the difficulty.” (Lot 54 D423)