Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty

Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)¹

secret

June 15, 1950.

1. While there probably cannot, and should not, be an abrupt transition from full SCAP control to full Japanese control, there should be some drama incident to an inevitably changing regime. A mere dwindling away of SCAP authority would belittle it and it might impair the great moral authority of General MacArthur, an authority which should be preserved as a continuing asset which, in a different setting, would still be of decisive value in the future.

2. Probably an International Conference and Treaty would be the best psychological approach, even though the Treaty itself, or supplementary agreement, reserved certain powers or provided for a phased relinquishment of SCAP authority, and even though the USSR and Communist China were not parties.

3. Much depends on whether the JCS want to use Japan generally as a major advanced offensive air base. That decision, if adopted as U.S. policy, would have many consequences in terms of relations with, and responsibilities for, the Japanese. An alternative is some form of defensive guarantee, stiffened by a continuing presence of some skeleton U.S. force.

4. Also relevant is U.S. policy in relation to South Korea and Formosa and the impression given Japanese and Russians as to our will to stand fast in these environs of Japan. In this connection see draft of JFD Korea speech.²

5. It is not believed that Russia’s attitude will be determined primarily by the legalisms of formal agreements or lack of them, as much as by the answers to 3 and 4. Russia has never been restrained, by agreements, from indirect aggression but probably would not engage in direct attempt to occupy Japan with military force unless and until general war should be determined on by the Politburo.

J[ohn] F[oster] D[ulles]

1. An unsigned handwritten marginal note reads: “This is a statement of basic principles by John Foster Dulles.” This memorandum was presumably written en route to the Far East.
2. Perhaps a reference to a draft of Mr. Dulles’ statement of June 19 made before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea in Seoul. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 12.